> On 18 May 2018, at 21:02, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 7:36 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > > a Turing Machine knows nothing excepts what state it should go into, if > it should write a 1 or a 0, and if it should move left or right or halt. > That's it. And yet it can calculate anything that can be calculated provided > that it just follows the laws of physics when it moves and it uses a minimum > amount of energy (that can also be calculated) and produces entropy whenever > it changes one symbol to another. > > > You change the definition. > > Huh?? I change the definition of what from what to what”
You were changing the mathematical definition of computations given independently by Church, Post, Turing, Markov , which are not dependent of any assumption in physics, to a definition of the physical implementation of such a machine, which indeed assume a physical realm, although not necessarily a primary one. > > > And you seem to ignore that the notion of computation and implementation > are definable in arithmetic > > Definitions can't make calculations, only matter that obeys the laws of > physics can. You are right. A definition cannot do a calculation. Only a machine/number/combinator can do that. But there are plenty of such entities in arithmetic. > > > You assume a primary matter for which there has never been evidence for > You keep saying that over and over and over again but I don't think you even > know what primary matter means. Leibniz invented the term > It cames with Aristotle. But Leibniz use a similar idea. > and it means matter in itself in bulk. Leibniz said primary matter was not a > complete substance because it is missing some key things, soul and shape, and > therefore by itself primary matter is passive and can't do anything; if you > mix those things in with primary matter then you get what Leibniz called > secondary matter, and that is complete and that is active and can do things. > But that moves is what my argument shows inconsistent. > When you say you don't believe in primary matter > My belief are private. I have never said that I don’t believe in primary matter. I have “only” proven that primary matter makes no sense at all once we assume computationalism. > you are saying you don't think matter soul and shape are separate things, > ? On the contrary, I explain why the machine can only separate those things, despite truth does not. I refer you to the two facts: G1* proves p <-> []p <-> ([]p & p) <-> ([]p & <>t) <-> ([]Øp & <>t & p) But G1 loves none of them. With G1 = G + (p -> []p), and G1* is the “starification" of G1. See my paper for more on this, or ask me. > they can not be separated, you think secondary matter is the only sort of > matter that there is. And that would make your beliefs far more matter > orientated than mine because although I don't believe in the soul I do > believe in shape , although I prefer to say information . I think > information and matter, although related, are 2 different things and I think > Leibniz was right, matter that has not been organized by information is just > a chaotic high entropy lump that can’t produce work or make calculations or > do anything else. > > No problem here. > >> And for years you have been confused by the difference between the 2 > different types of Turing Machines, the Turing Machines that can make a > calculation and the Turing Machines that can not. I like the type that can. > > > Read Turing and Church in Martin Davis “the undecidable”, > > Don't tell me tell Apple , they would get much better battery life out of > their next generation iPhone if they just stuff the paper inside it instead > of a energy hungry microchip. > > > You repeat the same joke again and again > > I'm not joking I'm dead serious!! Ever time I say nothing can be calculated > without matter that obeys the laws of physics and even then only if that > matter is in the form of a Turing Machine you point to some book or paper as > a counterexample, Of course not. I point to some book and paper which provides a counter-example. The book or paper as such does not provide the counter-example. You fake to see so to make your joke “show me a book which do calculation”. But that is just a joke, given that we both know that a book is not a machine. > well stop telling me and show me, show me how Apple used your idea in their > new iPhone. Put up or shut up. > > > Why do you invoke your God (Primary Matter) to block a metaphysical > argument? > > Not only are you ignorant what the term "primary matter" means you also > don't know what the word "God" means. Nobody knows that, but that is why we (re)define the term. By “God” I made clear I mean a transcendant power at the origin of everything, consciousness included. So God refer to Primary Matter for a materialist, to primary ideas for an idealist, to numbers for an arithmeticalist, etc. Only you want to use the christian notion of God, which makes few sense in our scientific context. > > is in a clear unambiguous way. A real Turing Machine is a Turing Machine that > can actually make a calculation. > > > All Turing machine can do a computation, > Then a microchip is a real Turing Machine and a description of one in a book > is NOT a real Turing Machine, just as a description of Hogwarts castle in a > Harry Potter book is a real description but it is NOT a real castle. You > confuse fact and fantasy. > > We both agree that a description of a machine in book is not a machine. But you confuse a description of a machine and the machine itself. In arithmetic, what Gödel showed (at 99,8%, Turing will complete this, as many others) is that arithmetic contains both the description of the machine, and the machine itself. It contains both the description of the computation, and the computations themselves. That is not entirely obvious, and require the ability to distinguish numbers and description of numbers, and between number relations, and the descriptions of the number relations. You seem to forget that the arithmetical or mathematical propositions have a meaning which is not in the description, but in the models which satisfied those description, like the standard model (reality) or arithmetic. I use “model” in the “reality” sense of the logicians here. > > computer science invites us to reread Plato. > > I politely decline the invitation because I prefer to read authors who know > where the sun goes at night. > > > Here you confuse the content of a paper, where you could learn what is a > computation, with a paper. > > I'm confuse?!! I think you're the one who is very VERY VERY confused, but it > would be easy to prove me wrong; just calculate 2+2, you are free to use the > contents of that paper you were talking about or any other paper or anything > else, the only restrictions I place is that you are not allowed to use matter > or energy or to increase entropy when you perform the calculation, other than > that anything goes. If you successfully accomplish my little task I will > publicly declare that I have been wrong all these years and you have been > totally right and is a genius. So what do you say, do you accept my > challenge? You ask me again something impossible. I can explain to you that all computations are realised in the arithmetical reality, I cannot make such a computation directly into a physical computation, which, as I show, necessitate all computations (given that matter emerges from them all). I predicted indeterminism, non-locality, non cloning of matter, from this hypothesis, and all that has been confirmed. But primary matter leads to contradiction with the facts, or to the elimination of first person, consciousness, etc. >> >>> What I said was only that if a computer find an even number not sum >> of two primes, I would believe the computer over a proof in ZF. >> >> >>I would trust the computer more than the axioms too, I would because I >> think physics always tells the truth, > > > Physics is neutral. Even metaphysics is neutral when done with the > scientific method. Nobody knows the truth as such. > > Then why did you say "I would believe the computer over a proof in ZF”? Because a computer is an incarnation of a much simpler theory that ZF. > > > You talk like an religious integrist. > > You need new material. > > https://www.amazon.com/Giant-Book-Insults-Incorporating-Occasions/dp/0806508817 > > <https://www.amazon.com/Giant-Book-Insults-Incorporating-Occasions/dp/0806508817> > You are the one believing in the second God of Aristotle “primary matter” and invoke it to stop doing research, like the roman christian did for some time. > > >You claim to know the truth. > > I claim physics knows the truth, You see. > that's why I (and you too) would believe a computer if it said a particular > even number was not the sum of 2 primes even if ZF or ANY set of axioms said > such a number was impossible. Physics can not lie but axioms can. Yes, indeed, that is provable in the theology of number, but that does not make matter into a primary notion, and mechanism still refutes physicalism. > > >> Why don't you believe the ZFC axioms are still consistent , Goldbach is > still true, and all computers are always wrong when they say a particular > very large even number is not the sum of two primes? > > > I tend to believe that ZFC is consistent. > > I do too, so I don't expect it to happen but if there were ever a conflict > between ZFC and a number a computer had calculated my belief in ZFC would be > totally and irretrievably shattered. My computer just stopped now, and announce me proudly that the (even) number 6783486227908796544457898890766500067758998000445177196799783486227834862279087965444578988907665000677908796544457898890766500067544557869087654300011000000000002 is not the sum of two primes. > So do you retract your previous statement "I would believe the computer over > a proof in ZF”? Honestly, I would believe anything which convince me with a proof which convince me. But I know already that if ZFC is pi_1 sound, and that if it proves Goldbach false, then even Robinson arithmetic can prove it false, and all computer can find the counter-example, but if that counter-example is too big, it will fails for the contingent reason that it is implemented in a physical universe. > If not, if you still stand by it, then that explains why you would not say > that he ZFC axioms are still consistent and Goldbach is still true despite > the even number the computer found, you would take the side of the computer How would I know that there was no bug in the computer? If the number given is too big, I will not been sure. But if ZFC gives a not too long proof that I can understand, I will believe more ZF than the computer. I believe only things that I can prove to myself. > as any sane man would because you implicitly assume physics is more > trustworthy than any set of axioms. I doubt less elementary arithmetic than any equation in physics, which makes infinite extrapolation from finite data. >> >>> you have to explain how that primary matter makes “more real” some >> computations, and "less real” others. > >> >> No, it would be nice to know why but I am under no obligation to >> explain why a real Turing Machine > > > Real? > > Yes real. Amen. > > > That is what we search. > > Then this is you lucky day because your search is over, a real Turing Machine > is one that can make a calculation. Define “real”, then. > > > You cannot use that word. > > Yes I can because I precisely define it, By invoking your God. That is the problem. I tend to be quite skeptical about it. > in fact I can't think of any definition of anything that is more precisely > defined. And if that's not enough I also provided numerous examples of it. > > > You confuse a machine with its description. > I'm not the one who thinks a description of a machine can do everything a > real machine can do that is made of atoms, uses energy, produces entropy and > makes calculations. I'm not confused by the difference between a 747 and a > picture of a 747, one can fly me to Tokyo and one can't. > > Assuming “real” 747. But that beg the question entirely. > > And you confuse a computations with its description too. > > So at least you admit there is a difference between those two things. I insist on that difference since the start. > I'll tell you exactly what I thing the difference is, a computation can make > a computation but a description of a computation can not. That is entirely correct. Nobody ever said that a description of a computation can do a computation. You need a universal machinery. What you seem to ignore is that the arithmetical reality is such a universal machinery, the physical reality too, but it is not the only one. All models of any Turing complete theory provides such a universal machinery. > That's why manufactures don't stuff books on computer theory inside computers > and thats why they prefer microchips. Made possible by the understanding of those books. The physical microchips incarnate the ideas in those books, but the arithmetical reality too, and indeed the physical will be explained by an arithmetical phenomenon. As I said, this explain better the facts than primary matter, which makes the mind-body problem unsolvable. Bruno > > John K Clark > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
