On 07 Sep 2016, at 20:06, [email protected] wrote:
On Wednesday, September 7, 2016 at 11:16:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 06 Sep 2016, at 17:42, [email protected] wrote:
On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 4:38:53 AM UTC-6,
[email protected] wrote:
I understand your pov. It has but one problem. You ignore the
elephant in the room; namely, those other worlds or universes
necessary for the outcomes not measured in this world to be
realized. But you have an out, stated in another post. They form
part of your imagination. Not good enough from my pov. AG
I should also add that the MWI sheds no light, AFAICT, on the
measurement problem; that is, why we get the outcome we get. As far
as collapse contradicting SR via the result of Bell experiments, I
am not sure about that conclusion. If FTL occurs, it may be the
case that in some frames Alice's measurement occurs first, in other
frames Bob's measurement occurs first. I tend to think this muddies
the waters on the issue of FLT transmission and contradictions with
relativity. AG
The "MWI" explains already a part of the mind-body problem when
formulated in the Digital Mechanist Frame. You don't need to even
know QM to understand the high plausibility of the "many-
computations".
If FTL occurs, and you keep both QM and SR, then an action in the
future can change the past, and physical causility becomes
meaningless. With mechanism, physical causality is not yet
guarantied, to be sure, but I would throw digital mechanism if it
could lead to future -> past physical action (it does not make sense).
Ah, you wrote:
Possible correction: my remark about relativity might apply to how
events are seen from a frame moving FTL -- that is, a breakdown in
causality -- and might not apply to Alice/Bob situation. AG
Well, OK, then. But it would apply if there were a collapse (in one
universe), even if Alice needs to send two bits of information to
transformed the effect (and send or get one qubit).
The "collapse" does not even refer to anything I can make sense of.
It looks like a continuous invocation of God. As an explanation, it
looks like a continuum of blasphemes (in the theology of the
universal machine).
Here's what collapse means to me; the wf evolves from a solution of
SWE, namely a superposition, to a delta function centered at the
measurement value. No one knows, or has a model how this
transformation occurs.It's in the category of a TBD, possibly
unknowable. It seems empirically based since repeated measurements
of the same system result in the same outcomes. I don't necessarily
believe in primary matter's existence. But its statistical
persistence seems undeniable, whereas the many worlds has yet to
manifest any persistence except in the minds of its advocates. AG
The MWI is only the SWE taken literally. If an observer O observes a
cat in the superposition d + a (dead + alive), we know that, before
interaction, the physical state is well described by the expression
O(a + d), with the tensor product noted multiplicatively, and that it
is equivalent with Oa + Od. So even at this stage the "O" can be
considered being in a superposition state. That is what I called the
linearity of the tensor product. Now, by the linearity of the wave
evolution we get O-a a + O-b b, that is each branch behaves
classically (P-i = O with i in its memory. And both 0-a and O-b can
repeat their measurement, and the linearity of the wave evolution
implies that they will always find the same measurement result. So the
MWI explains the persistence as much well as classical physics, or QM
+collapse (if that means something precise).
My point is that at this stage, QM (without collapse) is compatible
with Mechanism (used implicitly above) only insofar as the persistence
is explained from a statistics on *all* computations (which exist once
you agree that 2+2=4 independently of you and me).
My technical point is that this work in the sense that we can derive
quantum logic (and normally physics) from the logical structure that
the computations inherit from the logic of (machine) self-reference.
That is elegant because at this stage the "theory of everything" needs
no less and no more than very elementary axioms (and mechanism in the
meta-background).
The only axiom that I use are the following:
0 ≠ (x + 1)
((x + 1) = (y + 1)) -> x = y
x = 0 v Ey(x = y + 1)
x + 0 = x
x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1
x * 0 = 0
x * (y + 1) = (x * y) + x
Actually I could even just use the two combinators axioms:
Kxy = x
Sxyz = xz(yz)
Such axioms are Turing complete, and you can prove the existence of
the UD from them (and *in* them if you add some induction axioms, but
I prefer to put them in the epistemology of the observers).
The Turing-Church thesis rehabilit the neopythagorean theology, and we
get physics exactly when we use the antic definition of knowledge and
matter provided by them (notably by Moderatus of Gades).
On the contrary, if primary matter or if physicalism would be true, we
remain with the task of explaining what is their role for
consciousness (or just first person experience).
Aristotle idea of naturalism or (weak) materialism (the existence of a
physical primary reality) has only been a tool for letting the mind-
body problem sleep a bit, and that has been a very fertile simplifying
hypothesis, but now, with mechanism, and plausibly with only quantum
mechanics, we get the (predicted by the Platonist) problem of
justifying the relation between first person discourse and third
person discourse. We can't use the simple mind-brain identity theory,
because we have an infinity of quasi identical brains in arithmetic,
and we can't use a selection principle based on a substance without
damaging the mechanist hypothesis.
Keep in mind that my origianl goal is to solve the mind-body problem,
and with mechanism, we have no choice other than justifying the
appearance of physicalness from a statistic based on the mix of "*all*
computations + machine self-reference when distributed in those
computations. It works (till now). Non-mechanism does not work, and it
is well known that the mind-body problem has been put under the rug
since Aristotle (except by the Platonists, who were just banned from
our civilisation 1500 years ago).
In Soccer terms: Plato 1, Aristotle 0. I don't pretend it is the last
match.
Bruno
Bruno
On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 2:23:39 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 05 Sep 2016, at 19:31, [email protected] wrote:
On Monday, September 5, 2016 at 8:08:12 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 04 Sep 2016, at 20:27, [email protected] wrote:
Bruno, thank you for a detailed response. Most of it is above my
pay grade, but I will check some of your links and see what I can
make of them.
OK.
As for the MWI, I have a simple approach. If I went to LV and
played a slot machine for a single trial or outcome, and someone
asked me what happened to the other thousands of outcomes I
didn't get, I'd think that would be a crazy question.
I mainly agree, because there is no unanimity on which
counterfactual or conditional non standard logic to use.
Isn't it really much simpler? Just because something *could*
exist, like those thousands of other outcomes of the slot machine,
doesn't mean they *must* exist. The MWI insists all outcomes MUST
exist. I see no necessity for that. AG
You need it to get the interference between the terms of the wave.
I agree with Deutsch: QM is the science of multiple interfering
histories. The collapse is an addition to avoid that multiplication/
differentiation consequence.
But that's the question some physicists ask when they are
confronted with the non-linearity of collapse in the Copenhagen
Interpretation.
I tend to disagree here. The quantum situation is different
because with quantum mechanics, different outcomes can interfere
and thus have some physical underpinning which is hard to avoid,
especially without assuming the collapse of the wave.
How can you disagree? Many prominent physicists -- Greene,
Deutsch, Carroll -- when confronted with the non-linearity of
collapse, believe the MWI avoids or solves this problem. AG
?
I agree with them. MWI entails no-collapse, and the evolution is
purely linear. Just a "rotation" in the Hilbert space.
Accepting non linearity
There are work by Steinberg and Plaga which shows that if the QM
wave is slightly non linear, then we get the WW with a revenge:
interactions becomes possible in between terms of the wave. This
makes wrong special relativity, but also thermodynamics, etc.
The wf before measurement is linear insofar as it satisfies a
linear DE, and relativity is well tested. So I don't see any issue
here. AG
OK, but then there is no collapse. We agree, then, only the
collapse leads to non-linearity.
So I guess you mean that there is a (non linear) collapse, and
that, strictly speaking the SWR is false.
SWR = ?
Why does a non-linear collapse falsify SR? AG
By Bell's violation, if there is a collapse, it affects elements
which are space-separated. Einstein explained this already at the
Solvay congress.
You introduce a duality between observer and observed, or between
macro and micro-physics. And, you assume non-mechanism in
cognitive science.
How can we test our models without the duality of observer and
observed? You demand the impossible.
Read the book by Hans Primas on the foundation of chemistery. It
explains well why Everett restores monism in the philosophy of mind
(but he missed this happens directly with Mechanism).
What "non mechanism" have I assumed? QM just gives us
probabilities. It's not a causal theory. AG
With the collapse.
That is lot of things for which we don't have evidence.
Cosmologists applies QM on very big object, like black holes, if
not the entire universe, and people trying to justify a physical
collapse get a lot of problem, like non-locality, to cite the one
Einstein disliked the most, and I share a bit that opinion.
and actual time irreversibility (not FAPP) is an easier concept
to accept than the real or fictional other worlds necessary to
support the MWI.
Well, with mechanism, in all case (with or without QM) we get the
many histories/dreams/computations, and they exist like natural
numbers. We don't have to take the "worlds" as primitive
ontological reality. I tend to not really believe in *any* world.
Those belongs to the imagination of the relative universal
numbers, whose proof of existence can already be done in
elementary arithmetic.
Physics is about constructing and testing models of physical
reality, not about dreams.
Assuming there is a physical reality per se, but with Mechanism,
the physical reality is "only" a persistent statisticl illusion
emerging from all computational histories.
You can call the MWI a dream, but for me it's a nightmare. LOL. AG
BTW, the time irreversibility is not FAPP since the collapsed wf,
when inserted back into the SWE, recovers only itself exactly at
an earlier time, but not the original wf which collapsed. AG
Yes, OK. If there is such a collapse, but I don't see evidence.
If you measure a system repeatedly, you get the same measurement.
That's the evidence for collapse;
Not at all. That is what Everett explains in all details. You don't
need the collapse to explain, using only the SWE that in each
branch the observer feel like there has been a collapse, using only
a notion similar to the First Person Indeterminacy that we have
anyway in arithmetic.
that the system remains in the same eigenstate after measurement,
not in the original superposition. AG
Yes, with a collapse which is not explained, nor even well defined,
and which contradicts the SWE.
Computationalism and QM without collapse leads to immaterial
monism, which is nice as we don't have any evidence for primary
matter.
Bruno
I think it is human coquetry (grin). Nature loves to do things in
many exemplars, and elementary arithmetic loves that to. Personal
uniqueness is an illusion (provably so in the mechanist theory of
mind). The evidences are more on the side of reversibility, and
unitary evolution. But of course that might be false, and is still
an open problem in the computationalist theory. But there too, we
already got some evidence for linearity and a core symmetrical
physical structure.
Bruno
On Sunday, September 4, 2016 at 8:16:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 03 Sep 2016, at 21:02, [email protected] wrote:
On Friday, September 2, 2016 at 11:52:55 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson
wrote:
On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 11:27 AM, <[email protected]> wrote:
On Friday, September 2, 2016 at 11:07:09 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 31 Aug 2016, at 20:30, [email protected] wrote:
On Wednesday, August 31, 2016 at 11:17:22 AM UTC-6, Bruno
Marchal wrote:
On 30 Aug 2016, at 18:23, Alan Grayson wrote:
On Friday, June 10, 2016 at 6:10:41 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
On 11/06/2016 3:56 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 10 Jun 2016, at 03:02, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>> On 10/06/2016 1:41 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 09 Jun 2016, at 01:28, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>>> In other words, FPI is just the statement that Alice and
Bob have
>>>> to look to find out which of the (+,+'), (+,-'), (-,+'),
or (-,-')
>>>> worlds they are in. I don't think that actually adds
anything
>>>> significant to the discussion.
>>>
>>> That eliminates the physical spooky action at a distance
which are
>>> necessarily there in QM+collapse.
>>
>> You have yet to prove that -- assertion is not proof.
>
> By defining world by "closed for interaction", locality
follows from
> linearity.
Bruno, you specialize in these oracular pronouncements that mean
absolutely nothing.
This is just insulting, and add nothing but confusion.
Avoid ad hominem patronizing tone and focus on what you do not
understand or disagree with.
"locality follows from linearity" -- what a load of
total nonsense.
OK, I was quick there, but I provided more details in *many*
other posts. Please read most of a thread, not just a a
sentence here and there and then adding to the prejudices.
To be slightly less short, and explain, I was talking in the
frame of the non collapse formulation of QM, and I was just
saying that without any collapse, the linearity of the tensor
product with the linearity of the SWE ensure that at any time
everything is local, even computable, in the global third
person picture.
Basically, "physical non locality" needs to put some amount of
3p sense in the collapse of the wave, where in the MWI (and in
arithmetic) the indeterminacies and the non local appearances
are purely epistemic (first person or first person plural).
> There are 1p statistical interference, but Bell's inequality
violation
> is accounted without FTL, which is not the case with
collapse, or
> Bohmian particules.
> I gave the proof with others, and eventually you admitted
that there
> was no real action at a distance. But with one world, those
are real
> action at a distance. So I think the point has been made.
There is no FTL mechanism in action in one world or many: Bell
non-locality obeys the no-signalling theorem. You have to get
over
thinking that non-locality means FTL action.
Here's an article of interest. FWIW, I don't believe the no-
signalling theorem puts this issue
to rest. AG
In all the thread we (me and Bruce) were agreeing with this,
I haven't read every post in this thread, but from Bruce's
remark above, he apparently believes that you believe in FTL
transmission of information, and that since the no-signal
theorem denies that, your claim (or any claim of FTL
transmission) is falsified.
Guess what, you were completely wrong.
I was the one who denies the FTL.
My text may have confused you. I thought you went to the MWI to
deny FTL in this one-world. That's what I meant. But Bruce seems
to deny FTL in this world, by saying the phenomenon is just a
property of the wf, and in his appeal to the no-signalling
theorem; as if to say, if you can't send information, there
can't be FTL. But here "send information" in the context of no-
signalling theorem just means you can't send a message of
choice. AG
What does FPI stand for? TIA, AG
The article I posted denies that the apparent contradiction
between relativity and non locality can be resolved simply by
appealing to the non-signalling theorem, which Bruce seems to
assert.
I was the one asserting that with the MWI, even the Bell's
violation does not force FTL, even without signalling possible.
My point, shared by others in the thread, was that with the MWI
restores both 3p determinacy, and 3p locality. The point of
Clark and Bruce is that even with the MWI, Bell's inequality
violation proves that nature is 3p non local, and that action at
a distance exists.
I can only go by his words. So I don't see that the article I
posted is irrelevant to the discussion. AG
It was Bruce who claims that Bell's inequality violation shows
that FTL exists, even without possible signalling.
Then why does he tell you to "get over it", it being FTL? AG
Maybe he means that FTL exists in this world, so why resort to
the MWI to deny it. But then why does he bring up the no-
signalling theorem? AG
Hope I didn't offend any true believers in the MWI,
MWI is a theory. I have often explain, as a logician, that MWI is
not an interpretation but a different theory than Copenhagen.
MWI = wave-function postulate. Copenhagen-QM = wave function
postulate + collapse postulate. Of course both have some problem
of interpretation (like all theories). I tend to not accept the
notion of "physical world", and working in arithmetic I use only
the notion of computation. Indeed, my result is that both the
collapse of the wave and the wave itself are universal number's
First Person phenomenologies, when we assume a form of Mechanist
Hypothesis in cognitive science. Mechanism makes physicalism wrong.
but in extensive discussions about this on another MB, none of
the true believers could give a coherent account of these other
worlds; for example, where the energy comes from,
Energy is a "one-world" notion, but anyway, I don't believe in
worlds, at least not until someone explains what they mean. For
me, it is a convenient fiction. With Mechanism, a world is an
extrapolation made by numbers sharing sheaves of computation
verifying some measure weight, and such measure weighting must be
explained through the logic of self-reference. You might take a
look at my papers, like this one:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
Or this one, if you can access it:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2013.03.014
and whether an observer in this world is reproduced in other
worlds, and if so, with what memories. The MWI seems like a
desperate attempt to avoid non-locality and/or non-linearity of
QM. AG
Well, it avois the non linearity of the collapse, and its
dualism. OK. But the "other worlds" are only a consequence of
the contagion of the superposition of the particle (say) to the
observer. If you look at a cat in the dead+alive state, you end
yourself looking at a dead cat + looking at a alive cat. The
given brain states are orthogonal and do not interact, but can
still interfere statistically. This list is for people believing
that "everything" is a simpler conceptual notion than any
particular thing, and so welcome both the MWI in quantum physics,
and the "many-computations" in arithmetic, that we get from
Mechanism. I predicted the *appearance* of "many-worlds" before
knowing about quantum physics measurement problem.
About Bruce's points, maybe you should ask Bruce, as the cited
post is a bit out of the context of the thread.
You asked in another post what is the FPI.
It is an acronym for First Person Indeterminacy, and it is the
subjective indeterminacy that you get in the (classical) self-
duplication. Again, look at the paper sane04 cited above, where
this is made precise and explained. The FPI is the building brick
of the argument showing that Mechanism and Physicalism are
incompatible, and that physics is conceptually reduced to
arithmetic when we assume mechanism. I show that this leads to
testable consequences, and some are tested retrospectively with QM.
I agree that FTL (fast than light influence which not
necessarily exploitable for transmission of information) still
exist, and I agree that it is logically possible, but people
believing in that have the obligation to give evidence, and my
point is that in the MWI, Bell's violation is no more an
evidence, as Bell supposes definite outcomes in definite
realties, which makes no sense in the MWI, nor in
computationalism more generally.
I tend to agree that Bell's results assume one world. AG
Good. I think some people disagree with this on this list, but I
will let them to defend their point again, or not.
Bruno
Bruno
The question was specifically about some possible remnant of
physical action at a distance in the MWI. We both know that the
non signaling does not put light on this. Genuine physical
action at a distance obviously exist in the QM-with-collapse,
by Bell's inequality violation, but Bell's argument does not
show action at a distance( in any unique branch if that exist),
in the MWI.
What we have is the contagion of superposition, and they never
go quicker than interaction, that is at sub-speed of light.
And that is why we can define, or represent the "world" by set
of space-time events closed for interaction.
http://people.uleth.ca/~kent.peacock/FQXi_v2.pdf
Interesting (but out of topic indeed).
Bruno
>>> That adds nothing, indeed. That shows only that the
paradoxes came
>>> only from the axioms some have added to fit their
philosophical
>>> prejudices.
>>
>> So you add axioms to suit your philosophical prejudices
just as
>> others do -- how does that make your position any better
than that of
>> others?
>
> No. I subtract axioms.
>
> Bohr's axioms: SWE + COLLAPSE + number (add,mult) (+
> unintelligible theory of mind)
>
> Everett's axioms SWE + Number (add,mult). (+ mechanist
theory of
> mind)
>
> Your servitor's axioms: Number(add,mult). (+
mechanist theory
> of mind)
>
> And I don't pretend that is true, only that digital
mechanism makes
> this necessary and testable (modulo the usual "malin
génies").
All the above sets of axioms lead to non-local theories. You
may claim
just to subtract axioms, but that is as much choosing your
axioms as any
other procedure. And you have yet to show that you get the
physics of
this world out of your theory --and demonstrate the necessary
stability
of the physics. Just wishing evil genies away does not
actually banish them.
Bruce
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