> On 22 Jun 2018, at 16:16, smitra <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 21-06-2018 23:46, Brent Meeker wrote: >> On 6/21/2018 6:33 AM, smitra wrote: >>> On 21-06-2018 05:01, Brent Meeker wrote: >>>> On 6/20/2018 6:30 PM, smitra wrote: >>>>> On 19-06-2018 23:22, Brent Meeker wrote: >>>>>> On 6/18/2018 6:03 PM, smitra wrote: >>>>>>> On 17-06-2018 22:42, Jason Resch wrote: >>>>>>>> Hi Lawrence, >>>>>>>> Is the evolution of states of the wave function computable? If so then >>>>>>>> the result of MRDP implies it is Diophantine. >>>>>>>> Jason >>>>>>> Or you could try to see if QM could be a meta-theory that arises when >>>>>>> you try to give a statistical description of the set of all these >>>>>>> Diophantine sets. I tried to do something similar with the set of >>>>>>> algorithms a few years ago, getting a half-baked result, some hints at >>>>>>> how quantum field theory could arise from this. >>>>>>> You want to compute the probability that an observer that's encoded by >>>>>>> some mathematical structure has some given information content. So, if >>>>>>> you observe the outcome of an experiment, that's information in your >>>>>>> brain. >>>>>> Which is the QBism interpretation of QM. If you take the view that QM >>>>>> is about predicting and explaining what one will see, there's no point >>>>>> in going further...the rest is metaphysics. >>>>>> Brent >>>>> QM should then emerge as an effective theory and the correct >>>>> interpretation should also follow. >>>> ?? QBism is an interpretation. >>>> Brent >>> If we derive QM from a more fundamental principle then that is likely to >>> single out one particular interpretation of QM as the correct one. So, >>> which interpretation is correct is then no longer a philosophical or >>> metaphysical question, it's something that can be probed experimentally by >>> testing the underlying theory from which QM is derived. >> So you're considering finding a more fundamental theory such that QM >> will be a consequence or effective theory. Of course that may >> involve questions of interpretation of the more fundamental theory. >> Brent > > Yes, and there are good reasons to believe that even if the MWI is the > correct interpretation that it is unlikely to be the last word. There is a > problem with deriving the Born rule,
I do think that Gleason theorem solves this. I will not insist as it is not an easy theorem to explain. But I might ask you if you have a precise reason to doubt that this is possible. > also simply interpreting the meaning of probability from within the MWI is > problematic. Yes. Especially, why not count all computations? Why only the quantum one? That is what I am working on, using Mechanism as the main tool. > Also, if another sort of a multiverse exists besides the quantum multiverse, > then in any physics experiment you're going to measure the totality of all > the effects of all multiverses in which you have exact copies. The effects of > these other multiverses e.g. as provided by inflation theory cannot > necessarily be dismissed as trivial (e.g. by saying that it leads to > uncertainty of the quantum state, the effects of which can be absorbed in a > density matrix), as counting states with the restriction that the same > observer is present per my argument in the previous posting, also leads to > quantum-like laws. Eventually, that can be related to the importance of not assuming any infinities. With arithmetic, we elude the non standard models of arithmetic, because the laws of addition and multiplication in such non standard model can be proved to be non computable. But with any theories which assumes some infinity, we can no more fight against the white rabbits. No Infinities is not an option, as I thought sometimes ago, but is made obligatory. Judson Webb insight was correct: Mechanism is a finitism. Bruno > > Saibal > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
