For some reason Bruno takes great stock in a written diary in his thought experiment, but that evidence is worthless unless the identity of the writer can be unambiguously established after all the duplications and all the visits of various people to various cities is over. But Bruno says that as good as the duplicating machine is "Nothing can duplicate a first person view from its first person point of view, with or without computationalism. It just does not make any sense. It duplicates only the 1-view in the 3-1 view picture." If Bruno is correct then even after the duplication no more than one person wrote " What one and only one city will I, that is to say my first person view from my first person point of view, see after I am duplicated?" John Clark just wants to know if that one person is in Moscow or Washington. The question has a one word answer, so which word is it, Moscow or Washington?
On the other hand, if John Clark is right and computationalism is true then the duplicating machine can duplicate everything about you, not everything except for some sort of essence of self, not everything except for your consciousness, not everything except for your immortal soul, not everything except for the first person view from its first person point of view. If John Clark is right the duplicating machine can duplicate *EVERYTHING* about you and the diary doesn't have a one word answer or a answer of any kind because it's not a question, it's just words with a question mark at the end. And by the way, the very word "computationalism" means that a purely physical system can duplicate *EVERYTHING* about you, perhaps that's why Bruno prefers the homemade term "comp". John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
