On 10 May 2017 8:09 a.m., "Bruce Kellett" <[email protected]> wrote:
On 10/05/2017 3:28 pm, David Nyman wrote: On 10 May 2017 3:04 a.m., "Bruce Kellett" < <[email protected]> [email protected]> wrote: The computations underlying the conscious moment have, then, to also compute the physics that renders the memories veridicial -- but that involves memories stretching back tens of years. An awful lot of computations have to come together to make consciousness that means anything. Making the probability in the sea of random noise smaller and smaller all the time. Sure, but probability of what and from whose point of view? Aren't you continuing to think of this principally from a third person perspective (actually merely an abstract "view from nowhere")? Yes, from that impossible point of view there is no conceivable search function that could locate the critical computational structures of this sort; under this interpretation their measure is effectively zero. Yes, am trying to understand the operation of the dovetailer as a mechanism, and hence, from an external objective PoV. That is where I find the measure to be effectively zero. Sure, but if you get stuck there you'll never reconcile yourself to Bruno's argument. The structure of UD* is an eternalist conception. Its "activity" consists only in the intrinsic combinatorial characteristics of + and *. Nevertheless we know their presence is in fact assured by assumption. It should be clear by now that I do not like this argument -- "The theory must work because it has been assumed to be correct." But that assumes that the pieces of the theory fit together without problems. If I find problems in the "fitting together", then your conclusions are no longer assured. A contradictory theory predicts everything. That's not it at all. The term "assumption" simply means that the CTM (effectively CT + YD) is accepted as axiomatic at the outset. If that's not acceptable, fine, go in peace. But the point of the acceptance of the assumption is to try to refute the inferences drawn from it and it alone. In point of fact these computations have the recursive characteristic of exploding into an infinite fractal​-like structure of extremely high frequency (as Brent has recently put it) which would give them in a certain and possibly critical sense a highly robust and non-trivial structure. I don't know what that means. It's fractal like because it is the infinite extension of a tiny computational widget. It is infinitely recursive and hence highly self similar, robust and dense in structure. Complex combinatorial inter-connectivity of its intrinsically computational relations make it highly non trivial. But the key point is that, on the basis of Bruno's theory of computational subjectivity (again, implied by assumption of the CTM), they must be *self-locating* from the first person perspective. This is the key difference that would unleash the creative subjective potential of the torrential output of the UD, as distinct from Borges's merely alphabetical Babel which can only ever be a zero-informational wasteland. This just makes consciousness independent of the computations -- consciousness must exist first in order to self-locate on the appropriate computations. IoW, consciousness gives rise to the computations, not arithmetic -- or arithmetic is just a construct of conscious beings. Ah, I just wish we could stop using such a freighted term. Bruno's major contribution to philosophy of mind, IMO, had been his theory of self-referential subjectivity, even though it is at present a toy model. He suggests how various aspects such as communicability and non-communicability, qualia and quanta, truth and belief etc. can be modelled and emulated computationally. Much has been written here already about this. But consciousness in this sense doesn't precede any other feature of the schema. In a sense though it's the ultimate guarantor that the rest of the logical elements make sense. It has to be the culmination point. This is, after all, philosophy of mind. But how can we assess "probability" in such a context? Very controversial point as you know. Nonetheless, Hoyle gives us an intuitive heuristic that allows us to think of this in what is effectively a quasi-frequentist manner (i.e. the relative subjective frequency of "encountering" any particular momentary perspective over any finite segment of their abstract serialisation). This heuristic has both absolute (in the first instance) and relativising (in the second) self-sampling characteristics. If we think of it in something like this intuitive way (which IMO is the absolute key to the argument) then the justification of a measure assessed in the above manner has to lie in the direction of understanding how and why the "organised" threads of narrative subjectivity shouldn't be effectively swamped in a sea of subjective chaos because of competition from "pathological" quasi-narrative fragments. I've tried to pump our collective intuition with various analogies to suggest why this wouldn't necessarily be the case, to supplement Bruno's more rigorous logico-mathematical argument. Hardly conclusive of course but the intention is principally to encourage a harder look in this direction. I don't really understand where you are coming from with Hoyle's heuristic. Hoyle gives us a form of monopsychism. Assuming computationalism, the core engine of self-reference is the digital machine (effectively the TM). By definition, all such machines are formally equivalent. So we can adopt the perspective of the generic machine, given the necessary programming. As Hoyle then suggested, we can assess if the version of "our" (really the machine's) perspective could justifiably be expected to conform to "normality". In the novel, his character catches on quickly that the amnesic compartmentalisation between "personalities" would make it impossible for any of the putatively individualised characters to discern their underlying common genesis. My predilection for this heuristic is its quasi-frequentist account of probability as each possible momentary point of view is " encountered". This leads us in turn to consider the persistent or otherwise effect of what I've called the struggle between forgetting and remembering, or coherence and incoherence. The sea of pathological dross that must form the overwhelming but fragmented majority of the "conscus potential" of UD* must somehow be effectively​ suppressed from the perspective of the relatively tiny, but mightily persistent and powerful narrative threads of veridical consciousness (i.e. those that refer truthfully to an externality that in turn explicates their perceptions of it, or what we call physics). If the UD has anything at all to do with consciousness, then it is clear that physics must be entailed by exactly those calculations that entail consciousness. That does not seem to be the picture that comes to me from the UD -- the sea of chaos overwhelms everything. If consciousness is to self-select from this sea of randomness, consciousness must pre-exist the dovetailer, so the dovetailer itself becomes otiose. On the contrary, the UD is the structure that results in self-referential subjectivity in the first instance. This is then parsed in terms of the characteristics we look for under the aegis of the portmanteau term "consciousness". But I agree (and with Brent) that the relation with a physics that renders this subjectivity veridical is indispensable. Hence, again assuming CTM, the computational mechanism on which our consciousness will appear locally to supervene will always itself appear as some concrete manifestation of that physics. David Bruce A pathway of least effort through the phase space of possible subjectivity? Russell's solution to the possibility of an Occam catastrophe that would sink this fragile vessel is simply to assume that this physics is the unique requirement for its own observation. Open problem, as Bruno would say? David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. 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