On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 9:42:36 AM UTC-6, [email protected] wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 4:38:53 AM UTC-6, [email protected] > wrote: >> >> I understand your pov. It has but one problem. You ignore the elephant in >> the room; namely, those other worlds or universes necessary for the >> outcomes not measured in this world to be realized. But you have an out, >> stated in another post. They form part of your imagination. Not good enough >> from my pov. AG >> > > > I should also add that the MWI sheds no light, AFAICT, on the measurement > problem; that is, why we get the outcome we get. As far as collapse > contradicting SR via the result of Bell experiments, I am not sure about > that conclusion. If FTL occurs, it may be the case that in some frames > Alice's measurement occurs first, in other frames Bob's measurement occurs > first. I tend to think this muddies the waters on the issue of FLT > transmission and contradictions with relativity. AG >
Possible correction: my remark about relativity might apply to how events are seen from a frame moving FTL -- that is, a breakdown in causality -- and might not apply to Alice/Bob situation. AG > >> On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 2:23:39 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 05 Sep 2016, at 19:31, [email protected] wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Monday, September 5, 2016 at 8:08:12 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 04 Sep 2016, at 20:27, [email protected] wrote: >>>> >>>> Bruno, thank you for a detailed response. Most of it is above my pay >>>> grade, but I will check some of your links and see what I can make of >>>> them. >>>> >>>> >>>> OK. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> As for the MWI, I have a simple approach. If I went to LV and played a >>>> slot machine for a single trial or outcome, and someone asked me what >>>> happened to the other thousands of outcomes I didn't get, I'd think that >>>> would be a crazy question. >>>> >>>> >>>> I mainly agree, because there is no unanimity on which counterfactual >>>> or conditional non standard logic to use. >>>> >>> >>> *Isn't it really much simpler? Just because something *could* exist, >>> like those thousands of other outcomes of the slot machine, doesn't mean >>> they *must* exist. The MWI insists all outcomes MUST exist. I see no >>> necessity for that. AG * >>> >>> >>> You need it to get the interference between the terms of the wave. I >>> agree with Deutsch: QM is the science of multiple interfering histories. >>> The collapse is an addition to avoid that multiplication/differentiation >>> consequence. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> But that's the question some physicists ask when they are confronted >>>> with the non-linearity of collapse in the Copenhagen Interpretation. >>>> >>>> >>>> I tend to disagree here. The quantum situation is different because >>>> with quantum mechanics, different outcomes can interfere and thus have >>>> some >>>> physical underpinning which is hard to avoid, especially without assuming >>>> the collapse of the wave. >>>> >>> >>> *How can you disagree? Many prominent physicists -- Greene, Deutsch, >>> Carroll -- when confronted with the non-linearity of collapse, believe the >>> MWI avoids or solves this problem. AG* >>> >>> >>> ? >>> I agree with them. MWI entails no-collapse, and the evolution is purely >>> linear. Just a "rotation" in the Hilbert space. >>> >>> >>> >>>> Accepting non linearity >>>> >>>> >>>> There are work by Steinberg and Plaga which shows that if the QM wave >>>> is slightly non linear, then we get the WW with a revenge: interactions >>>> becomes possible in between terms of the wave. This makes wrong special >>>> relativity, but also thermodynamics, etc. >>>> >>> >>> *The wf before measurement is linear insofar as it satisfies a linear >>> DE, and relativity is well tested. So I don't see any issue here. AG * >>> >>> >>> OK, but then there is no collapse. We agree, then, only the collapse >>> leads to non-linearity. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> So I guess you mean that there is a (non linear) collapse, and that, >>>> strictly speaking the SWR is false. >>>> >>> >>> SWR = ? >>> >>> *Why does a non-linear collapse falsify SR? AG* >>> >>> >>> >>> By Bell's violation, if there is a collapse, it affects elements which >>> are space-separated. Einstein explained this already at the Solvay congress. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> You introduce a duality between observer and observed, or between macro >>>> and micro-physics. And, you assume non-mechanism in cognitive science. >>>> >>> >>> H*ow can we test our models without the duality of observer and >>> observed? You demand the impossible. * >>> >>> >>> Read the book by Hans Primas on the foundation of chemistery. It >>> explains well why Everett restores monism in the philosophy of mind (but he >>> missed this happens directly with Mechanism). >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> *What "non mechanism" have I assumed? QM just gives us probabilities. >>> It's not a causal theory. AG* >>> >>> >>> With the collapse. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> That is lot of things for which we don't have evidence. Cosmologists >>>> applies QM on very big object, like black holes, if not the entire >>>> universe, and people trying to justify a physical collapse get a lot of >>>> problem, like non-locality, to cite the one Einstein disliked the most, >>>> and >>>> I share a bit that opinion. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> and actual time irreversibility (not FAPP) is an easier concept to >>>> accept than the real or fictional other worlds necessary to support the >>>> MWI. >>>> >>>> >>>> Well, with mechanism, in all case (with or without QM) we get the many >>>> histories/dreams/computations, and they exist like natural numbers. We >>>> don't have to take the "worlds" as primitive ontological reality. I tend >>>> to >>>> not really believe in *any* world. Those belongs to the imagination of the >>>> relative universal numbers, whose proof of existence can already be done >>>> in >>>> elementary arithmetic. >>>> >>> >>> *Physics is about constructing and testing models of physical reality, >>> not about dreams. * >>> >>> >>> Assuming there is a physical reality per se, but with Mechanism, the >>> physical reality is "only" a persistent statisticl illusion emerging from >>> all computational histories. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> *You can call the MWI a dream, but for me it's a nightmare. LOL. AG * >>> >>>> >>>> BTW, the time irreversibility is not FAPP since the collapsed wf, when >>>> inserted back into the SWE, recovers only itself exactly at an earlier >>>> time, but not the original wf which collapsed. AG >>>> >>>> >>>> Yes, OK. If there is such a collapse, but I don't see evidence. >>>> >>> >>> *If you measure a system repeatedly, you get the same measurement. >>> That's the evidence for collapse; * >>> >>> >>> >>> Not at all. That is what Everett explains in all details. You don't need >>> the collapse to explain, using only the SWE that in each branch the >>> observer feel like there has been a collapse, using only a notion similar >>> to the First Person Indeterminacy that we have anyway in arithmetic. >>> >>> >>> >>> *that the system remains in the same eigenstate after measurement, not >>> in the original superposition. AG* >>> >>> >>> Yes, with a collapse which is not explained, nor even well defined, and >>> which contradicts the SWE. >>> Computationalism and QM without collapse leads to immaterial monism, >>> which is nice as we don't have any evidence for primary matter. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> I think it is human coquetry (grin). Nature loves to do things in many >>>> exemplars, and elementary arithmetic loves that to. Personal uniqueness is >>>> an illusion (provably so in the mechanist theory of mind). The evidences >>>> are more on the side of reversibility, and unitary evolution. But of >>>> course >>>> that might be false, and is still an open problem in the computationalist >>>> theory. But there too, we already got some evidence for linearity and a >>>> core symmetrical physical structure. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sunday, September 4, 2016 at 8:16:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 03 Sep 2016, at 21:02, [email protected] wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Friday, September 2, 2016 at 11:52:55 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 11:27 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Friday, September 2, 2016 at 11:07:09 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 31 Aug 2016, at 20:30, [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Wednesday, August 31, 2016 at 11:17:22 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 30 Aug 2016, at 18:23, Alan Grayson wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Friday, June 10, 2016 at 6:10:41 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On 11/06/2016 3:56 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>>>>> > On 10 Jun 2016, at 03:02, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >> On 10/06/2016 1:41 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>> On 09 Jun 2016, at 01:28, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>> In other words, FPI is just the statement that Alice and Bob >>>>>>>>>> have >>>>>>>>>> >>>> to look to find out which of the (+,+'), (+,-'), (-,+'), or >>>>>>>>>> (-,-') >>>>>>>>>> >>>> worlds they are in. I don't think that actually adds >>>>>>>>>> anything >>>>>>>>>> >>>> significant to the discussion. >>>>>>>>>> >>> >>>>>>>>>> >>> That eliminates the physical spooky action at a distance >>>>>>>>>> which are >>>>>>>>>> >>> necessarily there in QM+collapse. >>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>> >> You have yet to prove that -- assertion is not proof. >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > By defining world by "closed for interaction", locality follows >>>>>>>>>> from >>>>>>>>>> > linearity. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Bruno, you specialize in these oracular pronouncements that mean >>>>>>>>>> absolutely nothing. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> This is just insulting, and add nothing but confusion. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Avoid ad hominem patronizing tone and focus on what you do not >>>>>>>>> understand or disagree with. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> "locality follows from linearity" -- what a load of >>>>>>>>>> total nonsense. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> OK, I was quick there, but I provided more details in *many* other >>>>>>>>> posts. Please read most of a thread, not just a a sentence here and >>>>>>>>> there >>>>>>>>> and then adding to the prejudices. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> To be slightly less short, and explain, I was talking in the frame >>>>>>>>> of the non collapse formulation of QM, and I was just saying that >>>>>>>>> without >>>>>>>>> any collapse, the linearity of the tensor product with the linearity >>>>>>>>> of the >>>>>>>>> SWE ensure that at any time everything is local, even computable, in >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> global third person picture. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Basically, "physical non locality" needs to put some amount of 3p >>>>>>>>> sense in the collapse of the wave, where in the MWI (and in >>>>>>>>> arithmetic) the >>>>>>>>> indeterminacies and the non local appearances are purely epistemic >>>>>>>>> (first >>>>>>>>> person or first person plural). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> > There are 1p statistical interference, but Bell's inequality >>>>>>>>>> violation >>>>>>>>>> > is accounted without FTL, which is not the case with collapse, >>>>>>>>>> or >>>>>>>>>> > Bohmian particules. >>>>>>>>>> > I gave the proof with others, and eventually you admitted that >>>>>>>>>> there >>>>>>>>>> > was no real action at a distance. But with one world, those are >>>>>>>>>> real >>>>>>>>>> > action at a distance. So I think the point has been made. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> There is no FTL mechanism in action in one world or many: Bell >>>>>>>>>> non-locality obeys the no-signalling theorem. You have to get >>>>>>>>>> over >>>>>>>>>> thinking that non-locality means FTL action. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Here's an article of interest. FWIW, I don't believe the >>>>>>>>> no-signalling theorem puts this issue >>>>>>>>> to rest. AG >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> In all the thread we (me and Bruce) were agreeing with this, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I haven't read every post in this thread, but from Bruce's remark >>>>>>>> above, he apparently believes that you believe in FTL transmission of >>>>>>>> information, and that since the no-signal theorem denies that, your >>>>>>>> claim >>>>>>>> (or any claim of FTL transmission) is falsified. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Guess what, you were completely wrong. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I was the one who denies the FTL. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *My text may have confused you. I thought you went to the MWI to >>>>>>> deny FTL in this one-world. That's what I meant. But Bruce seems to >>>>>>> deny >>>>>>> FTL in this world, by saying the phenomenon is just a property of the >>>>>>> wf, >>>>>>> and in his appeal to the no-signalling theorem; as if to say, if you >>>>>>> can't >>>>>>> send information, there can't be FTL. But here "send information" in >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> context of no-signalling theorem just means you can't send a message of >>>>>>> choice. AG * >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *What does FPI stand for? TIA, AG* >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The article I posted denies that the apparent contradiction between >>>>>>>> relativity and non locality can be resolved simply by appealing to the >>>>>>>> non-signalling theorem, which Bruce seems to assert. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I was the one asserting that with the MWI, even the Bell's >>>>>>>> violation does not force FTL, even without signalling possible. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> My point, shared by others in the thread, was that with the MWI >>>>>>>> restores both 3p determinacy, and 3p locality. The point of Clark and >>>>>>>> Bruce >>>>>>>> is that even with the MWI, Bell's inequality violation proves that >>>>>>>> nature >>>>>>>> is 3p non local, and that action at a distance exists. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I can only go by his words. So I don't see that the article I >>>>>>>> posted is irrelevant to the discussion. AG >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> It was Bruce who claims that Bell's inequality violation shows that >>>>>>>> FTL exists, even without possible signalling. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *Then why does he tell you to "get over it", it being FTL? AG* >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> *Maybe he means that FTL exists in this world, so why resort to the >>>>>> MWI to deny it. But then why does he bring up the no-signalling theorem? >>>>>> AG * >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *Hope I didn't offend any true believers in the MWI, * >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> MWI is a theory. I have often explain, as a logician, that MWI is not >>>>> an interpretation but a different theory than Copenhagen. MWI = >>>>> wave-function postulate. Copenhagen-QM = wave function postulate + >>>>> collapse >>>>> postulate. Of course both have some problem of interpretation (like all >>>>> theories). I tend to not accept the notion of "physical world", and >>>>> working >>>>> in arithmetic I use only the notion of computation. Indeed, my result is >>>>> that both the collapse of the wave and the wave itself are universal >>>>> number's First Person phenomenologies, when we assume a form of Mechanist >>>>> Hypothesis in cognitive science. Mechanism makes physicalism wrong. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *but in extensive discussions about this on another MB, none of the >>>>> true believers could give a coherent account of these other worlds; for >>>>> example, where the energy comes from, * >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Energy is a "one-world" notion, but anyway, I don't believe in worlds, >>>>> at least not until someone explains what they mean. For me, it is a >>>>> convenient fiction. With Mechanism, a world is an extrapolation made by >>>>> numbers sharing sheaves of computation verifying some measure weight, and >>>>> such measure weighting must be explained through the logic of >>>>> self-reference. You might take a look at my papers, like this one: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html >>>>> >>>>> Or this one, if you can access it: >>>>> >>>>> http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2013.03.014 >>>>> >>>>> *and whether an observer in this world is reproduced in other worlds, >>>>> and if so, with what memories. The MWI seems like a desperate attempt to >>>>> avoid non-locality and/or non-linearity of QM. AG * >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Well, it avois the non linearity of the collapse, and its dualism. OK. >>>>> But the "other worlds" are only a consequence of the contagion of the >>>>> superposition of the particle (say) to the observer. If you look at a cat >>>>> in the dead+alive state, you end yourself looking at a dead cat + looking >>>>> at a alive cat. The given brain states are orthogonal and do not >>>>> interact, >>>>> but can still interfere statistically. This list is for people believing >>>>> that "everything" is a simpler conceptual notion than any particular >>>>> thing, >>>>> and so welcome both the MWI in quantum physics, and the >>>>> "many-computations" >>>>> in arithmetic, that we get from Mechanism. I predicted the *appearance* >>>>> of >>>>> "many-worlds" before knowing about quantum physics measurement problem. >>>>> >>>>> About Bruce's points, maybe you should ask Bruce, as the cited post is >>>>> a bit out of the context of the thread. >>>>> >>>>> You asked in another post what is the FPI. >>>>> It is an acronym for First Person Indeterminacy, and it is the >>>>> subjective indeterminacy that you get in the (classical) >>>>> self-duplication. >>>>> Again, look at the paper sane04 cited above, where this is made precise >>>>> and >>>>> explained. The FPI is the building brick of the argument showing that >>>>> Mechanism and Physicalism are incompatible, and that physics is >>>>> conceptually reduced to arithmetic when we assume mechanism. I show that >>>>> this leads to testable consequences, and some are tested retrospectively >>>>> with QM. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I agree that FTL (fast than light influence which not necessarily >>>>>>>> exploitable for transmission of information) still exist, and I agree >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>> it is logically possible, but people believing in that have the >>>>>>>> obligation >>>>>>>> to give evidence, and my point is that in the MWI, Bell's violation is >>>>>>>> no >>>>>>>> more an evidence, as Bell supposes definite outcomes in definite >>>>>>>> realties, >>>>>>>> which makes no sense in the MWI, nor in computationalism more >>>>>>>> generally. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *I tend to agree that Bell's results assume one world. AG * >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Good. I think some people disagree with this on this list, but I will >>>>> let them to defend their point again, or not. >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The question was specifically about some possible remnant of >>>>>>>>> physical action at a distance in the MWI. We both know that the non >>>>>>>>> signaling does not put light on this. Genuine physical action at a >>>>>>>>> distance >>>>>>>>> obviously exist in the QM-with-collapse, by Bell's inequality >>>>>>>>> violation, >>>>>>>>> but Bell's argument does not show action at a distance( in any unique >>>>>>>>> branch if that exist), in the MWI. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> What we have is the contagion of superposition, and they never go >>>>>>>>> quicker than interaction, that is at sub-speed of light. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> And that is why we can define, or represent the "world" by set of >>>>>>>>> space-time events closed for interaction. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> http://people.uleth.ca/~kent.peacock/FQXi_v2.pdf >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Interesting (but out of topic indeed). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>> That adds nothing, indeed. That shows only that the paradoxes >>>>>>>>>> came >>>>>>>>>> >>> only from the axioms some have added to fit their >>>>>>>>>> philosophical >>>>>>>>>> >>> prejudices. >>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>> >> So you add axioms to suit your philosophical prejudices just >>>>>>>>>> as >>>>>>>>>> >> others do -- how does that make your position any better than >>>>>>>>>> that of >>>>>>>>>> >> others? >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > No. I subtract axioms. >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > Bohr's axioms: SWE + COLLAPSE + number (add,mult) (+ >>>>>>>>>> > unintelligible theory of mind) >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > Everett's axioms SWE + Number (add,mult). (+ mechanist >>>>>>>>>> theory of >>>>>>>>>> > mind) >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > Your servitor's axioms: Number(add,mult). (+ mechanist >>>>>>>>>> theory >>>>>>>>>> > of mind) >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > And I don't pretend that is true, only that digital mechanism >>>>>>>>>> makes >>>>>>>>>> > this necessary and testable (modulo the usual "malin génies"). >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> All the above sets of axioms lead to non-local theories. You may >>>>>>>>>> claim >>>>>>>>>> just to subtract axioms, but that is as much choosing your axioms >>>>>>>>>> as any >>>>>>>>>> other procedure. And you have yet to show that you get the >>>>>>>>>> physics of >>>>>>>>>> this world out of your theory --and demonstrate the necessary >>>>>>>>>> stability >>>>>>>>>> of the physics. Just wishing evil genies away does not actually >>>>>>>>>> banish them. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Bruce >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>>>>> send an email to [email protected]. >>>>>>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>>>>>> Visit this group at >>>>>>>>> https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>>>> send an email to [email protected]. >>>>>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>>>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>>>>>>> . >>>>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in >>>>>>> the Google Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this topic, visit >>>>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/SJdbZNPRALg/unsubscribe >>>>>>> . >>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to >>>>>>> [email protected]. >>>>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>> >>>> >>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/e >>> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list> >>> >>> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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