On 4/21/2017 1:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 20 Apr 2017, at 22:24, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 4/20/2017 12:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
That looks nice. So now, I ask to you, and to everybody a question,
which is important, and still open although I do have some
opinion/hint.
You are in Helsinki, and you are scanned and annihilate as usual,
and (3p)-duplicate in three exemplars: one is reconstituted in W and
two in Moscow. You are told before, in Helsinki, that in Moscow, the
two exemplaries are in the exact same state and environment, and
that this will last forever (they will never 1p differentiate).
In what sense are they "two"?
Let us say that one is in a virtual environment imitating Moscow
centrum, put physically at the North of the "real" Moscow, and the
second one, is in the numerically identical virtual environment
imitating Moscow centrum, but put physically at the South of the
"real" Moscow. Again, we suppose that the substitution are done at the
right substitution level, so that the first person experience are
identical (but the processing is duplicated).
So really all the talk about "identical virtual environment" is
irrelevant. All you're really trying to specify is that they are having
the same (conscious?) thoughts.
Do they have exactly the same point-of-view?
Thay have the exactly same 1p history, yes.
You say they are in the exact same state and environment. So is the
environment the same? Is it the same at the quantum level? The same
quantum interactions with cosmic rays, etc?
Yes. Exatly the same with respect to the substitution level. ...
better to make the environment virtual to add a bit of realism.
But, as you've used term before, the substitution level is defined
strictly in terms of psychology, i.e. having the same thoughts ... does
that include subconscious thoughts?
This is your thought experiment. Is it significant that it's
nomologically impossible? Two different places, even quite close
together, will experience different cosmic ray bombardment, different
entanglements of quantum states, and these may make a difference at the
level of the computation.
Brent
I think Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles applies. But Leibniz
didn't know about quantum mechanics and superposition of states.
Nor do we, in that reasoning. We suppose a physical reality able to
run a universal Turing machine, but not much more, for the sake of the
theoretical reasoning.
Bruno
Brent
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