> On 29 Jun 2018, at 19:54, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > > > On 6/29/2018 2:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 28 Jun 2018, at 20:00, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net >>> <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 6/28/2018 8:46 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> Also, if another sort of a multiverse exists besides the quantum >>>>> multiverse, then in any physics experiment you're going to measure the >>>>> totality of all the effects of all multiverses in which you have exact >>>>> copies. The effects of these other multiverses e.g. as provided by >>>>> inflation theory cannot necessarily be dismissed as trivial (e.g. by >>>>> saying that it leads to uncertainty of the quantum state, the effects of >>>>> which can be absorbed in a density matrix), as counting states with the >>>>> restriction that the same observer is present per my argument in the >>>>> previous posting, also leads to quantum-like laws. >>>> Eventually, that can be related to the importance of not assuming any >>>> infinities. With arithmetic, we elude the non standard models of >>>> arithmetic, because the laws of addition and multiplication in such non >>>> standard model can be proved to be non computable. But with any theories >>>> which assumes some infinity, we can no more fight against the white >>>> rabbits. No Infinities is not an option, as I thought sometimes ago, but >>>> is made obligatory. Judson Webb insight was correct: Mechanism is a >>>> finitism. >>> >>> How is that consistent with your idea of the UD producing infinitely many >>> threads of computation through the same state? >> >> I do not see the inconsistency. I guess you confuse the object in the model >> (the natural numbers, the finite pieces of computations, …) and the model >> itself (N is infinite, but is not an existing object in arithmetic, just a >> meta-decor when we take some meat-distance). The UD is a finite being, and >> do only finite things, forever, but that “forever” needs a richer >> phenomenology to be accounted for. > > That sounds like double talk. The "forever" is just another way introducing > infinity while pretending that the infinity is not reached because it is only > potential in time. But there is no "time" in these abstractions; if they > exist at all, they exist complete. >
If that was true, theories like PA or ZF would be inconsistent. The number of the numbers is not a number, as Plotinus saw in that setting, but which will be made clear with sets from cantor to ZF. When we axiomatic the notion of numbers, we do not axiomatise any notion of set or subset of numbers, although we can talk about many such set by definable properties, but this does not make themselves into subject of discourse, for the same reason that the “set of all sets” cannot be a set. That can be retaliated to the idea in theology that God cannot be part of its creation. So, yes, it is double talk, if you want, but that is the obligatory double talk made precise through any formalisation, and that we cannot avoid due to incompleteness. It is partly formalised at the meta-level by the double logics of self-reference imposed by incompleteness: G and G*, Z1 and Z1*, etc. And yes, truth is complete but that can be seen only in Heave, and not on Earth. We can’t define the Arithmetical Truth, we can only approximate it, necessarily. Bruno > Brent > >> The paradox resolve when we distinguish what we can prove and what is true. >> All semantics of the rich theories are based on some axiom of infinity, but >> no semantics of a theory can be part of the theory. That is a consequence of >> results by Gödel and Tarski. We cannot define “infinity” in arithmetic, and >> there is none. But of course, the model are all infinite, but not part of >> the theory. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >>> <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com >>> <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >> <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com >> <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
