On 01 Aug 2016, at 22:01, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/1/2016 10:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Duplication experiments would then be a real test of the
hypothesis that consciousness could be separated from the physical
brain. If the duplicates are essentially separate conscious
beings, unaware of the thoughts and happenings of the other, then
consciousness is tied to a particular physical brain (or brain
substitute).
Not at all, but it might look like that at that stage, but what you
say does not follow from computationalism. The same consciousness
present at both place before the door is open *only* differentiated
when they get the different bit of information W or M.
But why do they differentiate? Because of physics.
Sure. At step 3, the digital emulation are physical, but that does not
mean that the physical was supposed to be primary.
Like anybody we take for granted that there is a physical reality; if
only because that is what we want to explain the appearance of.
UDA is a deduction. At each step we can do philosophy, but the
question is the validity of passing from one step to the next.
Conceiving at each step some reality/model which makes the proposition
false or weird do no invalidate the reasoning.
Bruno
Brent
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