On 20 April 2017 at 14:25, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> On 20 Apr 2017, at 11:53, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
> On 20 Apr 2017 10:08 a.m., "Bruno Marchal" <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>
> On 20 Apr 2017, at 09:23, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
> On 20 Apr 2017 8:05 a.m., "Bruno Marchal" <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>
> On 19 Apr 2017, at 19:09, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 19 April 2017 at 16:48, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>>
>> On 19 Apr 2017, at 12:56, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> On 19 April 2017 at 08:24, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>> John has never write one clear post refuting the step-3 which would make
>>> it possible to answer by one post. There is no need for this, as the answer
>>> is in the publications, which makes clear the 1-3 distinction, so the
>>> ambiguity that John dreams for cannot occur.
>>
>>
>> I've often wondered whether Hoyle's heuristic could be a way of
>> short-cutting this dispute. Hoyle gives us a way to think about every
>> subjective moment as if it occurred within the 1-view of a common agent.
>> Essentially the heuristic invites us to think of all subjective
>> experiences, aka observer moments, as a single logical serialisation in
>> which relative spatial and temporal orientation is internal to each moment.
>> In comp terms this conceptual agent might perhaps be the virgin
>> (unprogrammed) machine, on the basis that all such machines are effectively
>> computationally equivalent.
>>
>>
>> Exactly. With comp you have to fix one universal base to name all the
>> other number/program/machine, and their relative states relatively to the
>> universal numbers which implements them. The universal numbers are what
>> define the relative computations. A computation is only a sequence of
>> elementary local deformation, and once a universal sequence of phi_i is
>> given, they are parametrised by four numbers some u, and its own sequence
>> of phi_u(i,j)^s = phi_i(j)^s (the sth step of the computation by u of the
>> program i on the input j).
>>
>> But Hoyle heuristic does not seem to solve the "prediction" problem, for
>> each 1p-views there is an infinity of universal competing universal numbers
>> (and thus computations) below the substitution level (and worst: it is
>> impossible for the 1p to know its substitution level).
>>
>
> Sure, but I believe the idea is that after the metaphorical "selection"
> (i.e. not a real process - more below) of any given 1-view, the "agent"
> finds itself immediately 1-relativised to a particular psychological
> history. Hence ISTM that, from each 1-view, relative predictions would be
> the same as in the usual comp situation. Of course, there is always the
> issue of differential measure over the entire class of 1-views. Hoyle's
> heuristic imposes a quasi-frequency interpretation of probability for any
> finite segment of the serialisation and, in terms of histories, we do
> indeed find ourselves (at least psychologically) bounded within some
> quasi-finite segment. So I imagine Hoyle would want us to think in terms of
> the "most probable" continuations being selected more frequently, whether
> these are considered absolutely pre-selection, or relatively post. Of
> course the agent is bound to "encounter" 1-views of lower probability, but
> then this is ultimately a matter to be resolved in the struggle between
> consistent remembering (hardly ever) and inconsistent forgetting (almost
> always). One could say that the former are perhaps analogous to the
> in-phase, least-action part of Feynman's path integral approach and the
> latter with the out-of-phase part.
>
>
> That looks nice. So now, I ask to you, and to everybody a question, which
> is important, and still open although I do have some opinion/hint.
>
> You are in Helsinki, and you are scanned and annihilate as usual, and
> (3p)-duplicate in three exemplars: one is reconstituted in W and two in
> Moscow. You are told before, in Helsinki, that in Moscow, the two
> exemplaries are in the exact same state and environment, and that this will
> last forever (they will never 1p differentiate). The question is asked
> when you are still in Helsinki. What is P(W) and P(M) ?
> Then, I ask the same question, but in Helsinki we are told that some
> differentiation will occur between the two copies in Moscow, at some later
> time.
>
>
> You mean what is the effective differential measure of the states
> representing P and M, and should any subsequent question of the divergence
> or otherwise of the two examplars of M affect our view of this? Good
> question. Not sure. I'm tempted to answer, in terms of Hoyle, that a larger
> measure of any particular class of pigeon holes should always increase the
> "probability" of encountering exemplars of that class in any given finite
> traversal of the serialisation. So in that case from a Bayesian perspective
> I ought to say that P(M) is twice P(W). What's your view?
>
>
> My view is that the measure is on the distinguishable first person views
> sequences. So it is P(W) = P(M) = 1/2 in the first case where we are told
> in Helsinki that the copies in M remains forever similar (assuming this
> possible, which it can be in virtual rendering of that duplication, say),
> and it is P(W) = P(M) = 1/3 in the case the experiences of the
> M-reconstituted persons diverge, even if it diverges only after a long
> time, by the Y = II rules. A bifurcation in the future is, subjectively
> equivalent to a duplication in the path.
>
>
> Could some future bifurcation, perhaps long delayed, really be regarded as
> affecting a duplication question at some earlier, not-yet-differentiated
> juncture? Interesting question.
>
> (This answers also a question raised by John Clark in his recent comment
> to you, and I think we have discussed this also with respect to the
> unionist/fusionist problem raised by Bostrom, a long time ago).
>
>
> My point to John was just that his proposition would have no material
> impact for the restriction I proposed on a plausible 1-view, from the human
> perspective at least. My response was agnostic on the question of measure.
>
>
> OK.
>
>
>
>
> The
>
> probabilities are plausibly not on 3p-states or 1p-observer moments, but
> on distinguishable 1p-histories (memories of sequences of 1p-observer
> moments).
>
>
> Yeah, this is a tricky one without a single "right" answer of course.
>
>
> Indeed, when we rest on our intuition, but that is why it is nice that
> with computationalism, we can handled the problem by using the (addmitedly
> counter-intuitive) Gödel-Löbian logics of self-reference. First things
> which is given by the machine: the difference between what we can justify
> and what we cannot justify, but still know, and then the non knowable, etc.
>
> Of course, we can continue on the intuitive level, but we are warned: with
> computationalism, the intuition ([]p & p) is in a sort of tension/conflict
> with what we can justify. It is here that the scientist ([]p) want to
> eliminate the first person and god ([]p & p). But this is exactly the eroor
> of Penrose: to take for granted his own equivalence between []p and []p &
> p. that belongs to G* minus G. It is a "machine-theological" blasphem.
>
>
>
>
> Hoyle's pigeon hole notion seems to encourage us to think in a Bayesian
> way about both absolute and relative measures of classes of observer
> moments. In an Everettian context, we are encouraged to conceive more
> probable immediate continuations as being represented in larger measure in
> the evolving relative wave function - i.e. with respect to the Born rule.
> Indeed this is necessary to give any meaning to the notion of probability
> in a context where every possible continuation is conceived as being
> represented in some measure. And this would appear to apply over spectra of
> continuations that may be distinguishable in some limit but are not so very
> different.
>
> So again one should perhaps rationally predict any of such similar
> continuations as more or less equally probable and hence summing to a
> higher total measure as a class.
>
>
> That is a bit unclear to me.
>
Me too ;) I guess I meant expectation in a more general sense as distinct
from the very specific question you posed.
>
>
> Hence we should rationally expect typically to encounter continuations of
> this general sort. So what does this mean for actually indistinguishable
> continuations (whatever we can take that to mean in principle)?
>
>
> It means that the M guy is in exactly the same states. At some point this
> means same life and after-life. Clark is plausibly right on this: having to
> identical brain will not change your relative measure (normally: this has
> not yet been extracted from the Z1* logic, although it is very close, just
> to abstract even for me).
>
> (It saves us also of the idea that a brain with big axons and big neurons,
> like if fusing the two identical brain in your head, would have a bigger
> measure, which would threatened computationalism, as you would need to ask
> non digital functional question to the doctor like the thin-ness of the
> basic logical components).
>
>
>
> Still unsure, but I can't completely shift the intuition that you couldn't
> expect to clone even indistinguishable continuations indefinitely without
> rationally impacting the prediction scenario. Could you?
>
>
> I don't see the difficulty, even if I agree this is difficult to realize
> in practice. But this occurs in arithmetic, many infinite computations are
> undistinguishable from the 1p views. I have good reason to think that they
> don't add up. Yet, if they differentiate, they "retroact" on the measure.
> That is not more astonishing that the invariance of the 1p for the
> reconstitution delays, even when the delay are very big. It gives a similar
> apparent "retroaction". QM have those too, like in the temporal Bell's
> inequalities.
>
> If we add fusion and amnesia, the "not-counting-of similar 1p histories"
> is closer to explain the negative "amplitude of probability" interference
> of QM, but the intuition get tricky, and, as I said, I prefer to switch to
> math, given that computationalism gives us computer science and
> mathematical logic to get the logic of measure one, even if this is without
> really answering the question, at least not yet (even the quantum extracted
> from arithmetics remains weird and counter-intuitive. It is an
> intrinsically difficult subject).
>
Yeah, I guess one shouldn't push Hoyle's metaphor too far. It may help
with certain conceptual difficulties (especially for those agnostic on
comp) but it's hardly a precision tool. As you say, we need more formal
methods to progress further. Anyway, the Southern Italian sun beckons, so
bye for now!
David
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> David
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> David
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>> Anyway, in this way of thinking, after my 3-duplication there are of
>> course two 3-copies; so in the 3-view it can make perfect sense to say that
>> each copy is me (i.e. one of my continuations). Hence my expectation in
>> that same 3-sense is that I will be present in both locations. However,
>> again in terms of the heuristic, it is equally the case that each 1-view is
>> occupied serially and exclusively by the single agent: i.e. *at one time
>> and in one place*. Hence in that sense only a single 1-view can possibly
>> represent me *at that one time and that one place*. Hoyle shows us how all
>> the copies can indeed come to occupy each of their relative spatio-temporal
>> locations in the logical serialisation, but also that *these cannot occur
>> simultaneously*.
>>
>>
>> I think it is the indexical view, that Saunders attributes to Everett.
>>
>
> Well, it's clear from the narrative of the novel that Hoyle meant the
> 1-view.
>
>
>> It is also implicit in Galileo and Einstein relativity theory. With the
>> discovery of the universal number in arithmetic, and their executions and
>> interaction are described by elementary reasoning, although tedious like I
>> have try to give you a gist lately :)
>>
>>
>>
>> The crucial point to bear in mind is that according to Hoyle, both of
>> these understandings are equally true and *do not contradict each other*.
>>
>>
>> Mechanism would be inconsistent. But even arithmetic and computer science
>> would be inconsistent. It would be like the discovery of a program capable
>> to predict in advance the specific answer to where its backup will be
>> upload in a cut and double paste operation.
>>
>> In "real life" that is made precise and simple, I think, by the temporary
>> definition of the first person by the owner of the personal diary, which
>> enter the teleportation box.
>>
>> In the math, that will be be featured by the difference between "[]p",
>> and "[]p & p", with other nuances. They do not contradict each other, as G*
>> proves them equivalent on arithmetic, but they obey quite different logic.
>> A logic of communicable beliefs about oneself, and a logic of informal non
>> communicable personal intuition/knowledge, here limited to the rational.
>> "[]p & p" cannot be captured by one box definable in arithmetic, we can
>> only meta-define it on simpler machine than us that we trust. here you have
>> to introspect yourself if you agree or not with the usual axioms I have
>> given (which is really the question, did you take your kids back from
>> school when a teacher dares to tell them that 2+2=4.
>>
>>
>>
>> Furthermore, comp or no comp, they are surely consistent with anything we
>> would reasonably expect to experience: namely, that whenever sufficiently
>> accurate copies of our bodies could be made, using whatever method, our
>> expectation would nevertheless be to find ourselves occupying a single
>> 1-view, representing a subjectively exclusive spatio-temporal location.
>> Indeed it is that very 1-view which effectively defines the relative
>> boundaries of any given time and place. Subjective experiences are
>> temporally and spatially bounded by definition; it is therefore inescapable
>> that they are mutually exclusive in the 1-view.
>>
>>
>> Assuredly.
>>
>>
>>
>> So what Hoyle's method achieves here is a clear and important distinction
>> between the notion of 3-synchronisation (i.e. temporal co-location with
>> respect to a publicly available clock) and that of 1-simultaneity (i.e. the
>> co-occurrence of two spatio-temporally distinct perspectives within a
>> single, momentary 1-view). Whereas the former is commonplace and hence to
>> be expected, the latter is entirely inconsistent with normal experience and
>> hence should not be.
>>
>>
>>
>> But did Hoyle accepted the pure indexical view?
>>
>
> Yes, that he meant the 1-view is quite clear from the narrative of
> October the First.
>
>
>> Did he not attempt to make a selection with some flash of light?
>>
>
> But remember it's only meant to be a metaphor. So the flash of light (or
> the guy wandering among the pigeon holes) in effect plays the role of
> stepping through the computational continuations, when considered relative
> to any point of origin within a history. Otherwise the metaphor would have
> been static.
>
> It is tempting to select a computation among the infinities, like when
>> adding hidden variables and special initial condition in QM, or like when
>> invoking irrationality like Roland Omnès still in QM (sic), or, no less
>> irrational, like invoking God in QM again (like Belinfante), or like
>> invoking Primary Matter in Arithmetic (like, I'm afraid many of us do
>> unconsciously, by a sort of innate extrapolation, which has its role in
>> helping us to not confuse the prey and the predator.
>>
>> With computationalism, what is important is to understand that this leads
>> to a difficult mathematical problem, basically: finding a measure on the
>> (true) sigma_1 sentences. This is made possible only if we get the right
>> logic on the intensional variants of provability imposed by incompleteness.
>>
>> I should explain better this: there are three incompleteness theorems:
>>
>> 1) PA (and its consistent extensions) is (are) undecidable (there is a
>> true arithmetical proposition not provable by PA, which is assumed
>> consistent).
>>
>> 2) If PA is consistent, then PA cannot prove its consistency.
>>
>> 3) (which is the major thing) PA proves 2 above. That if: PA proves
>> (~beweisbar('f') -> ~beweisbar('~beweisbar('f')').
>>
>> Many people ignores that Gödel discovered (without proving it) that PA
>> already knew (in the theaetetus sense) Gödel's theorem. That will be proven
>> in all details by Hilbert and Bernays, and embellished by the crazy Löb
>> contribution. More on this more later. My scheduling tight up exponentially
>> up to June I'm afraid.
>>
>>
>>
>> By the way, I shall be on holiday in Sicily from April 20th until May
>> 12th (one of me only, I trust) so I probably won't be appearing much in the
>> list during that period.
>>
>>
>>
>> Meanwhile I think about the intermediate level, but it is difficult, if
>> not perilous, to give an informal account of the formal and informal
>> differences between the formal and informal, and this without going through
>> a minimum of formality, ... well don't mind too much.
>> May be you can meditate on the Plotinus - arithmetic lexicon, keeping in
>> mind we talk about a simple machine we trust to be arithmetically correct,
>> the machine will be able to "live" the difference between
>>
>
>> truth (the One, p)
>> rationally justifiable (the man (G), the Noùs (G*) []p
>> knowable (the universal soul, the first person, S4Grz) []p & p
>> (Theaetetus)
>> ====
>> Observable (Intelligible matter, Z1*) []p & <>t
>> Feelable (Sensible matter, X1*) []p & <>t & p. (Plotinus might be a
>> good intermediate level, somehow, Smullyan too perhaps)
>>
>> Just one truth, but viewed according to many different type of views (the
>> hypostases above), and different "observer moment" defined by the many
>> universal numbers in arithmetic (the box are parametrized by the four
>> numbers above, in a first simple description).
>>
>
> I will dream on this.
>
>
>>
>> Take it easy. Happy holiday!
>>
>
> I'll do my best
> !
>
>
> David
>
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> David
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
>> email to [email protected].
>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>>
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
>> email to [email protected].
>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>>
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to [email protected].
> To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to [email protected].
> To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to [email protected].
> To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to [email protected].
> To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to [email protected].
> To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to [email protected].
> To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
