On 08 May 2017, at 05:53, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 8/05/2017 3:14 am, David Nyman wrote:
On 6 May 2017 11:04 p.m., "Brent Meeker" <meeke...@verizon.net>
wrote:
On 5/6/2017 2:45 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 6 May 2017 10:16 p.m., "Brent Meeker" <meeke...@verizon.net>
wrote:
But that's what I mean when I say Bruno's theory has no predictive
success. QM (and Everett) would correctly predict that alcohol
molecules in the blood will interfere with neuronal function and
THEN invoking the physicalist theory of mind, i.e. that mind
supervenes on material events, it predicts that your ability to do
arithmetic will be impaired by drinking tequila. It will NOT
predict the contrary with more than infinitesimal probability. So
it's misdirection to say that it's just a measure problem.
Without having the right measure a probabilistic theory is just
fantasy...or magic as Bruno would say.
I have no idea why you say that. I thought it was clear that if
computationalism doesn't (ultimately) predict that its
predominating computational mechanism (i.e. the one effectively
self-selected by complex subjects, in this case, like ourselves)
is the physics those selfsame subjects observe,
That would certainly be an accomplishment - which in another post
Bruno says is trivially accomplished even in RA (I don't see it).
But to succeed in prediction it is not enough to show that some
world exists in which mind and physics are consistent (that the
physics that mind infers is also the real physics that predicts
effects on the mind). You need also to show this has large measure
relative to contrary worlds. One can make a logic chopping
argument that it must be that way for otherwise minds would not be
making sense of the physics they perceived - but that makes the
whole computational argument otiose.
I've been thinking a bit more about this and I'd like to set out
some further tentative remarks about the above. Your professional
expertise in these matters is orders of magnitude greater than mine
and consequently any comments you might make would be very helpful.
By the way, it would also be helpful if you would read beyond the
next paragraph before commenting because I hope I will come by
myself to the fly in the ointment.
Firstly, and "assuming computationalism" on the basis of CT + YD,
we are led to the view that UD* must include all possible
"physical" computational continuations (actually infinitely
reiterated). This of course is also to assume that all such
continuations are finitely computable (i.e. halting). Now, again on
the same assumptions, it might seem reasonable that our observing
such a physics in concrete substantial form is evidence of its
emergence (i.e. epistemologically) as the predominant computational
mechanism underlying those very perceptions. Hence it might seem
equally reasonable to conclude that this is the reason that these
latter correspondingly appear to supervene on concrete physical
manifestations in their effective environment.
Now wait a minute. We cannot escape the question of measure. Why
would it be reasonable to assume that a physics of this sort should
predominate in the manner outlined above? Well, firstly, it would
seem that the generator of the set of possible physical
computations is infinitely reiterative​ and hence very robust
(both in the sense of computational inclusiveness a la step 7, and
that of internal self-consistency). But who is to say that the
generators of "magical" or simply inconsistent continuations aren't
equally or even more prevalent? After all we're dealing with a
Library of Babel here and the Vast majority of any such library is
bound to be gibberish. Well, I'm wondering​ about an analogy with
Feynman's path integral idea (comments particularly appreciated
here). Might a kind of least action principle be applicable here,
such that internally consistent computations self-reinforce,
whereas inconsistent ones in effect self-cancel?
Also, absence of evidence isn't evidence of absence. I'm thinking
here about the evaluation of what we typically remember having
experienced. I can't help invoking Hoyle here again (sorry).
Subjectively speaking, there's a kind of struggle always in process
between remembering and forgetting. So on the basis suggested
above, and from the abstract point of view of Hoyle's singular
agent (or equally Bruno's virgin machine), inconsistent paths might
plausibly tend to result, in effect, in a net (unintelligible)
forgetting and contrariwise, self-consistent paths might equally
plausibly result in a net (intelligible) remembering. I'm speaking
of consistent and hence intelligible "personal histories" here. But
perhaps you would substitute "implausibly" above. Anyway, your
comments as ever particularly appreciated.
I think the problem here is the use of the word "consistent". You
refer to "internally consistent computations" and "consistent and
hence intelligible 'personal histories'." But what is the measure of
such consistency? You cannot use the idea of 'consistent according
to some physical laws', because it is those laws that you are
supposedly deriving -- they cannot form part of the derivation. I
don't think any notion of logical consistency can fill the bill
here. It is logically consistent that my present conscious moment,
with its rich record of memories of a physical world, stretching
back to childhood, is all an illusion of the momentary point in a
computational history: the continuation of this computation back
into the past, and forward into the future, could be just white
noise! That is not logically inconsistent, or comutationally
inconsistent. It is inconsistent only with the physical laws of
conservation and persistence. But at this point, you do not have
such laws!
In fact, just as Boltzmann realized in the Boltzmann brain problem,
Can you give the reference please?
states of complete randomness both before and after our current
conscious moment are overwhelmingly more likley than that our
present moment is immersed in a physics that involves exceptionless
conservation laws, so that the past and future can both be evolved
from our present state by the application of persistent and
pervasive physical laws.
Did Boltzman took into account QM? QM without collapse. Obviously he
did not take into account mechanism and its measure problem, and still
believe in some brain mind identity link.
Unless you can give some meaning to the concept of "consistent" that
does not just beg the question, then I think Boltzmann's problem
will destroy your search for some 'measure' that makes our
experience of physical laws (any physical laws, not just those we
actually observe) overwhelmingly likely.
No problem, but you will need a non computationalist theory of mind to
assure the identity link. But most such theories are highly
speculative, and of the negative kind, as they need to add non Turing
emulable magic, nor non-FPI-recoverable magic, to just keep a belief
intact, when that belief is not sustained by any evidence, just an
habit since long.
Bruno
Bruce
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