> On 25 Jun 2018, at 18:47, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 6/25/2018 4:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 24 Jun 2018, at 21:26, Brent Meeker <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 6/24/2018 8:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 21 Jun 2018, at 22:12, Brent Meeker <[email protected] >>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 6/21/2018 2:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 20 Jun 2018, at 00:28, Brent Meeker <[email protected] >>>>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 6/19/2018 7:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 16 Jun 2018, at 22:41, Brent Meeker <[email protected] >>>>>>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 6/16/2018 10:16 AM, John Clark wrote: >>>>>>>>>> > Another universe comes into existence when Joe the Plumber >>>>>>>>>> performs, say, a spin measurement. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> But a measurement (whatever in the world that means) does not need >>>>>>>>>> to be made and there is nothing special about Joe, if Everett is >>>>>>>>>> right the same thing happens every time an electron in Joe's skin >>>>>>>>>> encounters a photon, or for that matter whenever an electron >>>>>>>>>> anywhere encounters anything. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> That's where MWI gets fuzzy. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Not more than QM itself. We can define a world by a branch of the >>>>>>>> universe wave. But such world will be “world” only as part of a >>>>>>>> personal history. Everett disagrees, but his “relative state” is a >>>>>>>> better wording than “many-worlds” which is often confusing. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Do all the submicroscopic events that make to macroscopic difference >>>>>>>>> create different worlds? That can't be right because "worlds" are >>>>>>>>> classical things. So the Heisenberg but problem seems to reappear in >>>>>>>>> different form. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Heisenberg cut disappear, it is just that worlds differentiate from >>>>>>>> our perspective when they make difference for us, like when they can >>>>>>>> no more interfere. There is no cut, only the quantum wave (in the >>>>>>>> Schroedinger picture) and relative state related to macroscopic >>>>>>>> irreversibility, which needs only the classical chaos to be >>>>>>>> irreversible FAPP. Histories are internal things, already a form of >>>>>>>> first person plural notion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Right. But how FAPP does it have to be, how irreversible, in order >>>>>>> that it constitutes a conscious distinct state? That's how the >>>>>>> Heisenberg cut problem reappears at a different level. >>>>>> >>>>>> Very quickly, like when you mix milk in the coffee. Pure statistics >>>>>> theory provides the numbers, like when we can use Gauss e^(-x^2) instead >>>>>> of Pascal triangle. You don’t need 0 on the diagonal, only tiny numbers. >>>>> >>>>> I think you mean OFF the diagonal. >>>> >>>> Indeed. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> But how do you know you only need tiny numbers, and how tiny? I have >>>>> thought that perhaps there should be a smallest non-zero unit of >>>>> probability; but it has been pointed out that even tiny numbers may add >>>>> up when the density matrix is transformed to some other basis. >>>> >>>> It is just that the numbers are tiny only from your (3p) personal points >>>> of view. You brain needs to be enough of a mixture for consciousness to >>>> differentiate into universal machine (relative) state. In the case (which >>>> I doubt) that the brain is a quantum computer, we would be able to exploit >>>> the numbers which are not tiny in the relevant base to exploit quantum >>>> computing ability. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>>> You don’t need purely orthogonal state, the big numbers and classical >>>>>> chaos will lead to the right quasi classical phenomenology, >>>>> >>>>> So you say. But that requires a theory of "phenomenology", i.e. a theory >>>>> of how perception is realized. >>>> >>>> But I extract the quantum from such a phenomenology. Perception is mainly >>>> [a]<a>p with [a] designing a variant of the logic of self-reference G, or >>>> G*. >>>> >>>> It is provably realised in all models of the consistent extensions of very >>>> elementary arithmetic. >>>> >>>> (You might need to study some books on self-reference (the provability >>>> logic) to get the point). >>> >>> So you're claiming that you have derived QM from perception (as described >>> by provability). >> >> >> No, my main claim, and oldest result, is that IF mechanism is true THEN >> physics must be extracted in a very special way. You don’t need to see the >> derivation of physics to understand that physicalism does not work with >> Mechanism. But the point is to do the test before. >> >> Then it took me 30 years to make the test, and I showed that when we derive >> physics in that very special way, we get the first evidence that mechanism >> is correct, as we get the right logic. If we did not, Mechanism would be >> refuted. >> >> >> >> >>> But how does it then follow that perception is classical? >> >> That is the easy part. Because the universal machine is a classical notion; >> like arithmetic, and … quantum computer science, or the multiverse. It is >> part of our assumption: a machine stops or does not stop. > > As I understand your theory, you only get the indeterminancy and the > superposition of states by invoking the infinite threads fo the UD.
At the meta-level. The fact that we cannot be aware of the delays of the UD, measured in number of steps of the computations do the rest. Elementary arithmetic does not postulate an axiom of infinity, but the Löbian entities run by it can prove that there is no biggest prime number, and that if mechanism is true, such state of affair plays a role in shaping the physical laws. Bruno > >> >> >> >>> Also that doesn't solve the problem of small off-diagonal terms not being >>> small when written in a different basis. >> >> It does, we just do not use those bases, because they would evacuate the >> results we need to act in a world which has made us with classical brain, or >> at least, a classical reality. The “observable” are not classical, but they >> are not describing a reality, they describe only arithmetic seen in the >> observable mode ([]p & <>t (& p)). > > That's what I say about all of it. > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
