On 27 Dec 2017, at 20:02, Brent Meeker wrote:

A good idea, but I don't see that these "predictions" of computationalism have actually been derived. I think most of them are aspirational. For example, what is the proof that spacetime is continuous - in fact what is the proof there is such a thing as spacetime?

Yes, space-time is not yet there. It needs (I can argue) the right Temperley-Lieb coupling between variants of the proximity algebra given by the arithmetical quantization. That is for the next generation to solve or to refute computationalism, and improved our theory of mind. But we know already that the theology (and thus the physics) is invariant for the addition of oracles, and Löbianity appears to be quite sticky for the self-referential creatures.

Bruno



Brent

On 12/26/2017 11:18 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
Bruno has often spoken of the confirmations of computationalism known to date, and of the idea that it has passed many tests and not been falsified so far. I was hoping with this post to gather a complete list of those tests. What things in physics would disprove computationalism, and what tests has it passed so far? Below I try to collect a complete list from memory but it may be faulty. I ask that others might add to this list or correct things I have gotten wrong:

Tests and statuses of each test:
Non-emulability of physical laws
Non-discreteness (continuousness) of space time --- (somewhat confirmed) Infinite computation needed for tiniest amount of space --- (mostly confirmed)
Quantum Mechanics
Uncertainty principal (inability to collect exact and complete knowledge about environment) --- (confirmed) Indeterminancy --- (appearance of randomness is confirmed, explanation for being an "appearance only" i.e. first person indeterminancy vs. fundamental randomness is made is plausible)
Born Rule?
Quantization of Energy?
Unitarity
General Physics (I am not sure if these are required by computationalism, and could use some more help on these)
Linearity of physical laws?
Time reversibility?
Conservation of Information? (e.g. black hole information paradox)
Finite Description of Quantum States (e.g. Bekenstein Bound)
Link between Entropy and Information (e.g. Landauer's Principle)
Existence of a "Time" dimension?
Consciousness
Qualia - The non-communicable nature of some observations ?
Finiteness - (finite memory / age / information content of experience)? Are there other things I am missing? If any of the items I have included are incorrect I would greatly appreciate any correction and further insight.

Perhaps most interesting are any predictions which are presently unconfirmed, as this would lead to predictions which could later be tested and lead to a refutation of computationalism (or if passed, yield further evidence for computationalism).

Jason
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