On Fri, Apr 28, 2017 at 7:17 PM, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On 4/27/2017 11:46 PM, David Nyman wrote: > > > > On 27 Apr 2017 11:12 p.m., "Brent Meeker" <[email protected]> wrote: > > Sure. Here's the last exchange: > > Davic: As far as the contradiction is concerned, I think you've found it for > yourself. You've said many times that the number 2 has no independent > existence but must depend on there being 2 things. IOW, you take the view > that numbers are inferred only secondarily from objects which, broadly, is > the intuitionist position on mathematics. Fine, if so for numbers, then > equally so for computation. If computation is at root an inference from the > relations between objects, and at the same time one holds that consciousness > supervenes on those inferred relations, then one has reasoned oneself around > in a circle, and not a virtuous one at that. Is it really intelligible to > say that your mind supervenes on a set of secondary relations that are > themselves nothing other than a product of its own powers of inference? > > Brent: But on that account they are not "nothing other than" - the are > instantiated computational relations. > > David: Sorry, Brent, that doesn't help. AFAICT you're just dodging my point. > Could you respond in a way that isn't merely a verbal flourish? > > You didn't explain what point I was dodging. You said, "Is it really > intelligible to say that your mind supervenes on a set of secondary > relations that are themselves nothing other than a product of its own powers > of inference?" And insofar as I understand that, it seems to say > computationalism is incoherent because it would imply that mental constructs > supervene on themselves. First, that's not what I said. I pointed out that > I said they supervened on physical instantiation of computation. Second, I > don't see that saying mental constructs supervene on other mental constructs > is incoherent. There could be a hierarchy of self-reflection. > > > It's your use of the word instantiated that's the dodge. The only work that > word is doing in context is to assume what is demanding an explanation. The > whole question is precisely whether physical objects indeed "instantiate" > computation in a manner that could be shown to make a real difference to > anything, which is to say a difference that doesn't reduce to a mere > redescription of an existing physical state of affairs. And the point then > is that, if your notion of computation is inextricably bound to fundamental > physical action, the relevant physical states continue to evolve one into > another without the necessity of the merest notion of computation. > > > So your complaint is that I'm assuming a kind of emergence in which > computation emerges from physical processes and in your view is that this is > an illegitimate notion of computation because it's bound to physical > actions. Is that right? I would point out that Bruno supposes computation > to be emergent in arithmetic; even though it's just numbers satisfying > equations. > > > You're right, I think, to be looking for recursive explanation; that > computation permits an unlimited hierarchy of recursion is indeed its > utility in the subject under discussion. But the hierarchy has to be > anchored in the relevant relations in the first place, which are > definitevely computational not physical. > > > First, I deny that there is a hierarchy of explanation that has to be > anchored. Second, the question of what is the ontology of the world is > theory dependent. > > Once that is established in the theory then of course what starkly demands > explanation is the extraction of characteristically physical relations > within, as you elegantly put it, a hierarchy of self-reflection. Of course > this is an open question not a solution, although as Bruno points out, there > are some promising early indications. > > > There are also some falsifications - which are passed off as "everything > happens - just not here". > > And, lest the point be lost, should definitive contradiction be found in > this direction, so much the worse for computationalism as a theory of mind. > > Anyway, there you have both the contradiction and the reversal in a > nutshell. By the way, given the recent references to the alternative > assumption of an "external world", I feel I ought to point out that physics > has surely already shown us unequivocally that there is no such thing. The > most probing investigations have resulted only in the purely mathematical > formulation of a deterministically evolving state of affairs that is nothing > like the concrete perceptual world of inter-subjective agreement within > which we perceive and act. > > > It is perfectly consistent with, and predictive of, the concrete perceptual > world - modulo neurocognition. Physics (in the broad sense) accounts very > accurately for everything up to inputs to the brain. Darwinian evolution > accounts for some of what happens then, but not in much detail. I think AI > will eventually, not solve the "hard problem", but dissolve it.
I agree that once AI reaches human-level, we should treat it as a person and assume consciousness. I don't see how this dissolves the hard problem, though. Suppose such an AI exists now. What changes? Telmo. > Brent > > > The open question is then: how can it be that, under such conditions, a > concrete world *appears* to exist and how can such substantial appearances > be brought into principled alignment with what physics is describing? Your > hierarchy of self-reflection surely recommends itself in this regard, but I > feel honour bound to say that Bruno is pointing to a logically necessary > point of entry into that maze. Always assuming (and never forgetting) a > prior assumption of the computational theory of mind, of course. > > David > > > > > Brent > > > On 4/27/2017 9:35 AM, David Nyman wrote: > > Brent: We've just been through (again) finding there is no > contradiction between physics and arithmetic. Your answer seems to be > that physics can be an illusion of digital thought, therefore primary > physics is otiose. But thought can't be a consequence of physics > because....well you just don't see how it could be. > > That's a bit quick. I've explained both the reversal and the > incompatibility. Then either you don't respond or your response > suggests you haven't grasped the point. Care to try again? > > David > > On 27/04/2017, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 4/27/2017 12:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > If there is a primary physical reality, you have to explain how it > drives the arithmetical consciousness flux. But how could it do that? > If it does it in a digitally simulable way, it cannot work (because > that is done in arithmetic too) > > We've just been through (again) finding there is no contradiction > between physics and arithmetic. Your answer seems to be that physics > can be an illusion of digital thought, therefore primary physics is > otiose. But thought can't be a consequence of physics because....well > you just don't see how it could be. > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving > emails from it, send an email to > [email protected]. To post to this group, send > email to [email protected]. Visit this group at > https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit > https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving > emails from it, send an email to > [email protected]. To post to this group, send > email to [email protected]. Visit this group at > https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit > https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
