On Sun, Jul 31, 2016 at 9:32 PM, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > On Sun, Jul 31, 2016 at 4:48 AM, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> > wrote: > > >>>> >> We make a copy of you. [...] >> >> >>> > >>> > >>> OK stop right there! Bruno says >>> "Nothing can duplicate a first person view from its first person point of >>> view, with or without computationalism. It just does not make any sense. >>> It >>> duplicates only the 1-view in the 3-1 view picture." >> >> >> >> So you are saying that, for comuptationalism to be true, then the future diary must also be identical? If this is the case, then you believe that computationalism and duplicating machines (or the MWI) cannot be both true. But if you do believe this, I would ask why? > > > I'm not saying that, Bruno is. And I think what Bruno is saying is utterly > ridiculous.
I am re-pasting the text you cut above so that we have context. Bruno has never said that future diaries have to be identical. How could he say that while talking about "the man that sees Moscow" and "the man that seen Brussels"? This is an explicit reference to a difference between the diaries after duplication, and is something that the entire argument hinges on. > >> >> > f >> or comuptationalism to be true, then the >> future diary must also be identical? > > > I don't know what that means, identical to what? I am asking if you think that, for computationalism to be true, the diaries of the duplicates must be equal even after the duplication event. This is what you seem to be arguing for. >I'm saying that > computationalism > is true if and only if a physical machine can duplicate everything about > you, including " > a first person view from its first person point of > view > ". If computationalism is true, then the ability to have a first person experience of the world is duplicated, but the contents of this experience (after the time of the duplication) is not. If you make such a stringent demand, then I already have a duplication machine. It kind of looks like my wardrobe, but it's high tech stuff. It duplicates everything about you, including your position. It is so thorough that you will not even notice that anything happened, since both you and your copy will always have the same diary and be perfectly synchronous. > >> > >> Consider the case of duplication with destruction at the source. There >> is no original and we don't have to worry about that anymore, it's >> irrelevant to the argument. > > > Destroyed or not the "original" is always irrelevant to the argument. I am > conscious and I have John Clark's memories so I am John Clark regardless of > if somebody else also has those memories, Agreed. > it won't allow the original to > steal my consciousness from me. Agreed. > And after all, the original's atoms are no > more original than my own. Agreed. > > >> > >> My first person view at this moment is that I am Telmo Menezes, >> sitting at my desk writing this email. > > > Then you are > Telmo Menezes > , no question about it. > >> > >> I can see people walking on the >> street through my window, but I do not feel that I am them. > > > True, you don't even feel like that fellow over there who looks just > like you; he's the original Telmo Menezes but you don't feel like him > because right now you're having a different experience from him. Agreed, so why the stuff about duplicating the entire diary, including the future? > You are > having the experience of being inside the house looking out, but the > original is having the experience of being outside the house looking in. So > you don't feel like him because you're not him, although both you and the > original are > Telmo Menezes Yes! So you agree and there is no reason to not proceed with Bruno's argument. > >> >> > >> I assume >> they feel they are them. > > > Well yes, who else would they feel like? Precisely. > > >>> > >>> > >>> So that diary >>> only belongs to one of us, >> >> >> > >> No, the diary belongs to both > > > Of course the diary belongs to both! As I made clear it would belong to one > of us but not the other ONLY if Bruno is right, only if no physical > machine can duplicate " > a first person view from its first person point of > view > ". But Bruno isn't right. This is not what Bruno is saying at all. There is even no need to argue this point, he wrote a paper about it. You can check it and you will see that no such thing is said. > >>> >>> > >>> > >>> but neither of us knows which one and nobody knows how to find out. >> >> >> > >> You both know that it belongs to you and you are both correct. > > > Exactly. > > So Bruno is talking nonsense. What's the point of saying things like that? Be specific, otherwise we can't argue. > >> > >> The future cannot be duplicated. Don't you agree? > > > No I don't agree. Ok, then you have to come and try my duplication machine. > Subjective experience can be duplicated if > computationalism > is true and subjectivity is the most important thing in the universe, or at > least it is in my opinion. I'm not sure what "duplicating subjective experience" would even mean. What seems clear to me is that entities capable of subjective experience can be duplicated. Then, the content of their experience might diverge after duplication. >> >> > >> He uses "the Brussels man", "the Moscow man" etc, and he defines what >> these things mean: "the man who saw Moscow after coming out of the >> machine" etc. Otherwise, he uses personal pronouns when such things >> don't matter > > > Bruno does no such thing. Bruno talks constantly about taking bets and > giving odds BEFORE the duplication on the probability that "YOU " will see > Moscow, and that is pure gibberish. He's asking for your bet from your subjective experience after stepping into the duplication machine. It is not the pronouns muddle the waters, it's refusing to see the distinction between first person perspective (the one you just said above matters the most) and third person perspective. But we've been through this many times, it seems hopeless. >> >> > >> the future cannot be duplicated. > > > Not sure what that means but as long as you can put atoms in the right > position and with the right momentum anything can be duplicated, including > personal pronouns like "you" and "me" > and "I" > . And that's why > they must be used with > great care > . > > > >> > >> That makes sense right? > > > Perhaps if you clarified exactly what you meant it would. Hum? You removed what I said and left something there that I did not say. I have no time at the moment to fix your selective editing of our conversation so I'll just ignore this one -- whatever it was about. >> >> > >> If you insist in using that definition of person in a world with >> duplication machines (I would say most people would find it >> unnatural), > > > Certainly most people don't like the sound of it, such language is clunky > and it wouldn't work well for poetry, but then English was never made with > people duplicating machines in mind. > > >> >> > >> you are just playing tricks with language. > > > And mathematics is just playing tricks with numbers and logic is just > playing tricks with concepts. Assuming your reasoning is correct, sure. The problem is that language is more ambiguous -- this is why math and logic are necessary to begin with. You take full advantage of this ambiguity when it suits you, but deny it when it doesn't. This is why I say that you argue in bad faith. Having a honest discussion using language does not require that both parties agree, but it does require that both make an effort to correctly identify the opponent's position with some benevolence. >>> >>> > >>> > >>> John Clark thinks that when discussing matters of this sort the use of >>> personal pronouns should be minimized. >> >> >> > >> I don't see how that helps. > > > It helps enormously, although inelegant when dealing with duplicating > machines it becomes far more difficult to speak gibberish if personal > pronouns are used sparingly. For now duplication machines only exist in the thought experiment. There's really no need for you to say things like "John Clark is going to eat a ham sandwich". You remind me of soccer players around my parts, who tend to speak of themselves in the third person. Although, instead of talking about duplication machines, it's usually about how they are going to work hard for the team and how Jesus saved them from hard drugs and casual sex. > >> >> > >> If you have a duplication machine hiding >> in the closet and have been playing with it, your clones would also >> come here and use then name "John Clark". > > > And my copy (or my original if I am the copy) has just as much right to use > the name "John Clark" as I do, and no confusion is caused because when he > says "John Clark" he means exactly the same thing as I do when I say "John > Clark". Agreed. > However when my copy (or my original) uses words like "I" or "you" > or "me" he means something very different from what I mean by those words. Yes. So you get it. > So unless great care is taken, and Bruno never uses great care, enormous > confusion and ambiguity ensues . We've been through this. Bruno takes care, but you refuse to consider his "homemade acronyms", so I'm not sure what else you expect him to do. >> > >> Do you believe that it is possible for someone to experience being two >> persons at the same time > > > The short answer is yes, the long answer is > I believe John Clark can have 2 bodies so I believe it's possible for John > Clark to experience being two people at the same time. And you believe this is what happens after a duplication? > And I also believe > it's possible to later merge both memories into a single body so that single > person remembers being both persons. > And I also believe that if you remember > being that person then you are that person. I don't disagree with you, but this is a bit more tricky. Mental illness comes to mind. Telmo. > > John K Clark > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
