Wishful thinking gives a sense of direction, science tells how long it may take 
to get there.



-----Original Message-----
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Wed, Jan 25, 2017 5:46 am
Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post




On 25 Jan 2017, at 02:19, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:


 
Aristotelean or dull and ant-intellectual, perhaps. I am thinking, 
communication, trade, entertainment, is more enjoyable then platonic idealism, 
don't you?



Yes. I think so.


Now science is enjoyable too, but is not done for enjoyment per se. Truth is 
not always enjoyable, and science is not necessarily wishful thinking. 


Bruno




 
 
 
 
 
-----Original Message-----
 From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
 To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
 Sent: Mon, Jan 23, 2017 6:08 am
 Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post
 
 
 

 
 
On 22 Jan 2017, at 00:06, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
 

Unless these universes are somehow, touchable, it's as if, they don't exist.  
 

 
 
Not at all. Linearitu of QM makes them untouchable, but we have still to accept 
their physical existence because they do interfere statistically. If not you 
need a theory like Bohm, with the known difficulties which are insuperable in 
the relativistic domain, or use the collapse of the wave, which leads to a 
dualism, a god playing dice, action at distance, fuzzy notion of observers, etc.
 

 
 
Then with computationalism, we have the many-dreams anyway, already in 
arithmetic, which is already assumed by the physicist.
 

 
 
Then also, are you sure you can touch more easily one universe? Again, that 
leads to an absurd (non Turing emulable) role of matter in psychology.
 

 
 

 
 
 
 
I love the topic, but it's kind of never never land. 
 
 

 
 
This is perhaps due to Aristotelian prejudice. You seem to believe in (at least 
one) universe playing a fundamental role ..
 

 
 
 
 
Ya got wormholes, I'm interested. 
 
 
 

 
 
... or perhaps you are just not interested in fundamental question. The whole 
point is that this question (the number of universe) is amenable to empirical 
refutation. With computationalism, to put it bluntly: there are zero universe, 
only a reality emerging from the first person indeterminacy of the distributed 
subject in infinitely may computations, constrained by the theoretical computer 
science constraints imposed on self-observation.
 

 
 
Bruno
 

 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-----Original Message-----
 From: Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net>
 To: EveryThing <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
 Sent: Sat, Jan 21, 2017 3:39 pm
 Subject: Fwd: Correction to MWI post
 
 
 
    Phillip Ball's critique of MWI.
     
     Brent
     

       
       -------- Forwarded Message --------
       
       
Use this MWI  to          access the Aeon article. Sorry
       
     
   
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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
 


 
 
 
 
 
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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



 


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