On 08 May 2017, at 07:01, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 8/05/2017 2:45 pm, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
Rather than use the Boltzmann Brain hypothesis to elucidate the
conservation of energy in thermodynamics and entropy, why not take
Boltzmann a bit more seriously, and search for these suckers in the
galaxy, in other words, treat, as a working hypothesis BB's as real
phenomena? There's nobody out there that is sending easy to listen
to, signals. Maybe the BB's are probing people's butts as a prank,
by pretending they are UFO's? Hardee Har Har!
I think that, given a physical universe, Boltzmann brains are highly
unlikely. The reasons are essentially those elucidated by Sean
Carroll, http://arxiv.org/abs/1405.0298v1 . Namely de Sitter space
is a quiescent vacuum in which there are no quantum fluctuations of
the sort hypothesized to give rise to Boltzmann brains. The problem
is that David (and Bruno) cannot appeal to such an argument, because
Carroll presupposes a physical universe, and they can't do that on
pain of circularity.
Well said.
They need something like von Neuman-Wigner-Penrose action of
consciousness on matter/quantum-wave. Even Hameroff's view could'nt
help. Only some explicit non-mechanism could save Carroll argument. QM-
with-collapse-made-by consciousness is a good candidate, but of
course, if successful, it would made the mechanist out of job. But
today, this seems premature to me. We don'thave any evidence, but if
the Z1* and X1* (and S4Grz1) logics depart too much from nature, we
would have some evidence for it.
Bruno
Bruce
In fact, just as Boltzmann realized in the Boltzmann brain problem,
states of complete randomness both before and after our current
conscious moment are overwhelmingly more likley than that our
present moment is immersed in a physics that involves exceptionless
conservation laws, so that the past and future can both be evolved
from our present state by the application of persistent and
pervasive physical laws.
-----Original Message-----
From: Bruce Kellett <[email protected]>
To: everything-list <[email protected]>
Sent: Sun, May 7, 2017 11:53 pm
Subject: Re: What are atheists for?
On 8/05/2017 3:14 am, David Nyman wrote:
On 6 May 2017 11:04 p.m., "Brent Meeker" <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 5/6/2017 2:45 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 6 May 2017 10:16 p.m., "Brent Meeker" <[email protected]>
wrote:
But that's what I mean when I say Bruno's theory has no predictive
success. QM (and Everett) would correctly predict that alcohol
molecules in the blood will interfere with neuronal function and
THEN invoking the physicalist theory of mind, i.e. that mind
supervenes on material events, it predicts that your ability to do
arithmetic will be impaired by drinking tequila. It will NOT
predict the contrary with more than infinitesimal probability. So
it's misdirection to say that it's just a measure problem. Without
having the right measure a probabilistic theory is just
fantasy...or magic as Bruno would say.
I have no idea why you say that. I thought it was clear that if
computationalism doesn't (ultimately) predict that its
predominating computational mechanism (i.e. the one effectively
self-selected by complex subjects, in this case, like ourselves) is
the physics those selfsame subjects observe,
That would certainly be an accomplishment - which in another post
Bruno says is trivially accomplished even in RA (I don't see it).
But to succeed in prediction it is not enough to show that some
world exists in which mind and physics are consistent (that the
physics that mind infers is also the real physics that predicts
effects on the mind). You need also to show this has large measure
relative to contrary worlds. One can make a logic chopping
argument that it must be that way for otherwise minds would not be
making sense of the physics they perceived - but that makes the
whole computational argument otiose.
I've been thinking a bit more about this and I'd like to set out
some further tentative remarks about the above. Your professional
expertise in these matters is orders of magnitude greater than mine
and consequently any comments you might make would be very helpful.
By the way, it would also be helpful if you would read beyond the
next paragraph before commenting because I hope I will come by
myself to the fly in the ointment.
Firstly, and "assuming computationalism" on the basis of CT + YD,
we are led to the view that UD* must include all possible
"physical" computational continuations (actually infinitely
reiterated). This of course is also to assume that all such
continuations are finitely computable (i.e. halting). Now, again on
the same assumptions, it might seem reasonable that our observing
such a physics in concrete substantial form is evidence of its
emergence (i.e. epistemologically) as the predominant computational
mechanism underlying those very perceptions. Hence it might seem
equally reasonable to conclude that this is the reason that these
latter correspondingly appear to supervene on concrete physical
manifestations in their effective environment.
Now wait a minute. We cannot escape the question of measure. Why
would it be reasonable to assume that a physics of this sort should
predominate in the manner outlined above? Well, firstly, it would
seem that the generator of the set of possible physical
computations is infinitely reiterative​ and hence very robust
(both in the sense of computational inclusiveness a la step 7, and
that of internal self-consistency). But who is to say that the
generators of "magical" or simply inconsistent continuations aren't
equally or even more prevalent? After all we're dealing with a
Library of Babel here and the Vast majority of any such library is
bound to be gibberish. Well, I'm wondering​ about an analogy with
Feynman's path integral idea (comments particularly appreciated
here). Might a kind of least action principle be applicable here,
such that internally consistent computations self-reinforce,
whereas inconsistent ones in effect self-cancel?
Also, absence of evidence isn't evidence of absence. I'm thinking
here about the evaluation of what we typically remember
having experienced. I can't help invoking Hoyle
here again (sorry). Subjectively speaking, there's a kind of
struggle always in process between remembering and forgetting. So
on the basis suggested above, and from the abstract point of view
of Hoyle's singular agent (or equally Bruno's virgin machine),
inconsistent paths might plausibly tend to result, in effect, in a
net (unintelligible) forgetting and contrariwise, self-consistent
paths might equally plausibly result in a net (intelligible)
remembering. I'm speaking of consistent and hence intelligible
"personal histories" here. But perhaps you would substitute
"implausibly" above. Anyway, your comments as ever particularly
appreciated.
I think the problem here is the use of the word "consistent". You
refer to "internally consistent computations" and "consistent and
hence intelligible 'personal histories'." But what is the measure
of such consistency? You cannot use the idea of 'consistent
according to some physical laws', because it is those laws that you
are supposedly deriving -- they cannot form part of the derivation.
I don't think any notion of logical consistency can fill the bill
here. It is logically consistent that my present conscious moment,
with its rich record of memories of a physical world, stretching
back to childhood, is all an illusion of the momentary point in a
computational history: the continuation of this computation back
into the past, and forward into the future, could be just white
noise! That is not logically inconsistent, or comutationally
inconsistent. It is inconsistent only with the physical laws of
conservation and persistence. But at this point, you do not have
such laws!
In fact, just as Boltzmann realized in the Boltzmann brain problem,
states of complete randomness both before and after our current
conscious moment are overwhelmingly more likley than that our
present moment is immersed in a physics that involves exceptionless
conservation laws, so that the past and future can both be evolved
from our present state by the application of persistent and
pervasive physical laws.
Unless you can give some meaning to the concept of "consistent"
that does not just beg the question, then I think Boltzmann's
problem will destroy your search for some 'measure' that makes our
experience of physical laws (any physical laws, not just those we
actually observe) overwhelmingly likely.
Bruce
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