> On 5 Jul 2018, at 17:19, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Thu, Jul 5, 2018 at 4:55 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > >> >>>>Nobody has ever seen a demonstration of a non-physical calculation >> in a book and nobody ever will. >> >> >>> That contradicts all publication in the field. >> >> >>Maybe that's true if your field is flying saucer men in Roswell New >> Mexico or other varieties of junk science, but show me one citation from the >> journal Nature or Science or Physical Review Letters or The Journal of >> Applied Physics demonstrating a non-physical calculation. Just one will do. > > >You need to consult papers in mathematical logic journal. Obviously if > “scientific” means physics, you will not find the papers I am mentioning, > So you now admit that the experts who specialize in the study of physical > phenomena have, just as I said, "never seen a demonstration of a non-physical > calculation “ . >
Yes. Computability is born in mathematical logic, not in physics. Physical computer came later, and just show that the physical reality is Turing-complete. It only means that the physical reality can implement a universal Turing machine. Before that, it was shown that the arithmetical reality implement it too. But the physicists have all seen in the mathematical logic journal that the notion of computation is not a physical notion, as opposed of course to the notion of physical implementation of a computation. > And that dear Bruno flatly contradicts your statement "That contradicts all > publication in the field “ > I don’t see it. > , the truth of the matter is it does NOT contradict ANY of the publications > in the field of physical phenomena, except perhaps for the Roswell Flying > Saucer Journal. > > ? > >You would say that group theory assumes the existence of chalk and > blackboard. > > > Group theory can't assume anything but group theorists can, and yes they > assume the existence of chalk and blackboard that's why they use them, I > would not be surprised if you use them too from time to time. But that assumption is not part of the definition of group, like the notion of computation has nothing to do a priori with physics, even if you postulate physicalism. It is simply an easy verifiable fact. > > >I am not saying that a human does not need some energy to study > mathematics. > > But why? If energy comes from pure numbers then why do experts in pure > numbers need energy even when they study pure numbers? > > Because experts are physical being. With mechanism, they emerge in arithmetic or equivalent, though. > > > in this case I am alluding to an infinity of “correct” one. > > The ways numbers can be manipulated is infinite but only one of those > ways is compatible with physical reality ? > and we call that way arithmetic; it is the only way that is correct, That is utterly ridiculous, and circular. Physicists assume arithmetic to make sense of the observations. > and unlike you I don't feel the need to use any apologetic quotation marks. > > >>Your fundamental blunder is you've forgotten what a function is, you've > forgotten what your high school algebra teacher said on the very first day of > class, he said a function is a machine, > > > >I am not that old. The machines are enumerable, but the functions are not. > > A function can't exist unless a person or a machine is thinking about it, Because you assume a primary physical reality. But that is not a valid way to proceed when we do metaphysics with the scientific method. You give the answer before the question. Anyway, this has been refuted. > so the number of existing functions is not only enumerable it is finite, > assuming by "existence" we mean there is a difference between "X " and "not > X”. ? > > > like there are much more truth than proofs. > > And there are more incorrect proofs than correct ones, infinitely more in > fact. I guess you mean invalid. But that is false. It enumerable for both valid and non valid proofs. > > > >>A function is instructions written in a very compact form > > >No. That is a program, or machine. Most functions cannot be so compactly > represented. > > If you don't have a notation that allows you to represent a function in a > finite number of symbols then neither a person nor a machine can think about > it then it does not exist except in Plato's heaven, and there is no > detectable difference between Plato's heaven existing and Plato's heaven not > existing so, just like the luminiferous aether of old, it is useless > metaphysical baggage. This is your opinion. But it contradicts your belief in computationalism as I have shown. We know how you stop at a crucial but very easy step. > > > By itself, nothing can do anything. > > Matter doesn't need anything to do stuff except the laws of physics, but the > laws of numbers are not enough to enable numbers to do anything. As I said, that contradicts all the papers in the field. It shows that you never study even one paper. After all that is what you said. > > >in the arithmetical reality we can define what “doing things” can mean. > That is the whole point. > > I know, definitions have always been your whole point, but definitions are > just a linguistic convention and can't create anything. Level confusion again (and again …). > > > >>physics can make calculations with NAND and NOR circuits made from > mechanical rods ratchets and gears or vacuum tubes or transistors or > microchips or some other arrangement of matter that obeys the laws of > physics, such as the neurons in the bone box on your shoulders. > > > Assuming physicalism, > > No, assuming the scientific method and the evidence before your eyes whenever > you're looking at a computer screen as you're doing at this very instant. Again, you assume Aristotle criteria of reality. Begging the question. > > > Matter produce consciousness? > > Yes. > > > How? > > I don't know how and never claimed I did. But I do claim there is > incontrovertible evidence that matter DOES produce consciousness. First show an evidence of primary matter. > Whenever your brain changes your consciousness changes and whenever your > consciousness changes your brain changes. But that does not make the brain primitively material. > Matter doesn't care if Human Beings understands how it pulls off this trick > or not, it will keep doing it regardless. That is the christia, if not catholic, theory. There are others. > > >>Nobody has ever provided even the tiniest speck of evidence that there is > a connection between Turing non-computability and consciousness other than > consciousness is sorta weird and non-computability is sorta weird. > > >That is my point. > > That's it? That's all you've got? The only evidence non-computability is > connected to consciousness is that both are a bit odd? Of course not. It has been proved that consciousness and matter are not computable, like the behaviour of arbitrary universal machine. You might confuse total computable with partial computable, I think. > > >You said it yourself, two numerically identical brain, in two different > places, will be associated to the same consciousness. > > Yes. > > >That is the basic reason of the first person indeterminacy. > > Seeing Washington and seeing Moscow is NOT the same conscious experience, and > because a change in consciousness always results in a change in the brain the > brains will no longer be identical. But the person remains the same person with the criteria of personal identity that you have given. > And there is nothing indeterminate about any of it. It is all 100% > predictable but to obscure this fact it is necessary to introduce personal > pronouns with no referent. I think you lie, simply. We did agree on all referents. > > > Infinitely many programs/number-relations lead to the same experiences, > > There are not infinitely many instances of 2+3=5, there is only one. But 2+3=5 is a truth. We were talking about “2+3=5”, not 2+3=5. Bruno > > > John K Clark > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. 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