On 03 Aug 2016, at 07:28, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 3/08/2016 3:19 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wednesday, 3 August 2016, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net>
wrote:
On 8/2/2016 3:29 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wednesday, 3 August 2016, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net>
wrote:
On 8/2/2016 6:15 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
It's not that it can't, but rather that it doesn't, and if it does
then that would require some extra physical explanation, a radio
link between brains or something.
That's what I mean by illegitimately appealing to physics while
claiming that physics must be derived from computation of
consciousness.
Whatever theory we propose must be consistent with observation.
But, "if it does then that would require some extra physical
explanation, a radio link between brains or something." Is not an
observation, it's an assumption that all information transfer must
be physical.
There is no convincing evidence for telepathic communication, so a
theory that predicts it should occur would have to explain why we
don't observe it.
The suggestion that the one consciousness could inhabit more than
one physical body does not predict telepathy -- it could merely
indicate that consciousness is not localized to a single physical
body, that it is non-local, for instance. Or, indeed, that physics
is not fundamental but derivative on consciousness.
You cannot rule out these possibilities on the available evidence
(since we do not have person duplicating machines at the moment). As
I said, this is probably a question that can only be answered
empirically once we have actually duplicated people. Random
theorizing is just not going to cut it.
Sure. But once we assume computationalism, then the use of computer
science is no more random theorizing.
Bruno
Bruce
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