On 09 Jul 2017, at 00:13, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Jul 8, 2017 at 4:46 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
>> did Einstein believe in anything or did he just write
symbols on paper that got published as journal articles? If you
think he did believe it I'd like to know how you determined that,
and then I want to know what exactly Einstein's brain had that the
Turing Machine (the one that was doing such a good job emulating
Einstein) lacked."
> I do not understand. Are you assuming that Einstein is a p-
zombie?
I don't know and don't want to know what a "p-zombie" is, it
sounds obscene. However I do want to know if you assume that a
intelligent computer is a zombie, and if so why do you think that
is a reasonable assumption to make about a smart computer but not
about a smart person like Einstein.
You attribute things I have never said. mechanism implies strong AI.
That machine can be conscious is what I am working since the beginning.
> I do assume that Einstein brain is Turing emulable,
Good, so you haven't totally abandoned rationality.
> which means that the only difference is in the belief that
the "Einstein Turing machine" has.
The Einstein Turing machine says some brilliant things about our
physical world and it also says it passionately believes what it's
saying. There is plenty of evidence that it is telling the truth
about one of those statements, but what evidence do you have it is
lying about the other one? And what evidence do you have that the
biological Einstein was telling the truth about both?
I am just saying that universal machine can differ fro their beliefs,
and that it is a better identity criteria, and indeed the one we have
used (and agree) in all discussion. Do you agree that the Clark and
ensistenin are different person, despite being both (universal) machine?
> All universal machine do exactly the same thing
If they didn't then they wouldn't be a universal machine.
> and so is not a good criteria for person identity.
How do you figure that?
You have use this al lot, for example when saying that the W-guy is
the H-guy, ...
It seem to me that the observance of behavior that is exactly the
same is a great way to determine the equivalence of personal
identity; in fact I can't think of a better one.
Because it reflects the same beliefs.
> But they differ in their provability of believability
extension,
No idea what " believability extension" means or what proof
you have that it exists.
For the correct simple ideal machine, the set of what it can
rationally justify is recursively enumerable.
In logic we often identify a theory with the set of its theorem, as
opposed to the finite description of its axioms.
> All Löbian machine are universal machine. Not all
universal machine are Löbian machine.
If it can't emulate something then it's not a universal
machine, but it doesn't matter because you said a Turing Machine can
emulate a "Löbian machine". So whatever a "Löbian machine" can do a
Turing Machine can do it too.
Yes, making "universalness" a bad identity criterion. If universalnes
was the identty criterion, you could say yes to the lazy doctor which
replace the brain with 16k Radio-Shack computer. It can also emulate
all machines, if you provide the extended memory when asked.
> Löbian machines are Turing machine with enough belief so
So what test can I perform in the lab to determine if machine X
is Löbian or Turing? If you have none then it's not science.
That is impossible. That is alredy impossible for the factorial
programs, or any programs, by Rice theorem. The set of programs
computing the factorial function is not recurisiven nor even
recursively enumarable. It is a general theorem in computer science.
We can build programs computing function, but we cannot build a
program capable of testing which function is computed when given some
programs.
> that the G* theology
Oh no, now we have G* theology! If homemade jargon and acronyms
were science you'd have about 10 Nobel Prizes by now.
>Basically, you obtain a Löbian machine from a universal
Turing machine by adding enough "induction axiom".
It would be easy to include the induction axiom in a Turing
machine's program, just tell it that things usually continue. That
why Evolution managed to come up with brains that could make use of
inductive reasoning about 500 million years before brains that could
use deductive reasoning.
I use induction in the sense of Peano. It is part of deduction rule,
not inductive inference.
There is nothing magical about induction and there is certainly
nothing about it that is beyond a Turing Machine.
RA, seen as a Turing machine does not believe in the inudction axiom,
and that is the difference with PA. ZF believes in transfinite
induction, making it more powerful than PA, even just about arithmetic.
There is a branch of mathematical logic, called ordinal analysis,
which measure the provability power of theoreies and machine by
looking how much ordinal induction can be done. PA is characterized by
epsilon_0 (which is omega^omega^omega^...).
>> To hell with your silly childish step 3!
> Childish?
Yes childish.
> I would say "easy".
I would say "simple".
> But then you are the (only) one I know having a problem
with it.
The only one? If so, if I'm the only one who has a problem with
endowing the person pronoun "you"
Which one. I made it clear you need to distinguish many meaning of
"you". the problem is that you brush away the nuance that we need to
solve the ambiguities, and then complain.
That is pure rhetorical trick, illustrating that your goal is mockery,
not learning.
with the power to narrow down the infinite set of objects to just
one specific unique example of that set and do so immediately after
a "you" duplicating machine has been introduced then I'm dealing
with children. Especially when the entire point of the exercise is
to illuminate the nature of subjective experience, which is what
personal pronouns are all about, it's why "you" and "me" don't mean
the same thing.
Not the point is not illuminating the subjective experience, but
understanding that the notion of primitive matter makes no sense when
we assume Digital Mechanism. You makes this error many times before. I
guess you are trying to confuse people, and to hide your absence of
any argument.
Bruno
> Its theology is the same as us, when we assume
computationalism.
You really do need to get a dictionary so you can look up that
word.
John Clark
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