> On 22 May 2018, at 01:37, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Mon, May 21, 2018 at 7:33 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > > You were changing the mathematical definition of computations given > > independently by Church, Post, Turing, Markov , > > I don't know what definition you're referring to
See any (serious) textbook in logic. > but if it doesn't have something about actually obtaining an answer then its > idiotic, but neither Church, Post, Turing nor Markov were idiots. Contradiction. > > > which are not dependent of any assumption in physics, to a definition > > Definition be damned! I don't want a definition I want an answer, I want > an answer to the question "How much is 2+2?" and there is absolutely > positively no way to obtain that answer without using matter that obeys the > laws of physics. Proof? You seem unable to doubt that the physical reality may be don’t exist “ontologically”. But that was the point of *all* theologian (being aware that seeing is not proving) until the religious institution enforce the existence of matter as a dogma, notably 1500 years ago. That helps me to understand what is your problem. > > > > You are right. A definition cannot do a calculation. Only a > machine/number/combinator can do that. But there are plenty of such entities > in arithmetic. > > Well for gods sake stop wasting your time on this list and tell INTEL about > this revolutionary new discovery and then watch as the world is transformed > beyond recognition overnight!! > > > My belief are private. > > Mine aren't but then I am in a different situation than you, I am not > ashamed by my philosophical beliefs. > > >> you are saying you don't think matter soul and shape are separate things, > > > ? > ! > > >> they can not be separated, you think secondary matter is the only sort > of matter that there is. And that would make your beliefs far more matter > orientated than mine because although I don't believe in the soul I do > believe in shape , although I prefer to say information . I think > information and matter, although related, are 2 different things and I think > Leibniz was right, matter that has not been organized by information is just > a chaotic high entropy lump that can’t produce work or make calculations or > do anything else. > > > No problem here. > > Leibniz, who invented the term, It came from Aristotle’s metaphysics. Leibniz, like basically everyone, believe in this, but as I show, it is inconsistent with indexical digital mechanism (the idea that my body is physically Turing emulable). > said all "primary matter" brought to the table was continuity, soul and shape > were separate things. So if you mix in soul and shape with "primary matter" > you end up with "secondary matter" and that's the stuff that we observe and > that can actually do things. You have made no secret in showing your contempt > for "primary matter", but if it doesn't exist that means soul and shape can > not be separated from matter, so "secondary matter" is the only type of > matter there is. Right. But its existence is phenomenological. It is not made of a mixing of form and soul. Both soul and form come from computations, which, as we know since about a century, are not physical notion, but purely arithmetical one. > And that is why I say it would make you more matter orientated than I am. And > that is also why I said you don't know what "primary matter" means. > > >> I'm not joking I'm dead serious!! Ever time I say nothing can be > calculated without matter that obeys the laws of physics and even then only > if that matter is in the form of a Turing Machine you point to some book or > paper as a counterexample, > > >Of course not. I point to some book and paper which provides a > counter-example. > > LIKE HELL IT DOES! The damn book can't calculate 2+2 That joke again. > nor can the book tell me the answer to the question "How much is 2+2?" > without using matter that obeys the laws of physics > > > You fake to see so to make your joke > > It's not funny and I'm not joking. Yes you are. You also confuse book and its content. You confuse book and machine, you confuse computations and description of computations, etc. > > > we both know that a book is not a machine. > > Exactly, a book is not a machine. And only a machine of the general type > described by Turing can make a calculation. Yes, and those Turing equivalent to it, like very elementary arithmetic. Read Gödel 1931. > > > arithmetic contains both the description of the machine, and the machine > itself. It contains both the description of the computation, and the > computations themselves. > > And yet without the help of physics arithmetic is totally unable to answer > the question "How much is 2+2?”. Not at all. If mechanism is true, physics emerge from the numbers. You need only a physical reality to get a physical answer, but the whole of physics is explained, quanta and qualia. Ff you start from the physical reality, you get the quanta, but still needs to introduce magical infinities to get the qualia. So you can’t have both mechanism and physicalism together. Or, explain me what is primary matter, and how it makes a physical computations conscious than an arithmetical computation. You will see by yourself that you will need anon computable element in the body. > So like the word "God" the word "computation" has a meaning in the Brunospeak > language that is unrelated to the English meaning of the word, but I don't > know what those meanings are because only one person on the planet is fluent > in Brunospeak and I'm not him On the contrary, you are using Deutsch idea that computation are physical, which is not the standard definition given by the Church-Turing original thesis. > > >> it would be easy to prove me wrong; just calculate 2+2, you are free to > use the contents of that paper you were talking about or any other paper or > anything else, the only restrictions I place is that you are not allowed to > use matter or energy or to increase entropy when you perform the calculation, > other than that anything goes. If you successfully accomplish my little task > I will publicly declare that I have been wrong all these years and you have > been totally right and is a genius. So what do you say, do you accept my > challenge? > > > You ask me again something impossible. > > Obviously, but ask yourself a question "Exactly why is it impossible?". > Because physics can do something that mathematics can’t. Assuming Aristotle theology. > You may have reasons why physics can do something that mathematics can't and > they may be good reasons or they may be bad reasons it really doesn't matter > because for whatever reason the undeniable FACT remains physics can do > something that mathematics can’t. FACT? Even without computationalism, you will not see ONE paper of physics which assumes primary matter, even if all engineers do that assumption when they apply physics. All we can see are humans measuring numbers, and extrapolating number relations. The primary aspect of matter cannot be tested directly. Then my work shows how to test it indirectly, and up to now, there is no evidence for it. > Of course not just any old arrangement of matter can perform calculations, > Turing's genius was in showing us exactly what sort of matter arrangements > can make calculations and what sort can't. Just read it. > > > But primary matter leads to contradiction [...] > > I think you should stop talking about "primary matter" until you learn what > the phrase means. You keep telling me to read Plato, well I'm telling you to > read Leibniz, he is after all the guy who invented the term. No, it is Aristotle. I read Leibniz. I appreciate him, but there are three period where he defended different ideas in metaphysics, and it is a complex reading. > > >>why did you say "I would believe the computer over a proof in ZF”? > > > Because a computer is an incarnation of a much simpler theory that ZF. > > A computer isn't the incarnation of any theory, it's just a lump of matter > that obeys the laws of physics. A computer is an implementation/incarnation of Turing purely mathematical concept of universal machine. The same for an interpreter of a programming language, except this one is implemented in nature via the computer. There are many level of Turing universality in a modern computer. Only the bottom one is directly physical. > > >> If not, if you still stand by it, then that explains why you would not > say that the ZFC axioms are still consistent and Goldbach is still true > despite the even number the computer found, you would take the side of the > computer > > > How would I know that there was no bug in the computer? > > Because all the computer on the planet repeated the calculation and got the > same answer, or for some other reason it doesn't matter because this is a > thought experiment and the premise is there is no error in the ZFC based > proof that says a number with certain properties can not exist and there is > no error in a computer that produce a number that has those exact same > properties, the question is "which one do you believe?". Neither of us said > we'd believe the axioms over the computer because neither of us is insane. Then what you assume is simply that ZFC is inconsistent, which let not much choice for the answer. > > > if ZFC gives a not too long proof that I can understand, I will believe > more ZF than the computer. > > Well..., I didn't see that coming,.... I stand corrected. > > > I believe only things that I can prove to myself. > > How can you prove an axiom is true? You can’t, Indeed. But you are the one claiming that physicalism is a fact, when it is an axiom. > but you can prove that a axiom is false. If I can prove that an axiom A is false, then I can prove the axiom ~A, and that contradicts your statement above. I guess you mix axiom and “bet on nature”. > If the logic of the proof is correct but the results are wrong then one or > more of the axioms you started with must be bad. > > > I doubt less elementary arithmetic than any equation in physics, > > You wouldn't know any elementary arithmetic or anything else without matter > that obeys the laws of physics. According to your materialist metaphysics, which has been refuted. Bruno > > >Define “real”, then. > > I can't until you define "define". Then define "define "define"". Then > define "define "define "define""". Then ... >> >>> You cannot use that word [real]. >> >> >> Yes I can because I precisely define it, > > By invoking your God. > > The trouble with Brunospeak is the meaning of words change on a daily basis, > I said a real Turing machine is one that can make a calculation, so today > "God" is anything that can answer the question "How much is 2+2?", but nobody > knows what the ASCII string G-O-D will mean tomorrow in Brunospeak. > > >> I'm not confused by the difference between a 747 and a picture of a 747, > one can fly me to Tokyo and one can't. > > > Assuming “real” 747. But that beg the question entirely. > > I have no idea what that means. > > >>> And you confuse a computations with its description too. >> >> So at least you admit there is a difference between those two things. > > I insist on that difference since the start. > > So the description of how computations work that Turing gave us in his famous > 1936 paper was not itself a computation, and that is why we put > microprocessors and not copies of Turing's paper inside computers. > > >> a computation can make a computation but a description of a computation > can not. > > > That is entirely correct. Nobody ever said that a description of a > computation can do a computation. You need a universal machinery. > > You need matter that obey the laws of physics organized in the way Turing > described in 1936. > > >What you seem to ignore is that the arithmetical reality is such a > universal machinery, > > > Stop telling me that and SHOW ME! Add 2+2 without using matter or energy or > increasing entropy. > > John K Clark > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. 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