-----Original Message-----
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Sun, Jan 29, 2017 8:19 am
Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post
On 27 Jan 2017, at 13:57, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
What about Boltzmann Brains?
Do you view these as mindful observers?
I don't see any brain as mindful observers. Only a person is
mindful, and they own brains, which are just tools making that
person able to interact with some stable collection of universal
entities.
The UD generates all Boltzmann brains, but to be conscious, you need
more than a brain, you need a sheaf of normal (gaussian)
computations (measure 1, or 1 - epsilon). And, you, that is the
person, are not attached to any brain per se, but only to a
succession of brain state compute by a stable universal environment,
which lacks (by definition) for Boltzmann brains. That reduce the
Boltzmann brain problem in physics to justifying the appearance of
brain in arithmetic (the white rabbit problem).To simplify; we might
say that you need an infinity of brains belonging to an infinity of
stable computations. That such infinities exist and have a quantum
logic suggests that computationalism might be correct.
Bruno
-----Original Message-----
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Thu, Jan 26, 2017 2:07 pm
Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post
On 26 Jan 2017, at 17:07, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
If dreaming is a function of biological things,
It depends on how you define biological. If you define it like me
with a theorem in arithmetic/computer-science, of intensional
numbers (relative codes, like DNA, or programs) which can
reprodruces themselves with respect to other universal numbers,
physical or not, then, OK, like Bateson, psychology is a cousin of
biology, and we use ineddded the same trick (Dx = xx -> DD = DD)
both in abstract biology and in abstract psychology, ... and in
abstract theology.
where then, might be the brain of the dreamer.
That does simply not exist. It is all in your brain (grin).
If we except Babbage machine, computability and the notion of
computation have been discovered by mathematical logicians working
in the foundations of mathematics. Gödel discovered 95% of it, but
missed it. Post, Church and Turing got it, and then many others,
including Gödel who talk about a miracle (the closure of the set of
partial computable function from Cantor Diagonalization).
(Very) Elementary Arithmetic is already Turing universal.
Whatever can be done by a universal system can be done by any other
universal system.
So, if you are willing to admit that 2+2=4 and simlar propositions
are independent of you, then you are forced to admit that all
digital emulation of your brain are instantiated in term of some
(true) number relation. Actually (and that is the (interesting)
problem) there are infinitely many of them.
Can we contact the dreamer?
By amnesy and/or dissociation, you can go up to remember which
universal person you are, perhaps. Sy hello to the *many* dreamers!
Is there a an analog of the dreamers, neurobiology? Numbers may
generate reality, or so Tegmark has asserted.
And I have proved it well before. It follows from Church Thesis, and
a very minimal form of Occam razor for the believers-in-matter.
The numbers, or the combinators, etc. Any Church-Turing Universal
number/machine/finite-system will do.
Wolfram also gets this, and I ask, imbecile that I am, ok, so what
can we do with this? Can we contact the programmer?
If you want a mythology, one well suited for computationalism is
that the Big Goddess made a great Garden/Game for her Son which only
plays hide-and-seek with himself. The garden is very great, and God
can lost itself very deeply indeed.
Hey, like Jürgen Schmidhuber has written of, A Great Programmer.
Yes. The Universal Dovetailer is the (a) great programmer, if you
want. It generates all programs and it executes them all,
dovetailing on the executions so as not being trapped by non
stopping executions, which exist and are not algorithmically
recognizable (the price of universality). See my URL for a program
and one initial execution.
But is a dumb program. It is equivalent to Robinson arithmetic (very
elementary arithmetic, or PA without the induction axioms). It
generate all dreams, with a mathematical complex redundancy. But he
does not thought about itself, and is not aware of its universality.
For this, you need to add the beliefs in the induction axioms,
making them Löbian, dreamers.
The Universal dovetailer executes (without understanding) all Löbian
dreamers, but is not a Löbian machine itself.
For me, all I can handle is PowerShell...maybe.
You are without any doubt Universal, so you can emulate all
universal system, given enough time and space, and/or numbers. And
you are Löbian, I am pretty sure. You might probably blind yourself
with unnecessary prejudices, plausibly invented by your local
predators, as well as the predators of your ancestors, or something.
I mean even if computationalism is false, your Turing universality
is a provable fact. Then computationalism says that your local body
is not more than Universal. That leads to testable physical
constraints, and indeed we got the quantum aspect: statistic on
computations + a logic which makes it quantum-like. So, the idea is
not yet refuted, and is, to my knowledge, the only precise theory of
quanta (physics) and qualia (psychology, theology).
It is up to the believer in God or Matter to explain how their
favorite divinity manage to interfere with the computations which
are in arithmetic (a non controversial facts, both historically and
factually). Let us just compute and compare, like modest scientists
do. An evidence that the observable world departs from the physics
in the head of the universal numbers *would be* an evidence for some
God or some Matter, or some "Bostromian" malevolent emulations. But
there are just none yet.
Bruno
-----Original Message-----
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Thu, Jan 26, 2017 10:26 am
Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post
On 25 Jan 2017, at 21:25, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
Sounds like a Lôbian device is a necessity, in this facet of the
MWI? If they don't form naturally, God sets us in motion so we can
invent them.
If you agree that 2+2=4 and the like, we don't need to invoke (any)
God. Referential numbers provably exists, and all those having rich
cognitive abilities, like belieeing in the induction axioms, are
provably Löbian. God needs only to create the natural numbers, with
addition and multiplication. But the numbers themselves can only
hope to be correct.
Moreover, they imply that we get Everett's and Wheeler's universe to
function by supplying more observers. I am guessing the mightier the
observer, the more clout they have to change things, split things
off, etc. Larry Krauss once joked, that astronomers shouldn't peer
back in time, because they might cause the universe to collapse.
No worry :)
... because there are no universe, only dreams. But below our
substitution level, the dreams seems to cohere enough to allow long,
perhaps infinite, sharable "video games", and we extrapolate them
into "physical universe" (assuming computationalism if this needs to
be repeated). We can't collapse that. It belongs to a realm which is
"out of time", "out of space".
Bruno
-----Original Message-----
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Wed, Jan 25, 2017 11:09 am
Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post
On 25 Jan 2017, at 13:17, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
Wishful thinking gives a sense of direction,
Wishes can do that.
Wishful thinking leads to believe in things which do not exist, and
eventually to disarrays and difficulties.
science tells how long it may take to get there.
It can also say if "there" is accessible at all.
To be sure, as I explained sometimes, notably in the second part of
Sane04, there might be a sort of wishful thinking at the bottom of
reality, in the sense that if you convince rationally a Löbian
entity that If ever she believes in Santa Klaus, Santa Klaus exist,
then she will believe in Santa Klaus. That is actually Löb's
theorem, but the comparison with wishful thinking, or with the
placebo, is a bit metaphorical. Löb's theorem is still very amazing.
The machine rational beliefs are close for the rule
[]p -> p
---------
p
Put in another way: []([]p -> p) -> []p is true about the machine.
That is Löb's formula (with "[]" put for Gödel's provability
predicate of the entity). It happens that not only it is true, but
it is provable too by the Löbian entity (machine or divine being).
It is the main axiom of the modal logic G (and G*).
Bruno
-----Original Message-----
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Wed, Jan 25, 2017 5:46 am
Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post
On 25 Jan 2017, at 02:19, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
Aristotelean or dull and ant-intellectual, perhaps. I am thinking,
communication, trade, entertainment, is more enjoyable then platonic
idealism, don't you?
Yes. I think so.
Now science is enjoyable too, but is not done for enjoyment per se.
Truth is not always enjoyable, and science is not necessarily
wishful thinking.
Bruno
-----Original Message-----
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Mon, Jan 23, 2017 6:08 am
Subject: Re: Correction to MWI post
On 22 Jan 2017, at 00:06, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
Unless these universes are somehow, touchable, it's as if, they
don't exist.
Not at all. Linearitu of QM makes them untouchable, but we have
still to accept their physical existence because they do interfere
statistically. If not you need a theory like Bohm, with the known
difficulties which are insuperable in the relativistic domain, or
use the collapse of the wave, which leads to a dualism, a god
playing dice, action at distance, fuzzy notion of observers, etc.
Then with computationalism, we have the many-dreams anyway, already
in arithmetic, which is already assumed by the physicist.
Then also, are you sure you can touch more easily one universe?
Again, that leads to an absurd (non Turing emulable) role of matter
in psychology.
I love the topic, but it's kind of never never land.
This is perhaps due to Aristotelian prejudice. You seem to believe
in (at least one) universe playing a fundamental role ..
Ya got wormholes, I'm interested.
... or perhaps you are just not interested in fundamental question.
The whole point is that this question (the number of universe) is
amenable to empirical refutation. With computationalism, to put it
bluntly: there are zero universe, only a reality emerging from the
first person indeterminacy of the distributed subject in infinitely
may computations, constrained by the theoretical computer science
constraints imposed on self-observation.
Bruno
-----Original Message-----
From: Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net>
To: EveryThing <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Sat, Jan 21, 2017 3:39 pm
Subject: Fwd: Correction to MWI post
Phillip Ball's critique of MWI.
Brent
-------- Forwarded Message --------
Use this MWI to access the Aeon article. Sorry
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