On 29 Jul 2016, at 21:30, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Jul 29, 2016 at 10:25 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
>> No idea what " two 3-1 "I" " is and very much doubt it is worth
knowing.
> See preceding posts.
I tried that. It didn't help.
You might need to be more specific and quote the passage you don't
understand.
>> If computationalism is correct then everything about "you" can be
duplicated as long at the atoms have the correct position and
velocity, not almost everything, not everything except for the 1-
view, EVERYTHING!
> Let us imagine you are correct. If everything is duplicated, the
whole computational histories are duplicated.
Yes
> Above you agree that the W-experience and the M-experience are
different,
Certainly. Only a fool would disagree.
OK, but from this a twelve-years schoolboy or schoolgirl get already
the point.
> but if the device duplicates every thing,
It does if computationalism is correct, and I think it is.
> we should then have two experiences in W and two experiences in
M, but then again. That is not the case, so we get a contradiction,
and you were wrong.
Oh for heaven's sake! Obviously they’re identical when the
duplication is made, but after that they can and will differ if they
see different things, like different cities. And what's with this
two experiences in W stuff? If I stepped into the duplicating
machine in Helsinki and then do it again in Washington then there
would be 2 bodies in Washington that looked just like me, but there
would still only be one person until one of the bodies saw an aspect
of Washington and formed a memory the other didn't have.
> Nothing can duplicate a first person view from its first person
point of view, with or without computationalism.
If computationalism is true and if Charles Darwin was right then the
correct arrangement of atoms can indeed duplicate a first person
view from its first person point of view. Otherwise no.
> It just does not make any sense.
No it would make perfect sense, it's just that if a first person
view from its first person point of view were duplicated then things
would be odd, not logically inconsistent not physically impossible,
just odd. And the reason your "proof" is worthless is that very near
that beginning the assumption is made that things can't be odd. But
things can be odd.
Let me try something different; but I will go with numbered questions.
I will proceed when I get the answer.
Question 1 (30-07-2016)
We are in the step 3 protocol (read and annihilated in Helsinki,
copied in Washington and Moscow soon after).
Now, we add that in both Washington and Moscow, you will receive a cup
of coffee.
Do you agree that in Helsinki, the H-guy who believes he survive
teleportation/duplication, can expect to certainly drink a cup of
coffee soon (assuming computationalism, the correctness of the
substitution level, the default hypotheses, ...). That is, would you
agree that in Helsinki P(H-guy will-feel-drinking-coffee) = 1.
I think you have already answered this by the affirmative some times
ago, but I want to be sure.
Of course, anyone can play the game.
Bruno
John K Clark
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