On 25 Apr 2017 5:15 a.m., "Brent Meeker" <[email protected]> wrote:
On 4/24/2017 10:02 AM, David Nyman wrote: On 24 Apr 2017 7:32 a.m., "Brent Meeker" <[email protected]> wrote: I don't think there's any question that non-physical things exist, like chess and insurance and computations. The question was whether the assumption that computations can instantiate a mind, i.e. the possibility of a conscious robot, entails a contradiction of something. The "something" having to do with physics, is part of what I would like eulicidated. Bruno says it reverses the relationship of physics and psychology...but that's more of a polemic slogan than entailment of a contradiction. I don't think so. Here's the way I see it. Let's say we accept as a hypothesis a computational ontology. Since this requires no more than the natural numbers with + and * this amounts to an ontology of arithmetic. Platonism be damned, our interest at this point is merely in seeing where the hypothesis can take us. So, computationalism leads us to the extension of the UD, which in turn gives us the digital machine, aka the fully fungible universal computational device. The reversal then is between role of the "psychology" of that universal machine and the subset of the trace of the UD assumed to implement physics. The UD doesn't have a "psychology". Bruno talks about the "beliefs" of a universal theorem prover in arithmetic...but that's not a UD. And was is "the trace of the UD". To talk of taking a "subset of the trace" sounds to me like handing waving: We'll make a machine that writes all possible sentences and then there's a subset that describes the world. The former is now required to play the role of filter or selector on behalf of the latter; it's what distinguishes it from the much more general computational background. Of course that "filtration", by assumption, essentially equates to the extremely high probability of that very subset being required to support its own self-selection. Are you saying this "subset of the trace" must have a high probability of existing, or it has, by some measure, a high probability relative to other stuff not in the trace. If the latter, and if the measure can be defined, that would be an interesting result; but when I've asked about this in the past Bruno has just said it's a hoped for result. I understand that Bruno wants to take thoughts as fundamental and the wants to identify thoughts with provable or computable propositions in arithmetic. He thinks that the modality of "provable" is somehow a good model of "believes" or "thinks". But even if that were true (I don't think it is) it fails to account for the physical world which one thinks about and acts in. IOW it's selection by observation, with the part of "universal point of view" falling to the suitably programmed digital machine. It from bit really, but without the prior commitment to physics as the unexplained (aka primitive) assumption. OK? You don't seem to have even mentioned a contradiction. As far as the contradiction is concerned, I think you've found it for yourself. You've said many times that the number 2 has no independent existence but must depend on there being 2 things. IOW, you take the view that numbers are inferred only secondarily from objects which, broadly, is the intuitionist position on mathematics. Fine, if so for numbers, then equally so for computation. If computation is at root an inference from the relations between objects, and at the same time one holds that consciousness supervenes on those inferred relations, then one has reasoned oneself around in a circle, and not a virtuous one at that. Is it really intelligible to say that your mind supervenes on a set of secondary relations that are themselves nothing other than a product of its own powers of inference? David Brent David He also says it entails the non-existence of "primary matter"....but what is "primary matter". I've studied physics for many years and primary matter was never mentioned. But it is said to be logically contrary to the assumption that computations can instantiate a mind...whatever that means. Brent On 4/23/2017 3:52 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: It's you who's begging the question, first define what is a computation with physics first, without relying on abstract mathematical notion. Le 23 avr. 2017 12:45 PM, "Bruce Kellett" <[email protected]> a écrit : > On 23/04/2017 6:53 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > Le 23 avr. 2017 10:32, "Bruce Kellett" <[email protected]> a > écrit : > > But that does not prove that the computation does not run on a physical > computer. I take JC's point to be that your assumption of the primacy of > the abstract computation is unprovable. We at least have experience of > physical computers, and not of non-physical computers. (Whatever you say to > the contrary, > > > You're making an ontological commitment and closing any discussion on > it... > > > All I am asking for is a demonstration of the contradiction that you all > claim exists between computationalism and physicalism -- a contradiction > that does not simply depend on a definition of computationalism that > explicitly states "physicalism is false". In other words, where is the > contradiction? A demonstration that does not just beg the question. > > Bruce > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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