On Monday, December 4, 2017 at 1:40:25 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 01 Dec 2017, at 22:58, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: > > > > On Thursday, November 30, 2017 at 4:55:46 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 29 Nov 2017, at 22:55, [email protected] wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 9:14:48 PM UTC, [email protected] > wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 8:44:18 PM UTC, [email protected] > wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 5:29:01 PM UTC, John Clark wrote: > > On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 10:51 PM, <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > If, as you claim, any fundamental parameters can exist, > > > > That > is NOT > > what I claimed > . > I claimed any > f > undamental parameter > that > can exist > does exist, I did NOT claim > any > f > undamental parameter > can exist. There is a HUGE difference! > > > That's much more Tegmarkian than MWI. In the latter, the claim is that > except for the measurement realized, identical universes come into being > where the values not measured in this world, are realized, that is, > measured. So these other universes, if they exist, have the same > fundamental constants as our universe. AG > > > Even if all parameters consistent with logic CAN occur, it doesn't > necessarily mean they DO. I illustrated this possibility, but haven't > proved it (and AFAIK, no one has), with my thought experiment using the > real line. And in the case of the MWI, the parameters of those other worlds > must be IDENTICAL to this world, since the claim of MWI is that those > universes are identical except for the values measured. Now let's go back > to Joe the Plumber. Suppose in this world he leaves the casino after one > pull of the slot machine, having now created 10 million other universes. > Presumably some of those other Joe's continue playing, some not, resulting > in tens of millions of new universes, with identical Joe's, some continuing > to play, and some not. And on and on it goes. Does this really make sense > to you? Joe and slot machines is a parable. Purists can think of Joe in a > lab, shooting an electron at a double slit. AG > > > It seems to me it makes much sense that Bohm or Copenhagen. It is just the > SWE, viewed by machine which evolves doing the coding in some position > base, probably for some reason. > > It is shocking perhaps. But then for a Platonist, if the ultimate reality > is not shocking, it is a symptom you have not yet seen it. It is normal, > our brain are not build to study that ultimate reality, and I think that > somehow, it is even build for hidden some parts of the ultimate reality. > > > *Not shocking; rather it shows poor judgment; hubris to think humans can > create metastasizing universes by doing simple quantum experiments. * > > > On the contrary, with the Everett theory, any interaction can be seen as a > measurement, and a measurement create nothing, it makes only consciousness > differentiating. It is the collapse which is more like hubris, with looking > at something acting non locally everywhere, and consciousness changing the > course of matter. > > > * It creates and leaves a ton of unanswered questions under the rug and > ignored, which never seems to faze its enthusiasts. AG* > > > I am not sure what you mean. >
*What I mean is that Joe the Plumber cannot create a cascade of metastasizing universes by shooting a single electron at a double slit. He may leave the lab after one outcome, but his possibly uncountable copies won't, at least some of them. And those will continue the metastasizing process. And even those who leave after one outcome, will give rise to another set of possibly uncountable universes. The idea that Joe can initiate such a process is minimally fatuous -- and maximally a sign of a mental disorder; or if you prefer, a gross perversion of judgment. Where does the energy come from to create these universes? Sorry if I offend anyone, but the whole concept is abominably stupid, unworthy of being taken seriously. AG* > > The only (huge) problem which remains, in Everett, is in justifying the > appearance of the wave from all computations, and not just the quantum one, > and this from a computationalist theory of mind. But Everett was not > working on the mind-body problem, only physics, and by the abandon of the > collapse, he was paving a way to computationalism and its solution to the > riddle of consciousness and apparent matter. With the collapse theory, the > aristotelian strategy to hide the mind-body problem is re-instantiated. > > Bruno > > > > > > > > With Mechanism, it becomes conceptually very simple. You need only the > numbers and addition or multiplication (or any first order theory Turing > equivalent to it). That is, you need only a universal machine, in the > mathematical sense of Church, Post, Turing, Kleene, ... Then the existence > of all pieces of dreams is given by very elementary theory, and it involves > the dreamers sometimes sharing very long dreams, and some other > consciousness state. In fact this gives a theology in the greek sense of > the terms, meaning that it contains physics, making Mechanism testable. The > "many-apparent worlds" is a confirmation of the infinitely many dreams > below our substitution levels, and the math of self-reference provides > three quantum logics for the notion of "observable" by a mean Universal > Turing machine". > > Bruno > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
