> On 21 Jun 2018, at 22:12, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 6/21/2018 2:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 20 Jun 2018, at 00:28, Brent Meeker <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 6/19/2018 7:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 16 Jun 2018, at 22:41, Brent Meeker <[email protected] >>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 6/16/2018 10:16 AM, John Clark wrote: >>>>>> > Another universe comes into existence when Joe the Plumber >>>>>> performs, say, a spin measurement. >>>>>> >>>>>> But a measurement (whatever in the world that means) does not need to be >>>>>> made and there is nothing special about Joe, if Everett is right the >>>>>> same thing happens every time an electron in Joe's skin encounters a >>>>>> photon, or for that matter whenever an electron anywhere encounters >>>>>> anything. >>>>> >>>>> That's where MWI gets fuzzy. >>>> >>>> Not more than QM itself. We can define a world by a branch of the universe >>>> wave. But such world will be “world” only as part of a personal history. >>>> Everett disagrees, but his “relative state” is a better wording than >>>> “many-worlds” which is often confusing. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Do all the submicroscopic events that make to macroscopic difference >>>>> create different worlds? That can't be right because "worlds" are >>>>> classical things. So the Heisenberg but problem seems to reappear in >>>>> different form. >>>> >>>> Heisenberg cut disappear, it is just that worlds differentiate from our >>>> perspective when they make difference for us, like when they can no more >>>> interfere. There is no cut, only the quantum wave (in the Schroedinger >>>> picture) and relative state related to macroscopic irreversibility, which >>>> needs only the classical chaos to be irreversible FAPP. Histories are >>>> internal things, already a form of first person plural notion. >>> >>> Right. But how FAPP does it have to be, how irreversible, in order that it >>> constitutes a conscious distinct state? That's how the Heisenberg cut >>> problem reappears at a different level. >> >> Very quickly, like when you mix milk in the coffee. Pure statistics theory >> provides the numbers, like when we can use Gauss e^(-x^2) instead of Pascal >> triangle. You don’t need 0 on the diagonal, only tiny numbers. > > I think you mean OFF the diagonal.
Indeed. > But how do you know you only need tiny numbers, and how tiny? I have thought > that perhaps there should be a smallest non-zero unit of probability; but it > has been pointed out that even tiny numbers may add up when the density > matrix is transformed to some other basis. It is just that the numbers are tiny only from your (3p) personal points of view. You brain needs to be enough of a mixture for consciousness to differentiate into universal machine (relative) state. In the case (which I doubt) that the brain is a quantum computer, we would be able to exploit the numbers which are not tiny in the relevant base to exploit quantum computing ability. > >> You don’t need purely orthogonal state, the big numbers and classical chaos >> will lead to the right quasi classical phenomenology, > > So you say. But that requires a theory of "phenomenology", i.e. a theory of > how perception is realized. But I extract the quantum from such a phenomenology. Perception is mainly [a]<a>p with [a] designing a variant of the logic of self-reference G, or G*. It is provably realised in all models of the consistent extensions of very elementary arithmetic. (You might need to study some books on self-reference (the provability logic) to get the point). Bruno > > Brent > >> for most relative observers. We don’t need to kill all white rabbits, just >> to make them relatively rare. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
