> On 23 Mar 2018, at 02:46, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On Fri, 23 Mar 2018 at 11:32 am, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > From: Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >> >> On Thu, 22 Mar 2018 at 9:02 am, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> From: Stathis Papaioannou < <mailto:[email protected]>[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> >>> >>> On Wed, 21 Mar 2018 at 10:56 am, Bruce Kellett < >>> <mailto:[email protected]>[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> From: Stathis Papaioannou < <mailto:[email protected]>[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> >>> >>>> On Tue, 20 Mar 2018 at 10:09 am, Bruce Kellett < >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>[email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>> >>>> If the theory is that if the observable behaviour of the brain is >>>> replicated, then consciousness will also be replicated, then the clear >>>> corollary is that consciousness can be inferred from observable behaviour. >>>> Which implies that I can be as certain of the consciousness of other >>>> people as I am of my own. This seems to do some violence to the 1p/1pp/3p >>>> distinctions that computationalism rely on so much: only 1p is "certainly >>>> certain". But if I can reliably infer consciousness in others, then other >>>> things can be as certain as 1p experiences.... >>>> >>> >>>> You can’t reliable infer consciousness in others. What you can infer is >>>> that whatever consciousness an entity has, it will be preserved if >>>> functionally identical >>>> substitutions in its brain are made. >>> >>> >>> You have that backwards. You can infer consciousness in others, by >>> observing their behaviour. The alternative would be solipsism. Now, while >>> you can't prove or disprove solipsism in a mathematical sense, you can >>> reject solipsism as a useless theory, since it tells you nothing about >>> anything. Whereas science acts on the available evidence -- observations of >>> behaviour in this case. >>> >>> But we have no evidence that consciousness would be preserved under >>> functionally identical substitutions in the brain. Consciousness may be a >>> global affair, so functionally equivalence may not be achievable, or even >>> definable, within the context of a conscious brain. Can you map the >>> functionality of even a single neuron? You are assuming that you can, but >>> if that function is global, then you probably can't. There is a fair amount >>> of glibness in your assumption that consciousness will be preserved under >>> such substitutions. >>> >>> >>>> You can’t know if a mouse is conscious, but you can know that if mouse >>>> neurones are replaced with functionally identical electronic neurones its >>>> behaviour will be the same and any consciousness it may have will also be >>>> the same. >>> >>> You cannot know this without actually doing the substitution and observing >>> the results. >>> >>> So do you think that it is possible to replace the neurones with >>> functionally identical neurones (same output for same input) and the >>> mouse’s behaviour would *not* be the same? >> >> Individual neurons may not be the appropriate functional unit. >> >> It seems that you might be close to circularity -- neural functionality >> includes consciousness. So if I maintain neural functionality, I will >> maintain consciousness. >> >> The only assumption is that the brain is somehow responsible for >> consciousness. The argument I am making is that if any part of the brain is >> replaced with a functionally identical non-biological part, engineered to >> replicate its interactions with the surrounding tissue, consciousness will >> also necessarily be replicated; for if not, an absurd situation would >> result, whereby consciousness can radically change but the subject not >> notice, or consciousness decouple completely from behaviour, or >> consciousness flip on or off with the change of one subatomic particle. > > There still seems to be some circularity there -- consciousness is part of > the functionality of the brain, or parts thereof, so maintaining > functionality requires maintenance of consciousness. > > By functionality here I specifically mean the observable behaviour of the > brain. Consciousness is special in that it is not directly observable as, for > example, the potential difference across a cell membrane or the contraction > of muscle is. > > One would really need some independent measure of functionality, independent > of consciousness. And the claim would be that reproducing local functionality > would maintain consciousness. I do not see that that could readily be tested, > since mapping all the inputs and outputs of neurons or other brain components > may not be technically possible. One could map neuron behaviour at some crude > level, but would that be sufficient to maintain consciousness? Natural cell > death, and the death of neurons does, generally, lead to noticeable changes > in consciousness and function -- have you not noticed decline in memory and > other mental faculties as you get older? When consciousness changes in this > way, the subject is usually only too painfully aware of the decline in mental > acuity. To avoid this effect, characteristic of cell death, one is largely > forced to define the reproduction of functionality in terms including > maintenance of consciousness (and behaviour) -- hence the circularity. > > It isn’t currently possible to map the behaviour of neurons and replace them > with artificial equivalents, but this is a philosophical discussion. Replace > a volume of neural tissue with a black box that exactly replicates the > original tissue’s interactions with its surroundings. There is no explicit > consideration of consciousness, just the local physical interactions. All the > remaining neurones in the brain are going to fire in the same way as before, > and all the muscles are going to contract in the same way as before. Do you > think it is possible that despite this, consciousness would be changed? > Assume that the replaced tissue was significantly involved in some faculty > you would definitely notice if you lost, such as visual perception or > language.
Yes, and if someone argue that consciousness is not maintained whatever the substitution level is, it is up to them to explain what in the brain+local-evirnoment is not Turing emulable. I see only the “wave packet reduction”, but I don’t see any evidence for that reduction, and it would make Quantum mechanics inconsistent (I think) and not usable in cosmology, nor in quantum information science. To believe that the brain is not a “natural” machine is a bit like believing in some magic. Why not, but where are the evidences? Bruno > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
