On 21 Aug 2017, at 01:49, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Aug 20, 2017 at 10:02 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
>> 1-you = Homemade Baby Talk.
> 1-you refer to your subjective, first person, experience.
And your subjective first person, experience refers to
the 1-you.
Exact.
And round and round we go.
Only if you put the personal diaries based definition of 1p in your
subconscious.
>> But I know you love homemade acronyms too so perhaps you
prefer HBT.
> Ad hominem.
But it's true, it is a undeniable fact that you do love homemade
acronyms and jargon. Sorry if you consider this predisposition of
yours to be rather embarrassing
No. It is false. I use simple abbreviation in threads repeating long
term. Anyway, this is ad hominem and distract from the issue.
>>> Washington or Moscow, each with a probability of 1/2.
>> That's the same thing you said BEFORE the duplication,
>Indeed. I do the prediction lways before the experience. if
not, it is not a prediction.
After a coin flip I know a lot more and can say much more
precisely about what the coin ended up doing than I could say
before;
Like after pushing on the button, from all the 1p experiences
accessible in our context.
back then all I could could say is it will land heads with
50% probability, but now after the flip I can say the coin landed
the way it landed with 100% certainty. That's a big improvement and
I just want you to do the same thing.
You say before the experiment the best you could say is
"Washington or Moscow, each with a probability of 1/2" but now the
experiment is over and with the benefit of all the new found
knowledge you've gained from it I just want to know your new
improved answer to the question "What is the name of the one and
only one city I will end up seeing after I became two?".
Very easy. I open the door, notice the city of Moscow, and write the
result in my diary. I know for sure I see that city, and only believe
intellectually that I might have a doppelganger in Washington. Bth of
us get the answer, and both of us could not predict it in Helsinki,
for the obvious reason that a specific prediction is necessarily
refuted by one copy. Morality, I bet "W v M", and it is the best
prediction available.
You continue to abstract ourself from the question asked, which is
about the 1p experience that anyone can live when duplicating oneself.
If your answer after the experiment isn't better than the one made
before then it wasn't a question and it makes no sense to
even talk about probability AFTER the event.
>> now that the duplication Is long over is that STILL the best
you can say even now?
> No, after the duplication, there is no more prediction. Only
verification if my bet was correct or not. You can look at the
detailed answer in previous post,
I don't want a goddamn detailed answer,
Aaah! OK, but don't complain on the gibberish brought by you avoiding
the "details".
the question "What is the name of the one and only one city I will
end up seeing after I became two?" requires only a one word
answer!
Only if we were trying to prove that self-duplication leads to 3p-
indeterminacy. But nobody has ever defended such a crap.
And if nobody can ever know what the one word answer is ever AFTER
the experiment is over then it wasn't a question.
But somebody can. Indeed, two-body! Just listen to all copies, and of
course, there are multiple, given the protocol. You are eliminating
the opinion of all copies. You talk like if they have both become
zombie. That means, you assume computationalism false, simply, but
that end the reduction ad absurdum.
A string of words can be well formed and correctly follow all the
rules of English grammar and yet have no meaning, and sticking a
question mark on at the end doesn't help.
>> Regarding a coin, if the best we could say is "after the
coin fell and everybody observed how it landed it turned out it
fell heads or tails with a probability of 1/2" then the very
concept of probability would be utterly meaningless.
> That is my point.
If that was your point you made it well. You said that even AFTER
the experiment is over and even with the benefit hindsight you say
the best you could have told the Helsinki man about what he ended
up seeing is "Washington or Moscow, each with a probability of
1/2", and that is utterly meaningless.
Then throwing a coin is deterministic too, as I would say the same, in
that same retrospective way.
>> But we can do better than that, much better, we can say "it
turned out that after the coin was flipped in landed heads with 100%
certainty" with no need to add and any ifs ands or buts
whatsoever. That's because "how will the coin land after it is
flipped?" is a real question with a real answer, but "what one city
and only one city will I see after I am no longer one but have
become two?" is not a question and thus it obviously has no
answer, not today not tomorrow not ever.
> You just rephrase the question in a strange way,
I didn't make it strange, it's your thought experiment not mine.
But rephrased strangely by you.
> but it is obvious that when we assume mechanism, the question
makes perfect sense.
Then now that it's all over and you know all there is to know you
should have a perfect one word answer to the question. So let's
hear it!
Ig there was an one word answer, there would be no indeterminacy. The
one word answer is in the verification process, and it is enough to
listen to the copies which is each one word-result they got. But you
never listen to W-JC, nor to M-JC. You make them into zombie, making
computationalism false. QED.
You know with certainty (given what we have accepted) that after
pushing on the button, you (whoever you can possibly feel to be)
will see only one city, and this without knowing which one in
Helsinki.
I'm not talking about Helsinki, that was BEFORE the experiment!
I want to know what new thing you've learned from the experiment now
that it's completed.
Ask W-BM and M-BM, they both confirms "W v M" and "~(W & M"), nd given
the definition of 1p, that solves the problem. There is no paradox, no
contradiction, only an impossibility by principle.
I what to know what your new improved answer is.
In Helsinki, I knew (modulo comp) that I will find myself in W or M,
but without any certainty about which one. And after the experience,
both copies get the 1p answer, and the confirmation. Again, your
misunderstanding is just based on the fact that you want us to claim
we have a 3p indeterminacy, but no-one has ever claimed that this was
the case, and that is why to understand the 1p-indeterminacy, you need
to understand the difference between 1p and 3p, and in this case, the
use of the diary makes clear that the notion of 1p used is 3p
testable, and so the 1p-indeterminacy is provable (in the
computationalist frame, of course).
But now, you will say that 1p, 1-you, diary, ... are baby talks, like
if an ad hominem remark could make an argument not valid.
Bruno
John K Clark
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