On Tue, 20 Mar 2018 at 10:09 am, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
> From: Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> > > > It is possible that consciousness is fully preserved until a threshold is > reached then suddenly disappears. So if half the subject’s brain is > replaced, he behaves normally and has normal consciousness, but if one more > neurone is replaced he continues to behave normally but becomes a zombie. > Moreover, since neurones are themselves complex systems it could be broken > down further: half of that final neurone could be replaced with no change > to consciousness, but when a particular membrane protein is replaced with a > non-biological nanomachine the subject will suddenly become a zombie. And > we need not stop here, because this protein molecule could also be replaced > gradually, for example by non-biological radioisotopes. If half the atoms > in this protein are replaced, there is no change in behaviour and no change > in consciousness; but when one more atom is replaced a threshold is reached > and the subject suddenly loses consciousness. So zombification could turn > on the addition or subtraction of one neutron. Are you prepared to go this > far to challenge the idea that if the observable behaviour of the brain is > replicated, consciousness will also be replicated? > > > If the theory is that if the observable behaviour of the brain is > replicated, then consciousness will also be replicated, then the clear > corollary is that consciousness can be inferred from observable behaviour. > Which implies that I can be as certain of the consciousness of other people > as I am of my own. This seems to do some violence to the 1p/1pp/3p > distinctions that computationalism rely on so much: only 1p is "certainly > certain". But if I can reliably infer consciousness in others, then other > things can be as certain as 1p experiences.... > You can’t reliable infer consciousness in others. What you can infer is that whatever consciousness an entity has, it will be preserved if functionally identical substitutions in its brain are made. You can’t know if a mouse is conscious, but you can know that if mouse neurones are replaced with functionally identical electronic neurones its behaviour will be the same and any consciousness it may have will also be the same. > -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
