On 03 Aug 2016, at 00:49, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 3/08/2016 4:28 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/2/2016 5:40 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
The point that I am trying to make here is that a person's
consciousness at any moment can consist of many independent
threads. From this I speculate that some of these separate threads
could actually be associated with separate physical bodies. In
other words, it is conceivable that a duplication experiment would
not result in two separate consciousnesses, but a single
consciousness in separate bodies. If this is so, the fact that the
separate bodies receive different inputs does not necessarily mean
that they differentiate into separate conscious beings, any more
than the fact that I receive different inputs from moment to
moment means that I dissociate into multiple consciousnesses.
Or that the fact that you get two different perspectives on the
same object by seeing it and by feeling it doesn't cause you to
split into two consciousnesses. But it seems that it can if your
corpus callosum is cut. Then your left hand (controlled by the
right brain hemisphere) and left field of vision may disagree on
the nature of the same object. And only the left brain hemisphere
will be able to report on the object. Which indicates to me that
not only is thought a physical phenomenon, but the "conscious self"
is only unified superficially by the creation of a verbal narrative.
Of course I agree with this. Previous philosophical work on personal
identity with split brains was essentially based on the experiences
of people with split brains, or of severed corpus callosum. This is
basically why one associates a consciousness with a physical brain
-- splitting the brain (even though the halves are not identical)
leads to two distinct persons (at least, as far as we can tell).
The point I am making to Bruno, however, is that these physical
examples are not in evidence by step 3 of his argument. He cannot
rely on conclusions of the total argument to justify intermediate
steps in the argument -- that is manifestly circular: Bruno cannot
use physical results to justify any of the steps in his argument for
FPI or anything else.
Tell me if you are OK with question 1 and 2. Then later you will see
that your remark here is not relevant.
Bruno
Bruce
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