On 26 Apr 2017, at 00:19, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 4/25/2017 1:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Apr 2017, at 01:13, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 24/04/2017 6:07 pm, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Mon, Apr 24, 2017 at 6:08 AM, Russell Standish <[email protected]
> wrote:
On Sun, Apr 23, 2017 at 11:49:51AM +0200, Telmo Menezes wrote:
Ok, so you are rejecting computationalism. Computationalism is
the
hypothesis that our mind supervenes on computations (sorry
Bruno, it's
easier to write for the purpose of this discussion :). You are
declaring that mind supervene on the physical brain.
That is not it at all. We've clarified with Bruno many times that
computational supervenience is compatible with physical
supervenience. Which is just as well, as otherwise it would be
so much
the worse for computationalism.
I have no doubt that the brain is a physical computer, and that
computations performed by the brain are no different from any other
computations.
We are discussing physicalism and computationalism, and if they are
compatible or not, correct?
Bruce repeatedly makes variation of the claim: "look, the brain is
physical and the brain generates consciousness, these are the
facts".
This is what I am replying to. It's an argument from authority that
leaves no space for debate or reasoning.
First, it is not an argument from authority, it is an argument
made on the basis of all the available evidence -- consciousness
supervenes on the physical brain.
Second. An argument from authority is not necessarily a reason to
reject that argument. Because life is short and we cannot be
experts in absolutely everything, we frequently have to rely on
authorities -- people who are recognized experts in the relevant
field. I am confident that when I drive across this bridge it will
not collapse under the weight of my car because I trust the
expertise of the engineers who designed and constructed the
bridge. In other words, I rely on the relevant authorities for my
conclusion that this bridge is safe. An argument from authority is
unsound only if the quoted authorities are themselves not reliable
-- they are not experts in the relevant field, and/or their
supposed qualifications are bogus. There are many examples of this
-- like relying on President Trump's assessment of anthropogenic
global warming, etc, etc.
Third, since it is now clear that the term "physicalism" refers to
the belief in primary matter, I have never ascribed to
"physicalism".
Usually I use "Weak materialism" for the "assumption/belief" in
primary matter. primary means "in need to be assumed"; Something is
"primary" if to get its existence we need to assume it, or
something equivalent. For example, we know since the failure of
logicism that numbers are primary. We cannot derive them from logic.
But we can - and did - derive them from observation and manipulation
of objects. Numbers came from measuring the size of sheepherds, the
steps from one place to another,... You learned them that way at
your mother's knee.
I was using "derivation" in the logical or mathematical sense. Size of
sheepherds can be used for illustration, but if you think we can
derive numbers from sheep, show me a theory of sheepherds not using
numbers, and then a logical derivation of number existence from that.
It is a bit like the difference between we derive atoms from the
observation all around us, and we explain the origin of atoms from the
consumption of star.
What you said is correct, but not relevant in the search of a
fundamental theory.
Of course, we can derive them from the combinators theory, but
combinators are Turing equivalent to the numbers.
Weak materialism is just the belief in some matter, and that matter
cannot be explained by something non material.
I must used "weak" before materialist, because the term
"materialist" has a special meaning in philosophy of mind: it means
that only matter "really" exist, ad is opposed to dualism (matter
and mind exists) and immaterialism monism (only immaterial objects
exist)
Physicalism is the assumption, in metaphysics/theology, that
physics is the fundamental science to which all other sciences can
be, in principle, reduced.
We can conceive some forms of physicalism which are immaterialist,
for example Tegmark is close to this. But usually, most physicalist
are weak materialist, and often I use weak materialism and
physicalism as being quasi the same thing.
I am an empirist, indeed, I extracted "computationalism" from
biology, well before I knew about Church and Turing. And I take
physics very seriously, and as the ultimate judge. Indeed, my point
is that if mechanism is correct, the physical reality is "in the
machine's head", and that is what makes mechanism testable: by
comparing the physics in the head of the machine with the physics
inferred from the observation.
Testable requires not comparison, but falsifiability. So if
computationalism predicts things that are not observed, as it must
if it is to explain thoughts, then it seems it if falsified. It is
saved only by the too cheap trick of saying everything exists.
Not everything, just 0 and the successors.
Then we get all computations as a theorem, and all the rest as
computation seen from the first person self-referential pov of the
machines emulated by those computation.
Bruno
I do not know what "primary matter" is supposed to mean, and it
certainly has never been a subject of study that I have
encountered in my lifetime of work in physics.
The expression "primary matter" comes from Aristotle, which is the
first to clearly assume it as a metaphysical assumption/theory.
He used it because he was criticizing Democritus who had explicated
the idea of "atoms and the void". We only know of the atomist
philosophy indirectly. Criticism was congenial to the Roman Church,
but the original was not. If the atomist had prevailed instead of
Aristotle and Christianity, science would be 900yrs more advanced.
Brent
It has no role in physics at all, except helping the physicists to
sleep and not to be too much perturbate by the mind-body problem,
which since day one is the trouble maker for those who want to be
physicalist or weak-materialist.
What I have argued for is the existence of an external, objective,
physical world about which there is intersubjective agreement.
No problem with this, even if the "cosmos" (not the universal wave,
but the branch we are in) will appear eventually to be much
plausibly a first person plural construct (of numbers, not machine).
Whether the matter in this world is primary or emergent from
something more fundamental is an open question, and still the
subject of active debate in the physics community: I have no
commitment to either side of this argument. Likewise, there is an
ongoing debate among physicists about realist or anti-realist
interpretations of quantum mechanics, alongside more general
debates about realism in the philosophy of physics in general.
So I do not take kindly to attempts to silence me, or put me down,
by categorizing my views in simplistic terms, or in ways that I
have never entertained.
My problems with computationalism arise from the fact that I do
not believe in mathematical platonism,
I prefer to use "platonism" for Plato's theology, and use "realism"
here. I also do not believe in mathematical realism. But
arithmetical realism is needed by any one willing to give sense to
the Church-Turing thesis, or number theory. Arithmetical realism is
neutral on finitism/not-finitism. It is just the agreement with
Robinson arithmetic. It is even consistent with ultrafinitism. You
can believe in a biggest natural number. To be sure, the proof of
the consistency of RA + "there is a biggest natural number" cannot
be done by ultrafinitist means, but since Gödel we know that the
proof of consistency of a theory usually use more than the theory.
and the fact that computationalism has not produced any concrete
results about the physical world -- it is all speculative --
There is noting speculative in showing that physicalism is
incompatible with mechanism, and mechanism has been the motor of
basically all progress in science since Diderot (who defined
rationalism by Mechanism).
Usually, non-mechanism is judged speculative, as it speculates on
actual infinities (from personal god(s) to substantial soul) for
which we have no evidence at all.
Then mechanism reminds us that primary matter is also speculative.
So, most would agree that mechanism is the less speculative theory
of mind that we have. Indeed, it even shows that physicalism and
weak materialism are incoherent, and reminds us that indeed, there
are never been any evidences for it. It is just an extrapolation of
our local feeling, similar to extrapolate that the earth is flat
from very local measurement.
there is not even a proof of the existence of an acceptable
physical solution. When you have derived Newton's laws from
computationalism, then we might have something to talk about.
The goal is to progress on the mind-body problem, and expose the
metaphysical prejudice. Then, criticizing a metaphysics because it
does not give result in physics, is like criticizing physics
because it does not give a recipe for the pizza. Today, mechanism
seem to be the only theory which propose an explanation why the
average universal numbers develop some physical beliefs, and is the
only one capable of explaining the difference between quanta and
qualia.
Bruno
Bruce
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