On 25 Apr 2017, at 14:35, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 25/04/2017 6:59 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Apr 2017, at 01:13, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 24/04/2017 6:07 pm, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Mon, Apr 24, 2017 at 6:08 AM, Russell Standish <[email protected]
> wrote:
On Sun, Apr 23, 2017 at 11:49:51AM +0200, Telmo Menezes wrote:
Ok, so you are rejecting computationalism. Computationalism is
the
hypothesis that our mind supervenes on computations (sorry
Bruno, it's
easier to write for the purpose of this discussion :). You are
declaring that mind supervene on the physical brain.
That is not it at all. We've clarified with Bruno many times that
computational supervenience is compatible with physical
supervenience. Which is just as well, as otherwise it would be
so much
the worse for computationalism.
I have no doubt that the brain is a physical computer, and that
computations performed by the brain are no different from any other
computations.
We are discussing physicalism and computationalism, and if they are
compatible or not, correct?
Bruce repeatedly makes variation of the claim: "look, the brain is
physical and the brain generates consciousness, these are the
facts".
This is what I am replying to. It's an argument from authority that
leaves no space for debate or reasoning.
First, it is not an argument from authority, it is an argument
made on the basis of all the available evidence -- consciousness
supervenes on the physical brain.
Second. An argument from authority is not necessarily a reason to
reject that argument. Because life is short and we cannot be
experts in absolutely everything, we frequently have to rely on
authorities -- people who are recognized experts in the relevant
field. I am confident that when I drive across this bridge it will
not collapse under the weight of my car because I trust the
expertise of the engineers who designed and constructed the
bridge. In other words, I rely on the relevant authorities for my
conclusion that this bridge is safe. An argument from authority is
unsound only if the quoted authorities are themselves not reliable
-- they are not experts in the relevant field, and/or their
supposed qualifications are bogus. There are many examples of this
-- like relying on President Trump's assessment of anthropogenic
global warming, etc, etc.
Third, since it is now clear that the term "physicalism" refers to
the belief in primary matter, I have never ascribed to
"physicalism".
Usually I use "Weak materialism" for the "assumption/belief" in
primary matter.
The change in terminology from post to post is very confusing.
Recently, "physicalism" was defined as the belief in primary matter.
If these are the same, do not use two terms -- it merely causes
confusion.
It depends what e are discussing. I have always been clear on this.
primary means "in need to be assumed"; Something is "primary" if to
get its existence we need to assume it, or something equivalent.
OK, so in those terms the working hypothesis is that the physical
universe is primary, because we assume the existence of an external,
objective, physical world.
You mean that this is your hypothesis. I assume this only in the
reductio ad absurdum. It is typically not an assumption with
computationalism, where we assume a physical universe enough rich to
implement a universal number, but we don't assume that the physical
reality *needs* to be assume. At the start, computationalism is
neutral on this, at the end, we have to abandon physicalism.
The nature of that world is the subject of study,
The object of study is "everything", that include consciousness,
numbers and matter, and we must be neutral on what is primary or not.
The only assumption of computationalism is Church thesis, and "yes
doctor". That implies arithmetical realism, and the need of a physical
reality, but not of a primary consciousness, nor a primary physical
reality.
and we do not start by assuming that either matter or arithmetic is
primary:
OK, then. Don't forget consciousness.
because they might be emergent from something more fundamental, who
knows. Agnosticism on metaphysical matters is the usual scientific
stance.
Yes, and that is crucial when we do metaphysics or theology with the
scientific attitude.
For example, we know since the failure of logicism that numbers
are primary. We cannot derive them from logic.
But we can derive them from physics.
That is too vague to be true or wrong. I have never see any
presentation of physics which do not assume the numbers, or equivalent
(like the real trigonoetrical functions). I am not even sure what
could mean "deriving the numbers from physics". You need to elaborate.
Of course, we can derive them from the combinators theory, but
combinators are Turing equivalent to the numbers.
Weak materialism is just the belief in some matter, and that matter
cannot be explained by something non material.
I must used "weak" before materialist, because the term
"materialist" has a special meaning in philosophy of mind: it means
that only matter "really" exist, ad is opposed to dualism (matter
and mind exists) and immaterialism monism (only immaterial objects
exist)
Physicalism is the assumption, in metaphysics/theology, that
physics is the fundamental science to which all other sciences can
be, in principle, reduced.
This is what is more usually defined as strong reductionism; which
has nothing to do with the belief in any "primary matter".
If you define "matter" by the object of study of the physicists, it
becomes equivalent. In matter I include time, energy, space, etc. In
most discussion, to distinguish weak-materialism and physicalism is a
bit what I called a 1004 fallacy. Distracting precision.
We can conceive some forms of physicalism which are immaterialist,
for example Tegmark is close to this. But usually, most physicalist
are weak materialist, and often I use weak materialism and
physicalism as being quasi the same thing.
And that confusion of terminology is most unhelpful.
I don't think so.
I am an empirist, indeed, I extracted "computationalism" from
biology, well before I knew about Church and Turing. And I take
physics very seriously, and as the ultimate judge. Indeed, my point
is that if mechanism is correct, the physical reality is "in the
machine's head", and that is what makes mechanism testable: by
comparing the physics in the head of the machine with the physics
inferred from the observation.
And that is the point of my scepticism regarding computationalism --
you say the theory is to be tested against observation, or physics,
but yet you cannot give any serious account of the physics of the
external world.
I predicted the many-worlds and the non booleanness well before I knew
quantum mechanics leads to that. The point is in giving a serious
account of the physical reality *and* its relation with consciousness,
where physicalism fails since always.
Any objective assessment of your achievements, in your own terms as
measured against physics, is a resounding "Fail".
That would be a wonderful news, and I predicted in the 1980 that this
fail would be given before 2000. But up to now, nobody has found a
discrepancy. A good thing given that 99% of the scientists believe
implicitly or explicitly in computationalism.
My work formulate a problem, and solve it at the propositional level.
It is not measured against physics. It is refuted or confirmed. Up to
now, it is confirmed, so mechanism is still not refuted.
You talk like if mechanism was proposed to replace physics, but that
is ridiculous. Physics is fine and does not need to change. It is just
physicalism which is refuted in the mechanist frame. I just make
precise, and mathematical, the mind-body problem, and give the
propositional theology of the machine.
I am not sure you understand the very basic goal here. The result is
important because it shows that some common form of strong atheism is
epistemologically inconsistent, because those strong atheists believe
in both physicalism and mechanism. They get consistent by denying the
first person notion, or consciousness, and lead to eliminative
materialism. My opponents have always been eliminativist who do not
believe in consciousness, mind, person, etc.
I do not know what "primary matter" is supposed to mean, and it
certainly has never been a subject of study that I have
encountered in my lifetime of work in physics.
The expression "primary matter" comes from Aristotle, which is the
first to clearly assume it as a metaphysical assumption/theory. It
has no role in physics at all, except helping the physicists to
sleep and not to be too much perturbate by the mind-body problem,
which since day one is the trouble maker for those who want to be
physicalist or weak-materialist.
It is a completely useless term as far as current science is
concerned. And, although a metaphysical term, I suspect that it is
of little relevance to the mind-body problem.
Without the physicists formalizing physics, this has not much sense.
Could you state your assumptions?
What I have argued for is the existence of an external, objective,
physical world about which there is intersubjective agreement.
No problem with this, even if the "cosmos" (not the universal wave,
but the branch we are in) will appear eventually to be much
plausibly a first person plural construct (of numbers, not machine).
That is your hope, but it has yet to be demonstrated.
It is a theorem in QM-without collapse (Everett, 1957), and already a
theorem in the theology of the machine.
Whether the matter in this world is primary or emergent from
something more fundamental is an open question, and still the
subject of active debate in the physics community: I have no
commitment to either side of this argument. Likewise, there is an
ongoing debate among physicists about realist or anti-realist
interpretations of quantum mechanics, alongside more general
debates about realism in the philosophy of physics in general.
So I do not take kindly to attempts to silence me, or put me down,
by categorizing my views in simplistic terms, or in ways that I
have never entertained.
My problems with computationalism arise from the fact that I do
not believe in mathematical platonism,
I prefer to use "platonism" for Plato's theology, and use "realism"
here. I also do not believe in mathematical realism. But
arithmetical realism is needed by any one willing to give sense to
the Church-Turing thesis, or number theory.
Yes, I know that mathematical platonists often prefer to be called
mathematical realists. But you split too fine a hair by
distinguishing arithmetical realism from mathematical realism.
What ???
This means you have never read any book in logic. Logicians are
careful to distinguish many subtheories of PA, and many over-theories
of PA. Arithmetical realism is basically the place where 99% of the
mathematician agree. Above arithmetic, you have analysis which is far
more difficult to agree on. There, constructive and non cponstructive
mathematics diverges completely, and both diverges themselves a lot. I
am NOT a set theoretical realist.
You definitely need to read some book in mathematical logic.
Computability is a universal notion (if we aassume Church's thesis),
but provability admits transfinite differentiation (studied in a field
called ordinal proof ananlysis).
Arithmetical realism is neutral on finitism/not-finitism. It is
just the agreement with Robinson arithmetic. It is even consistent
with ultrafinitism. You can believe in a biggest natural number. To
be sure, the proof of the consistency of RA + "there is a biggest
natural number" cannot be done by ultrafinitist means, but since
Gödel we know that the proof of consistency of a theory usually use
more than the theory.
and the fact that computationalism has not produced any concrete
results about the physical world -- it is all speculative --
There is noting speculative in showing that physicalism is
incompatible with mechanism, and mechanism has been the motor of
basically all progress in science since Diderot (who defined
rationalism by Mechanism).
Since your definitions of terms seems to change with context, I am
not at all sure what you mean here by "mechanism". Is this the same
as computationalism?
Yes. It is a short for "digital mechanism". But of course, Diderot
missed the Church thesis. Without it, "mechanism" is only the
intuition that things can be explained without invoking magic.
Or something quite different? Whatever you mean by this, I would
dispute that this has been any sort of motor for progress in science
since the 18th century
Mechanism *is* the progress. Before mechanism is was "magic" or "God
made it". Unless you backtrack to Pythagorus and the greeks.
-- you seem to disregard the empirical content of science.
On the contrary, I work on making it compatible with the simplest, and
quasi-unique, scientific (without magic) theory of mind we have.
Again, you don't seem to have read what I have written, and to be
negative just for being negative. Have you read the sane04 paper? If
you miss something there, just ask.
But you have not shown incompatibility of anything with physicalism
(or strong reductionism). You certainly haven't shown anything to be
incompatible with "primary matter", because none of us knows what
that might be.
Which step of the UDA you don't understand?
Usually, non-mechanism is judged speculative, as it speculates on
actual infinities (from personal god(s) to substantial soul) for
which we have no evidence at all.
Then mechanism reminds us that primary matter is also speculative.
So, most would agree that mechanism is the less speculative theory
of mind that we have. Indeed, it even shows that physicalism and
weak materialism are incoherent, and reminds us that indeed, there
are never been any evidences for it.
It shows no such thing. We have repeated asked for this
contradiction between computationalism (mechanism) and physicalism
(weak materialism), and you are always forced to concede that there
is no such contradiction.
? (explain me how physicalism is coherent with mechanism, without
using magic. How do a physical reality select computations?
The best you can come up with is that you cannot believe anything
else.
?
But, i am sorry, but what you can or cannot believe has no place in
a scientific discussion.
Science is only belief. "Science = knowledge" is scientism. I use
"belief" in the doxastic sense, which is also the mundane sense of
assumption, or assertion we accept temporarily, like in "I belief it
rains".
It is less that helpful for you to continue to claim results that
you are unable to substantiate.
Ad hominem. The argument of those who have no argument.
It is just an extrapolation of our local feeling, similar to
extrapolate that the earth is flat from very local measurement.
there is not even a proof of the existence of an acceptable
physical solution. When you have derived Newton's laws from
computationalism, then we might have something to talk about.
The goal is to progress on the mind-body problem, and expose the
metaphysical prejudice. Then, criticizing a metaphysics because it
does not give result in physics, is like criticizing physics
because it does not give a recipe for the pizza.
Who says physics does not have a recipe for pizza?
Me. Show me the derivation if you believe the contrary. Tell me if
Mozarella is necessary or contingent, and give me a proof.
If your goal is to progress the mind-body problem, you should not in
that endeavour make all sorts of extravagant claims about physics --
such as the reversal between physics and arithmetic --
But then argue. This is again just ad hominem.
and repeatedly state that the test of your theory is its agreement
with physics.
I really wish it didn't. You have to show the discrepancy between the
material hypostases given and some physical experience.
As you say, if all you are doing is metaphysics, then you should
stay clear of the hard science
The goal is to illustrate that with mechanism, metaphysics is an hard
science.
and not attempt to replace physics by something else.
I never did that. You criticize an imaginary work. You seem the one
replacing theology with physics. I do theology. I never pretended
doing physics, except that I show that if mechanism is correct physics
is reduced to number theology, which is itself part of meta-
arithmetic, itself part of arithmetic.
But, in so far as you make claims about physics, it is perfectly
legitimate to criticize you for the content of those claims.
But I do not see the critics. All you remark fail to address any points.
Today, mechanism seem to be the only theory which propose an
explanation why the average universal numbers develop some physical
beliefs, and is the only one capable of explaining the difference
between quanta and qualia.
I think neuroscience, with its reliance on the undisputed concept of
the supervenience of the mind (consciousness) on the physical brain,
That expression is ambiguous. Is it a one-one correspondance, or a one-
many? All the difference is there.
might be a more productive path to follow.
For the "simple" human consciousness study, yes. But this avoid the
computationalist matter problem, which is part of the traditional mind-
body problem.
You are like a man with a hammer, for whom everything seems like a
nail. You are a man who is fascinated by logic, so you seen
everything as a problem in logic. Others might see things a little
more clearly.
I have no interest in logic, except as a tool in theology (where
mathematical logic is born, actually). But I should not even answer
because this is only ad hominem remark, and this post confirms my
feeling that you have not read anything I have written. If you have a
problem with the reasoning, just ask question, instead of spreading
your undounded prejudices in very vague ad hominem remark, please.
bruno
Bruce
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