On 6 May 2017 11:04 p.m., "Brent Meeker" <[email protected]> wrote:
On 5/6/2017 2:45 PM, David Nyman wrote: On 6 May 2017 10:16 p.m., "Brent Meeker" <[email protected]> wrote: On 5/6/2017 12:59 PM, David Nyman wrote: On 6 May 2017 8:08 p.m., "Brent Meeker" <[email protected]> wrote: On 5/6/2017 1:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > Exactly why I used arithmetic as the example. Arithmetic, according to >>>> your theory of consciousness, is independent of perception and physics. >>>> Conscious thoughts, beliefs are entailed by arithmetic and so should be >>>> independent of tequila. >>>> >>> >>> That does not follow. Even Robinso Arithmetic can prove that a machine >>> drinking some amount of tequila will prove anything. >>> >> >> That would be impressive. Is this proof published? >> > > It is trivial. RA computes all states reaction in all computational > histories. RA is a universal dovetailer, to be short. In the simulation of > tequila + brain, people get drunk. > That's what I was afraid of. Your theory successfully predicts it because it predicts "everything", including people drink tequila and don't get drunk. Yes, but the key is the measure, isn't it. Everett also predicts that everything consistent with QM happens. Somehow this leads to a probabilistic account of what to expect. We know the math but we don't know the reason. You're no doubt bored with my banging on about Hoyle, but I must say that his is so far the only metaphor that has ever conveyed to me how something could be both certain and uncertain depending on one's point of view. So I think it's far too tricksy to say that comp predicts everything (or Everett, or eternal inflation for that matter). The key is the measure and how that measure discriminates between the typical, the unusual, and the downright weird. Open problem, sure, but hardly an empty or pointless one. But that's what I mean when I say Bruno's theory has no predictive success. QM (and Everett) would correctly predict that alcohol molecules in the blood will interfere with neuronal function and THEN invoking the physicalist theory of mind, i.e. that mind supervenes on material events, it predicts that your ability to do arithmetic will be impaired by drinking tequila. It will NOT predict the contrary with more than infinitesimal probability. So it's misdirection to say that it's just a measure problem. Without having the right measure a probabilistic theory is just fantasy...or magic as Bruno would say. I have no idea why you say that. I thought it was clear that if computationalism doesn't (ultimately) predict that its predominating computational mechanism (i.e. the one effectively self-selected by complex subjects, in this case, like ourselves) is the physics those selfsame subjects observe, That would certainly be an accomplishment - which in another post Bruno says is trivially accomplished even in RA (I don't see it). But to succeed in prediction it is not enough to show that some world exists in which mind and physics are consistent (that the physics that mind infers is also the real physics that predicts effects on the mind). You need also to show this has large measure relative to contrary worlds. One can make a logic chopping argument that it must be that way for otherwise minds would not be making sense of the physics they perceived - but that makes the whole computational argument otiose. Well, not otiose perhaps, but I agree that the theory is nowhere near that point. But why ask for such predictions at this stage? Their lack doesn't invalidate the theory, which at this point is a species of psycho-theology, in my estimation. It's certainly not a substitute for QM as a physical theory, for example, although it would seem to be at least consistent with it (just as well). I think much of the problem in the discussions here has been that some commentators, such as yourself, want to take comp as a competitor to much more fully developed physical theories whereas in fact it's a much broader philosophical position with, as Bruno points out, ancient antecedents. What is remarkable therefore is that this time honoured tradition actually seems to be implied by the default theory of mind, or at least that this position is defensible (which is to say Bruno's life's work). David That's how it is similar to the Boltzmann brain problem. I think Sean Carroll has solved the Boltzmann brain problem, but there is still some controversy. Thanks, I'll look it up. David then it must fail. In effect, at that point we would have arrived at a notion of computation that did indeed appear to supervene on objects in the effective physical environment, albeit qua computatio, as Bruno was wont to say. Hence if the physical brain got plastered, so would the mind apparently supervening on it. That's true in this world...one among infinitely many. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
