On Thu, 22 Mar 2018 at 8:57 am, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On 3/21/2018 2:27 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > On Thu, 22 Mar 2018 at 5:45 am, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> >> On 3/20/2018 11:29 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> On Wed, 21 Mar 2018 at 9:03 am, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On 3/20/2018 1:14 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Wed, 21 Mar 2018 at 6:34 am, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 3/20/2018 3:58 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: >>>> >>>> The interesting thing is that you can draw conclusions about consciousness >>>> without being able to define it or detect it. >>>> >>>> I agree. >>>> >>>> >>>> The claim is that IF an entity >>>> is conscious THEN its consciousness will be preserved if brain function is >>>> preserved despite changing the brain substrate. >>>> >>>> Ok, this is computationalism. I also bet on computationalism, but I >>>> think we must proceed with caution and not forget that we are just >>>> assuming this to be true. Your thought experiment is convincing but is >>>> not a proof. You do expose something that I agree with: that >>>> non-computationalism sounds silly. >>>> >>>> But does it sound so silly if we propose substituting a completely >>>> different kind of computer, e.g. von Neumann architecture or one that just >>>> records everything instead of an episodic associative memory, for the >>>> brain. The Church-Turing conjecture says it can compute the same >>>> functions. But does it instantiate the same consciousness. My intuition >>>> is that it would be "conscious" but in some different way; for example by >>>> having the kind of memory you would have if you could review of a movie of >>>> any interval in your past. >>>> >>> >>> I think it would be conscious in the same way if you replaced neural >>> tissue with a black box that interacted with the surrounding tissue in the >>> same way. It doesn’t matter what is in the black box; it could even work by >>> magic. >>> >>> >>> Then why draw the line at "surrounding tissue". Why not the external >>> enivironment? >>> >> >> Keep expanding the part that is replaced and you replace the whole brain >> and the whole organism. >> >> Are you saying you can't imagine being "conscious" but in a different way? >>> >> >> I think it is possible but I don’t think it could happen if my neurones >> were replaced by a functionally equivalent component. If it’s functionally >> equivalent, my behaviour would be unchanged, >> >> >> I agree with that. But you've already supposed that functional >> equivalence at the behavior level implies preservation of consciousness. >> So what I'm considering is replacements in the brain far above the neuron >> level, say at the level of whole functional groups of the brain, e.g. the >> visual system, the auditory system, the memory,... Would functional >> equivalence at the body/brain interface then still imply consciousness >> equivalence? >> > > I think it would, because I don’t think there are isolated consciousness > modules in the brain. A large enough change in visual experience will be > noticed by the subject, who will report that things look different. This > could only happen if there is a change in the input to the language system > from the visual system; but we have assumed that the output from the visual > system is the same, and only the consciousness has changed, leading to a > contradiction. > > > But what about internal systems which are independent of perception...the > very reason Bruno wants to talk about dream states. And I'm not > necessarily asking that behavior be identical...just that the body/brain > interface be the same. The "brain" may be different in how it processes > input from the eyeballs and hence report verbally different perceptions. > In other words, I'm wondering how much does computationalism constrain > consciousness. My intuition is that there could be a lot of difference in > consciousness depending on how different perceptual inputs are process > and/or merged and how internal simulations are handled. To take a crude > example, would it matter if the computer-brain was programmed in a > functional language like LISP, an object-oriented language like Ruby, or a > neural network? Of course Church-Turing says they all compute the same set > of functions, but they don't do it the same way and that might make a > difference in consciousness (and at least verbal behavior). > If the behaviour of the brain is different then it isn't contentious that consciousness will also be different. The question is whether there would be a difference in consciousness even though the behaviour is the same: for example, if the subroutine controlling an artificial dopamine receptor is written in LISP or in Ruby. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. 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