On Fri, Apr 28, 2017 at 7:17 PM, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > > On 4/27/2017 11:46 PM, David Nyman wrote: > > > > On 27 Apr 2017 11:12 p.m., "Brent Meeker" <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > Sure. Here's the last exchange: > > Davic: As far as the contradiction is concerned, I think you've found it for > yourself. You've said many times that the number 2 has no independent > existence but must depend on there being 2 things. IOW, you take the view > that numbers are inferred only secondarily from objects which, broadly, is > the intuitionist position on mathematics. Fine, if so for numbers, then > equally so for computation. If computation is at root an inference from the > relations between objects, and at the same time one holds that consciousness > supervenes on those inferred relations, then one has reasoned oneself around > in a circle, and not a virtuous one at that. Is it really intelligible to > say that your mind supervenes on a set of secondary relations that are > themselves nothing other than a product of its own powers of inference? > > Brent: But on that account they are not "nothing other than" - the are > instantiated computational relations. > > David: Sorry, Brent, that doesn't help. AFAICT you're just dodging my point. > Could you respond in a way that isn't merely a verbal flourish? > > You didn't explain what point I was dodging. You said, "Is it really > intelligible to say that your mind supervenes on a set of secondary > relations that are themselves nothing other than a product of its own powers > of inference?" And insofar as I understand that, it seems to say > computationalism is incoherent because it would imply that mental constructs > supervene on themselves. First, that's not what I said. I pointed out that > I said they supervened on physical instantiation of computation. Second, I > don't see that saying mental constructs supervene on other mental constructs > is incoherent. There could be a hierarchy of self-reflection. > > > It's your use of the word instantiated that's the dodge. The only work that > word is doing in context is to assume what is demanding an explanation. The > whole question is precisely whether physical objects indeed "instantiate" > computation in a manner that could be shown to make a real difference to > anything, which is to say a difference that doesn't reduce to a mere > redescription of an existing physical state of affairs. And the point then > is that, if your notion of computation is inextricably bound to fundamental > physical action, the relevant physical states continue to evolve one into > another without the necessity of the merest notion of computation. > > > So your complaint is that I'm assuming a kind of emergence in which > computation emerges from physical processes and in your view is that this is > an illegitimate notion of computation because it's bound to physical > actions. Is that right? I would point out that Bruno supposes computation > to be emergent in arithmetic; even though it's just numbers satisfying > equations. > > > You're right, I think, to be looking for recursive explanation; that > computation permits an unlimited hierarchy of recursion is indeed its > utility in the subject under discussion. But the hierarchy has to be > anchored in the relevant relations in the first place, which are > definitevely computational not physical. > > > First, I deny that there is a hierarchy of explanation that has to be > anchored. Second, the question of what is the ontology of the world is > theory dependent. > > Once that is established in the theory then of course what starkly demands > explanation is the extraction of characteristically physical relations > within, as you elegantly put it, a hierarchy of self-reflection. Of course > this is an open question not a solution, although as Bruno points out, there > are some promising early indications. > > > There are also some falsifications - which are passed off as "everything > happens - just not here". > > And, lest the point be lost, should definitive contradiction be found in > this direction, so much the worse for computationalism as a theory of mind. > > Anyway, there you have both the contradiction and the reversal in a > nutshell. By the way, given the recent references to the alternative > assumption of an "external world", I feel I ought to point out that physics > has surely already shown us unequivocally that there is no such thing. The > most probing investigations have resulted only in the purely mathematical > formulation of a deterministically evolving state of affairs that is nothing > like the concrete perceptual world of inter-subjective agreement within > which we perceive and act. > > > It is perfectly consistent with, and predictive of, the concrete perceptual > world - modulo neurocognition. Physics (in the broad sense) accounts very > accurately for everything up to inputs to the brain. Darwinian evolution > accounts for some of what happens then, but not in much detail. I think AI > will eventually, not solve the "hard problem", but dissolve it.
I agree that once AI reaches human-level, we should treat it as a person and assume consciousness. I don't see how this dissolves the hard problem, though. Suppose such an AI exists now. What changes? Telmo. > Brent > > > The open question is then: how can it be that, under such conditions, a > concrete world *appears* to exist and how can such substantial appearances > be brought into principled alignment with what physics is describing? Your > hierarchy of self-reflection surely recommends itself in this regard, but I > feel honour bound to say that Bruno is pointing to a logically necessary > point of entry into that maze. Always assuming (and never forgetting) a > prior assumption of the computational theory of mind, of course. > > David > > > > > Brent > > > On 4/27/2017 9:35 AM, David Nyman wrote: > > Brent: We've just been through (again) finding there is no > contradiction between physics and arithmetic. Your answer seems to be > that physics can be an illusion of digital thought, therefore primary > physics is otiose. But thought can't be a consequence of physics > because....well you just don't see how it could be. > > That's a bit quick. I've explained both the reversal and the > incompatibility. Then either you don't respond or your response > suggests you haven't grasped the point. Care to try again? > > David > > On 27/04/2017, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > On 4/27/2017 12:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > If there is a primary physical reality, you have to explain how it > drives the arithmetical consciousness flux. But how could it do that? > If it does it in a digitally simulable way, it cannot work (because > that is done in arithmetic too) > > We've just been through (again) finding there is no contradiction > between physics and arithmetic. Your answer seems to be that physics > can be an illusion of digital thought, therefore primary physics is > otiose. But thought can't be a consequence of physics because....well > you just don't see how it could be. > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving > emails from it, send an email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send > email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at > https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit > https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving > emails from it, send an email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send > email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at > https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit > https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
