On Tue, 27 Mar 2018 at 6:40 am, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On 3/26/2018 8:24 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > On 26 March 2018 at 15:20, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> >> On 3/25/2018 7:14 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> >> >> On 26 March 2018 at 04:57, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On 3/25/2018 2:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 21 Mar 2018, at 22:56, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 3/21/2018 2:27 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Thu, 22 Mar 2018 at 5:45 am, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 3/20/2018 11:29 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>> >>>> On Wed, 21 Mar 2018 at 9:03 am, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 3/20/2018 1:14 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, 21 Mar 2018 at 6:34 am, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 3/20/2018 3:58 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> The interesting thing is that you can draw conclusions about >>>>>> consciousness >>>>>> without being able to define it or detect it. >>>>>> >>>>>> I agree. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> The claim is that IF an entity >>>>>> is conscious THEN its consciousness will be preserved if brain function >>>>>> is >>>>>> preserved despite changing the brain substrate. >>>>>> >>>>>> Ok, this is computationalism. I also bet on computationalism, but I >>>>>> think we must proceed with caution and not forget that we are just >>>>>> assuming this to be true. Your thought experiment is convincing but is >>>>>> not a proof. You do expose something that I agree with: that >>>>>> non-computationalism sounds silly. >>>>>> >>>>>> But does it sound so silly if we propose substituting a completely >>>>>> different kind of computer, e.g. von Neumann architecture or one that >>>>>> just >>>>>> records everything instead of an episodic associative memory, for the >>>>>> brain. The Church-Turing conjecture says it can compute the same >>>>>> functions. But does it instantiate the same consciousness. My intuition >>>>>> is that it would be "conscious" but in some different way; for example by >>>>>> having the kind of memory you would have if you could review of a movie >>>>>> of >>>>>> any interval in your past. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I think it would be conscious in the same way if you replaced neural >>>>> tissue with a black box that interacted with the surrounding tissue in the >>>>> same way. It doesn’t matter what is in the black box; it could even work >>>>> by >>>>> magic. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Then why draw the line at "surrounding tissue". Why not the external >>>>> enivironment? >>>>> >>>> >>>> Keep expanding the part that is replaced and you replace the whole >>>> brain and the whole organism. >>>> >>>> Are you saying you can't imagine being "conscious" but in a different >>>>> way? >>>>> >>>> >>>> I think it is possible but I don’t think it could happen if my neurones >>>> were replaced by a functionally equivalent component. If it’s functionally >>>> equivalent, my behaviour would be unchanged, >>>> >>>> >>>> I agree with that. But you've already supposed that functional >>>> equivalence at the behavior level implies preservation of consciousness. >>>> So what I'm considering is replacements in the brain far above the neuron >>>> level, say at the level of whole functional groups of the brain, e.g. the >>>> visual system, the auditory system, the memory,... Would functional >>>> equivalence at the body/brain interface then still imply consciousness >>>> equivalence? >>>> >>> >>> I think it would, because I don’t think there are isolated consciousness >>> modules in the brain. A large enough change in visual experience will be >>> noticed by the subject, who will report that things look different. This >>> could only happen if there is a change in the input to the language system >>> from the visual system; but we have assumed that the output from the visual >>> system is the same, and only the consciousness has changed, leading to a >>> contradiction. >>> >>> >>> But what about internal systems which are independent of >>> perception...the very reason Bruno wants to talk about dream states. And >>> I'm not necessarily asking that behavior be identical...just that the >>> body/brain interface be the same. The "brain" may be different in how it >>> processes input from the eyeballs and hence report verbally different >>> perceptions. In other words, I'm wondering how much does computationalism >>> constrain consciousness. My intuition is that there could be a lot of >>> difference in consciousness depending on how different perceptual inputs >>> are process and/or merged and how internal simulations are handled. To >>> take a crude example, would it matter if the computer-brain was programmed >>> in a functional language like LISP, an object-oriented language like Ruby, >>> or a neural network? Of course Church-Turing says they all compute the >>> same set of functions, but they don't do it the same way >>> >>> >>> They can do it in the same way. They will not do it in the same way with >>> a compiler, but will do it in the same way when you implement an >>> interpreter in another interpreter. The extensional CT (in terms if which >>> functions are calculated) entails the intensional CT (in terms of which >>> computations can be processed. Babbage machine could emulate a quantum >>> brain. It involves a relative slow-down, but the subject will not notice >>> without external clues. In arithmetic, all possible sorts of computers are >>> implemented infinitely often, with some special redundancy which plays a >>> role in the computations statistics, the first person statistics and the >>> origin of the physical appearances. >>> >>> >>> You retreat into what is possible. My question is much more directly >>> pragmatic. If I actually made a silicon based replacement for your brain >>> that had the same input/output would you consciousness be different if the >>> replacement processed the information differently...and how could you or we >>> know? >>> >> >> I have made the argument that your consciousness would not be different >> if the replacement processed the information differently provided that the >> I/O behaviour at the interface with the neural tissue was the same. This >> follows from consideration of what it means to be conscious, which we can >> do even if we can't verify or even define consciousness. If consciousness >> were changed but the outputs to the rest of the brain unchanged, the >> subject would either not notice any change (and what significance could >> consciousness have if a an arbitrarily large change in it would go >> unnoticed) or, if he did notice a change, it could not be communicated and >> there would be a decoupling between consciousness and behaviour from that >> point on. >> >> >> Well he might not notice the change because he can't remember how it was >> before the substitution (maybe it's memory and recall processes that were >> changed) and so the change *could be* communicated...if it were noticed, >> but it isn't. >> > > There would be no point in the experiment if the change in conscious would > not have been noticed anyway. People lose neurones every day as part of > ageing and don't notice anything, because the change is too subtle. The > experiment would have to be something very obvious, such as swapping out > the subject's entire visual cortex and switching between the original, the > new, and nothing, asking the subject: "I am now switching between A, B and > C, tell me if you notice any difference as you look at the pictures on the > screen". The subject would answer, “With B, I am blind. With A and C, I see > exactly the same thing, and all the associated thoughts, emotions and so on > are the same. If one is an electronic implant, I can only conclude that it > works just as well as the original in generating visual experiences.” > > >> It seems to me there's something fishy about making behavior and >> conscious thought functionally equivalent so neither can change without a >> corresponding change in the other. My intuition is that there is a lot of >> my thinking that doesn't show up as observable behavior. No doubt it's >> observable at the micro-level in my brain; but not at the external level. >> > > There are thoughts that may not affect external behaviour in most > circumstances but they could affect it given the appropriate input: for > example, a question about what the subject is thinking. If there are > thoughts that could never, under any circumstances, affect behaviour then > they cannot be conscious thoughts, and they can’t be what is called “the > subconscious” either, since that bubbles up occasionally and affects > consciousness. > > > But does that mere possibility mean anything? Certainly I have many > thoughts which will never be the subject of a question, "What are you > thinking". Suppose that 90% of my thoughts are never evinced in external > behavior. Then 90% of my consciousness might be different and no one > (including me) would know the difference. > If you are not and never can be aware of it then in what sense is it consciousness? > -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
