On Tuesday, 2 August 2016, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 2/08/2016 3:07 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 01 Aug 2016, at 09:04, Bruce Kellett wrote: >> >> Consider ordinary consequences of introspection: I can be conscious of >>> several unrelated things at once. I can be driving my car, conscious of the >>> road and traffic conditions (and responding to them appropriately), while >>> at the same time carrying on an intelligent conversation with my wife, >>> thinking about what I will make for dinner, and, in the back of my mind >>> thinking about a philosophical email exchange. These, and many other >>> things, can be present to my conscious mind at the same time. I can bring >>> any one of these things to the forefront of my mind at will, but processing >>> of the separate streams goes on all the time. >>> >>> Given this, it is quite easy to imagine that a subset of these >>> simultaneous streams of consciousness might be associated with myself in a >>> different body -- in a different place at a different time. I would be >>> aware of things happening to the other body in real time in my own >>> consciousness -- because they would, in fact, be happening to me. >>> >>> If you dissociate consciousness from an actual single brain, then these >>> things are quite conceivable. >>> >> >> Dissociating consciousness from any actual single brain is what UDA >> explains in detail. Then the math shows that this dissociation run even >> deeper, as your 1p consciousness is associated with the infinitely many >> relative and faithful (at the correct substitution level or below) state in >> the (sigma_1) arithmetical relations. >> >> Duplication experiments would then be a real test of the hypothesis that >>> consciousness could be separated from the physical brain. If the duplicates >>> are essentially separate conscious beings, unaware of the thoughts and >>> happenings of the other, then consciousness is tied to a particular >>> physical brain (or brain substitute). >>> >> >> Not at all, but it might look like that at that stage, but what you say >> does not follow from computationalism. The same consciousness present at >> both place before the door is open *only* differentiated when they get the >> different bit of information W or M. >> >> However, if consciousness is actually an abstract computation that is >>> tied to a physical brain only in a statistical sense, then we should expect >>> that the single consciousness could inhabit several bodies simultaneously. >>> >> >> It is irrelevant to decide how many consciousness or first person there >> is. We need only to listen to those which have differentiated to extract >> the statistics. >> > > The point that I am trying to make here is that a person's consciousness > at any moment can consist of many independent threads. From this I > speculate that some of these separate threads could actually be associated > with separate physical bodies. In other words, it is conceivable that a > duplication experiment would not result in two separate consciousnesses, > but a single consciousness in separate bodies. If this is so, the fact that > the separate bodies receive different inputs does not necessarily mean that > they differentiate into separate conscious beings, any more than the fact > that I receive different inputs from moment to moment means that I > dissociate into multiple consciousnesses. The difference is that the threads of consciousness in an individual can combine, whereas the threads in separate individual cannot. > It seems that the only reason that one might expect that the different > inputs experienced by the separate duplicates would lead to a > differentiation of the consciousnesses -- i.e., two separate and distinct > conscious beings -- is that one is implicitly making the physicalist > assumption that a single consciousness is necessarily associated with a > single body, such that separate physical bodies necessarily have separate > consciousnesses. There is no a priori reason why separate individuals, whether duplicates or not, cannot share a consciousness, but it is a matter of observation that they in fact do not, since telepathy is not real. Even if telepathy did occur, it would be a special phenomenon with a separate explanation, not something that would occur simply because there wer duplicates. > I suggest that for step 3 to go through, you need to demonstrate that > computationalism requires that a single consciousness cannot inhabit two or > more separate physical bodies: without such a demonstration you cannot > conclude that W&M is not a possible outcome that the duplicated person > could experience. You must demonstrate that different inputs lead to a > differentiation of the consciousnesses in the duplication case, while not > so differentiating the consciousness of a single person. The required > demonstration must be based on the assumptions of computationalism alone, > you cannot rely on physics that is not yet in evidence. > > In other words, start from your basic assumptions: > (1) The "yes doctor" hypothesis; > (2) The Church-Turing thesis; and > (3) Arithmetical realism; > and demonstrate that consciousness is limited to a single physical brain. > Not that consciousness can be associated with a physical brain; but that > the one consciousness cannot inhabit two identical, but physically > separated brains. > It's not that it can't, but rather that it doesn't, and if it does then that would require some extra physical explanation, a radio link between brains or something. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. 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