Le 28 avr. 2017 12:01 AM, "Brent Meeker" <[email protected]> a écrit :
On 4/27/2017 9:21 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2017-04-27 18:17 GMT+02:00 Brent Meeker <[email protected]>: > > > On 4/27/2017 12:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> If there is a primary physical reality, you have to explain how it drives >> the arithmetical consciousness flux. But how could it do that? If it does >> it in a digitally simulable way, it cannot work (because that is done in >> arithmetic too) >> > > We've just been through (again) finding there is no contradiction between > physics and arithmetic. Your answer seems to be that physics can be an > illusion of digital thought, therefore primary physics is otiose. But > thought can't be a consequence of physics because....well you just don't > see how it could be. > > Thought *can be* a consequence of physics *but not* in a computationalist setting, as in computationalism, though are the result of computations which are not physical object. I don't see any problem with computationalism being false... but if it is true, then to predict correctly your next state, you should have to take into account the infinity of computations computing your current state to have a measure on your next states... In QM you take the current state into account by a finite description. The idea that there are an infinity of computations is of no use since that doesn't tell you anything about what it would mean to "take account of them". Because if all these infinity of computations exists, at every steps they diverge, so to make predictions you have to have a measure functions. If you restrict computations by "physically instantiated in this universe"... well it's not computationalism... But it's a lot more useful - and testable. I don't care, because the only thing I said is that's not computationalism. Quentin Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
