On Sun, Jul 31, 2016 at 4:48 AM, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> wrote:
> >> We make a copy of you. [...] >> >> > > >> > >> OK stop right there! Bruno says >> >> " >> *Nothing can duplicate a first person view from its first person point >> of view, with or without computationalism. It just does not make any >> sense. It duplicates only the 1-view in the 3-1 view picture*." > > > > > So you are saying that > [...] > I'm not saying that, Bruno is. And I think what Bruno is saying is utterly ridiculous. > > f > or comuptationalism to be true, then the > > future diary must also be identical? I don't know what that means, identical to what? I'm saying that computationalism is true if and only if a physical machine can duplicate *everything* about you, including *"* *a first person view from its first person point of view* ". > > > Consider the case of duplication with destruction at the source. There > > is no original and we don't have to worry about that anymore, it's > > irrelevant to the argument. > Destroyed or not the "original" is always irrelevant to the argument. I am conscious and I have John Clark's memories so I am John Clark regardless of if somebody else also has those memories, it won't allow the original to steal my consciousness from me. And after all, the original's atoms are no more original than my own. > > > My first person view at this moment is that I am Telmo Menezes, > > sitting at my desk writing this email. Then you are Telmo Menezes , no question about it. > > I can see people walking on the > > street through my window, but I do not feel that I am them. True, you don't even feel like that fellow over there who looks just like you; he's the original Telmo Menezes but you don't feel like him because right now you're having a different experience from him. You are having the experience of being inside the house looking out, but the original is having the experience of being outside the house looking in. So you don't feel like him because you're not him, although both you and the original are Telmo Menezes . > > > I assume > > they feel they are them. Well yes, who else would they feel like? > > >> > >> So that diary >> >> only belongs to one of us, > > > > > No, the diary belongs to both Of course the diary belongs to both! As I made clear it would belong to one of us but not the other ONLY if Bruno is right, only if no physical machine can duplicate " *a first person view from its first person point of* *view* *".* But Bruno isn't right. > > >> > >> but neither of us knows which one and nobody knows how to find out. > > > > > You both know that it belongs to you and you are both correct. > Exactly. So Bruno is talking nonsense. > > > The future cannot be duplicated. Don't you agree? > No I don't agree. Subjective experience can be duplicated if computationalism is true and subjectivity is the most important thing in the universe, or at least it is in my opinion. > > > He uses "the Brussels man", "the Moscow man" etc, and he defines what > > these things mean: "the man who saw Moscow after coming out of the > > machine" etc. Otherwise, he uses personal pronouns when such things > don't matter Bruno does no such thing. Bruno talks constantly about taking bets and giving odds BEFORE the duplication on the probability that "*YOU *" will see Moscow, and that is pure gibberish. > > > the future cannot be duplicated. > Not sure what that means but as long as you can put atoms in the right position and with the right momentum anything can be duplicated, including personal pronouns like "you" and "me" and "I" . And that's why they must be used with great care . > > That makes sense right? Perhaps if you clarified exactly what you meant it would. > > > If you insist in using that definition of person in a world with > > duplication machines (I would say most people would find it > unnatural), Certainly most people don't like the sound of it, such language is clunky and it wouldn't work well for poetry, but then English was never made with people duplicating machines in mind. > > > you are just playing tricks with language. > And mathematics is just playing tricks with numbers and logic is just playing tricks with concepts. > > >> > >> John Clark thinks that when discussing matters of this sort the use of >> >> personal pronouns should be minimized. > > > > > I don't see how that helps. It helps enormously, although inelegant when dealing with duplicating machines it becomes far more difficult to speak gibberish if personal pronouns are used sparingly. > > > If you have a duplication machine hiding > > in the closet and have been playing with it, your clones would also > come here and use then name "John Clark". > And my copy (or my original if I am the copy) has just as much right to use the name "John Clark" as I do, and no confusion is caused because when he says "John Clark" he means exactly the same thing as I do when I say "John Clark". However when my copy (or my original) uses words like "I" or "you" or "me" he means something very different from what I mean by those words. So unless great care is taken, and Bruno never uses great care, enormous confusion and ambiguity ensues . > > Do you believe that it is possible for someone to experience being two > > persons at the same time The short answer is yes, the long answer is I believe John Clark can have 2 bodies so I believe it's possible for John Clark to experience being two people at the same time. And I also believe it's possible to later merge both memories into a single body so that single person remembers being both persons. And I also believe that if you remember being that person then you are that person. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. 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