On 25 March 2018 at 20:18, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 21 Mar 2018, at 23:49, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On Thu, 22 Mar 2018 at 9:02 am, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> From: Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> >> >> >> On Wed, 21 Mar 2018 at 10:56 am, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> From: Stathis Papaioannou < <[email protected]>[email protected]> >>> >>> On Tue, 20 Mar 2018 at 10:09 am, Bruce Kellett < >>> <[email protected]>[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> If the theory is that if the observable behaviour of the brain is >>>> replicated, then consciousness will also be replicated, then the clear >>>> corollary is that consciousness can be inferred from observable behaviour. >>>> Which implies that I can be as certain of the consciousness of other people >>>> as I am of my own. This seems to do some violence to the 1p/1pp/3p >>>> distinctions that computationalism rely on so much: only 1p is "certainly >>>> certain". But if I can reliably infer consciousness in others, then other >>>> things can be as certain as 1p experiences.... >>>> >>> >>> You can’t reliable infer consciousness in others. What you can infer is >>> that whatever consciousness an entity has, it will be preserved if >>> functionally identical substitutions in its brain are made. >>> >>> >>> You have that backwards. You can infer consciousness in others, by >>> observing their behaviour. The alternative would be solipsism. Now, while >>> you can't prove or disprove solipsism in a mathematical sense, you can >>> reject solipsism as a useless theory, since it tells you nothing about >>> anything. Whereas science acts on the available evidence -- observations of >>> behaviour in this case. >>> >>> But we have no evidence that consciousness would be preserved under >>> functionally identical substitutions in the brain. Consciousness may be a >>> global affair, so functionally equivalence may not be achievable, or even >>> definable, within the context of a conscious brain. Can you map the >>> functionality of even a single neuron? You are assuming that you can, but >>> if that function is global, then you probably can't. There is a fair amount >>> of glibness in your assumption that consciousness will be preserved under >>> such substitutions. >>> >>> >>> >>> You can’t know if a mouse is conscious, but you can know that if mouse >>> neurones are replaced with functionally identical electronic neurones its >>> behaviour will be the same and any consciousness it may have will also be >>> the same. >>> >>> >>> You cannot know this without actually doing the substitution and >>> observing the results. >>> >> >> So do you think that it is possible to replace the neurones with >> functionally identical neurones (same output for same input) and the >> mouse’s behaviour would *not* be the same? >> >> >> Individual neurons may not be the appropriate functional unit. >> >> It seems that you might be close to circularity -- neural functionality >> includes consciousness. So if I maintain neural functionality, I will >> maintain consciousness. >> > > The only assumption is that the brain is somehow responsible for > consciousness. > > > Consciousness is an attribute of the abstract immaterial person. The > locally material brain is only responsible for the relative manifestation > of consciousness. The computations does not create consciousness, but > channel its possible differentiation. But that should not change your point. >
But you start off with the assumption that replacing your brain with a machine will preserve consciousness - "comp". From this assumption, the rest follows, including the conclusion that there isn't actually a primary physical brain. > The argument I am making is that if any part of the brain is replaced with > a functionally identical non-biological part, engineered to replicate its > interactions with the surrounding tissue, consciousness will also > necessarily be replicated; for if not, an absurd situation would result, > whereby consciousness can radically change but the subject not notice, or > consciousness decouple completely from behaviour, or consciousness flip on > or off with the change of one subatomic particle. > > > OK, > > Bruno > > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
