On 6/25/2018 4:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Jun 2018, at 21:26, Brent Meeker <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 6/24/2018 8:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Jun 2018, at 22:12, Brent Meeker <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 6/21/2018 2:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 20 Jun 2018, at 00:28, Brent Meeker <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 6/19/2018 7:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 Jun 2018, at 22:41, Brent Meeker <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 6/16/2018 10:16 AM, John Clark wrote:
>
/Another universe comes into existence when Joe the
Plumber performs, say, a spin measurement./
But a measurement (whatever in the world that means) does not
need to be made and there is nothing special about Joe, if
Everett is right the same thing happens every time an electron
in Joe's skin encounters a photon, or for that matter whenever
an electron anywhere encounters anything.
That's where MWI gets fuzzy.
Not more than QM itself. We can define a world by a branch of
the universe wave. But such world will be “world” only as part
of a personal history. Everett disagrees, but his “relative
state” is a better wording than “many-worlds” which is often
confusing.
Do all the submicroscopic events that make to macroscopic
difference create different worlds? That can't be right because
"worlds" are classical things. So the Heisenberg but problem
seems to reappear in different form.
Heisenberg cut disappear, it is just that worlds differentiate
from our perspective when they make difference for us, like when
they can no more interfere. There is no cut, only the quantum
wave (in the Schroedinger picture) and relative state related to
macroscopic irreversibility, which needs only the classical
chaos to be irreversible FAPP. Histories are internal things,
already a form of first person plural notion.
Right. But how FAPP does it have to be, how irreversible, in
order that it constitutes a conscious distinct state? That's how
the Heisenberg cut problem reappears at a different level.
Very quickly, like when you mix milk in the coffee. Pure
statistics theory provides the numbers, like when we can use Gauss
e^(-x^2) instead of Pascal triangle. You don’t need 0 on the
diagonal, only tiny numbers.
I think you mean OFF the diagonal.
Indeed.
But how do you know you only need tiny numbers, and how tiny? I
have thought that perhaps there should be a smallest non-zero unit
of probability; but it has been pointed out that even tiny numbers
may add up when the density matrix is transformed to some other basis.
It is just that the numbers are tiny only from your (3p) personal
points of view. You brain needs to be enough of a mixture for
consciousness to differentiate into universal machine (relative)
state. In the case (which I doubt) that the brain is a quantum
computer, we would be able to exploit the numbers which are not tiny
in the relevant base to exploit quantum computing ability.
You don’t need purely orthogonal state, the big numbers and
classical chaos will lead to the right quasi classical phenomenology,
So you say. But that requires a theory of "phenomenology", i.e. a
theory of how perception is realized.
But I extract the quantum from such a phenomenology. Perception is
mainly [a]<a>p with [a] designing a variant of the logic of
self-reference G, or G*.
It is provably realised in all models of the consistent extensions
of very elementary arithmetic.
(You might need to study some books on self-reference (the
provability logic) to get the point).
So you're claiming that you have derived QM from perception (as
described by provability).
No, my main claim, and oldest result, is that IF mechanism is true
THEN physics must be extracted in a very special way. You don’t need
to see the derivation of physics to understand that physicalism does
not work with Mechanism. But the point is to do the test before.
Then it took me 30 years to make the test, and I showed that when we
derive physics in that very special way, we get the first evidence
that mechanism is correct, as we get the right logic. If we did not,
Mechanism would be refuted.
But how does it then follow that perception is classical?
That is the easy part. Because the universal machine is a classical
notion; like arithmetic, and … quantum computer science, or the
multiverse. It is part of our assumption: a machine stops or does not
stop.
As I understand your theory, you only get the indeterminancy and the
superposition of states by invoking the infinite threads fo the UD.
Also that doesn't solve the problem of small off-diagonal terms not
being small when written in a different basis.
It does, we just do not use those bases, because they would evacuate
the results we need to act in a world which has made us with classical
brain, or at least, a classical reality. The “observable” are not
classical, but they are not describing a reality, they describe only
arithmetic seen in the observable mode ([]p & <>t (& p)).
That's what I say about all of it.
Brent
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