> On 24 Jun 2018, at 11:35, Russell Standish <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Fri, Jun 22, 2018 at 04:30:54PM -0400, John Clark wrote: >> On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 5:09 PM, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >* * >>> *The only thing I am asking is:* >>> *1) Physics -> Brains, Cars, Atoms, Etc.* >>> *2) ??? -> Physics -> Brains, Cars, Atoms, Etc.* >>> *Do we have enough information to decide between the above two theories? >>> Have we really ruled out anything sitting below physics?* >>> >> >> If I define physics as the thing that can tell the difference between a >> correct computation and a incorrect computation and between a corrupted >> memory and a uncorrupted memory, and as long as we're at this philosophic >> meta level that's not a b ad definition, then I don't think anything >> is below physics. > > If you define physics that way, then you are using the term > differently to Bruno, for whom physics is very definitely > phenomenology - tables, chairs, billiard balls, electrons and such. > > I made a somewhat similar point to Bruno, when I asked why his > platonic arithmetic could be considered ur-stuff (which I defined to > be pretty much how you define physics above). His retort was that > integers weren't stuff - but I think that is somewhat of a lost in > translation moment. The French word etouffe
Etoffe. > basically means material, > and in English stuff used to mean the same, but in more recent times has > taken on a placeholder function, a generic collection of "things". > > The real point is that with computationalism (in particular the CT > thesis), it doesn't matter what the computers are made of (ie what the > ur-stuff really is), phenomenal physics will be the same, a > consequence of what is computible. So the ur stuff is given by 0, s(0), …, but it is not suff at all. It is not material, and eventually “matter” is a vague term referring to the prediction we can make, taking into account that no machine/number can localise itself in one computations, but only an infinity of them and this phenomenologically (as there is no infinities in arithmetic). > > One mystery does remain though - why don't we see things like Hilbert > hotel computers? It is a somewhat hidden assumption of > computationalism that such things don't exist. Only 0, s(0), s(s(0) … are existing. You need an axiom of infinity to have a Hilbert Hostel. My axioms are only classical logic + Kxy = x and Sxyz = xz(yz). Bruno > > >> >> >>> >> >>>> Then why is brain damage a big deal? Why do I need my brain to think? >>>> >>> >>> >* * >>> *The base computations that implement your brain may be sub-routines of a >>> larger computation,* >>> >> >> If true then that is an example of something physics can do but mathematics >> can not. And I have to say that is a mighty damn important sub-routine! >> >>> >> >>>> Without physics 2+2=3 would work just as well as 2+2=4 and insisting the >>>> answer is 4 would just be an arbitrary convention of no more profundity >>>> than the rules that tell us when to say "who" and when to say "whom". >>>> >>>> > >>> *For any computation to make sense, you need to be working under some >>> definitions of integers and relations between them. * >>> >> >> Definitions are made for our convenience, they do not create physical >> objects. And there are an infinite number of ways integers and >> the relations between them could have been defined, so why did >> mathematicians pick the specific definition that they did? Because that's >> the only one that conforms with the physical world, and thats why >> mathematics is the best language to describe physics. >> >> >>> * > Without that, you can't even define what a Turing machine or what a >>> computation is.* >>> >> >> I don't need to describe either one because I've got something much much >> better than definitions, examples. >> >> *>I can imagine a computation without a physical universe. * >>> >> >> I can't. >> >> >> >* * >>> *I can't imagine a computation without some form of arithmetical law.* >>> >> >> I can. A Turing Machine will just keep on doing what its doing regardless >> of the English words or mathematical equations you use to describe its >> operation. >> >>> >> >>>> As far as simulation is concerned in some circumstances we could figure >>>> out that we live in a virtual reality, assuming the computer that is >>>> simulating us does not have finite capacity we might devise experiments >>>> that stretch it to its limits and we'd start to see glitches. Or the >>>> beings doing the simulating could simply tell us, as they have complete >>>> control over everything in our world so they would certainly be able >>>> to convince us they’re telling the truth. >>>> >>>> >>> > >>> T >>> *hey could convince us something strange is going on, but they couldn't >>> convince us they weren't lying about whatever they might be telling us >>> about the architecture that is running the simulation. This follows >>> directly from the Church-Turing thesis. The Church-Turing thesis says any >>> program or Turing Machine can be executed/emulated by any computer. >>> Therefore, no program or machine can determine whether it is being computed >>> by or emulated by any particular Turing machine vs. any other that might be >>> emulating it.* >>> >> >> OK, they could prove they're simulating us but they couldn't prove the >> logical hardware architecture of their machine worked the way they said it >> did, however in some circumstances they could provide some pretty >> compelling evidence that they were telling the truth. For example suppose >> they found out how to solve all non-deterministic polynomial time problems >> in polynomial time and that's how they were able to make a computer >> powerful enough to simulate our universe. And they said they themselves >> were being simulated and their simulators told them how to do this and now >> they are passing the secret on to us. We try it and pretty soon we have >> made our own simulated universe with intelligent, and presumably conscious, >> beings in it. After that I’d tend to believe what they said. >> >> >> >>>> It was discovered more than 30 years ago that if Quarks didn't exist >>>> inside protons then high speed electrons would scatter off protons >>>> differently than the way they are observed to scatter. If you assume Quarks >>>> don't exist then there are consequences, those high speed electrons will >>>> behave in ways that surprise you. In other words physics told you that your >>>> assumption was incorrect. >>>> >>> >>> *>Okay. So you do accept relations between mathematical objects can >>> support your consciousness?* >>> >> >> A mathematical object is just something that has been defined in the >> language of mathematics, J K Rowling defined Hogwarts Castle in the >> language of English but that doesn't mean either of them must exist. There >> are an infinite number of ways mathematicians could have defined a quark >> but they picked the one that physics told them to, the one that scattered >> electrons the way we see in experiments. >> >> >>> > >>> *Integers (let's go by normal definitions of 0, 1, 2, etc.) have >>> properties.* >>> >> People invented numbers thousands of years ago to count things, if the laws >> of physics were different and physical objects spontaneously duplicated >> themselves and spontaneously disappeared our "normal definition" of >> integers would be very different from what we have now. >> >>> >>> > >>> *We can't arbitrarily say "2+2=5", this is playing with strings, not >>> integers.* >>> >> >> We can't be arbitrary if we don't want a conflict between mathematics and >> physics, but if you take out physics then play away, you can let 2+2 >> be anything you want and there are no consequences. >> >> >> > >>> * Would you say that mathematics imposes "meta laws" which must be true >>> across all possible/imaginable universes?* >>> >> >> Yes I think so, but the meta laws would be physical not mathematical. If >> we're very lucky we might be able to describe those meta laws >> mathematically (although almost certainly not with the mathematics we have >> now) but I don't think there is any chance of a pure mathematician ever >> finding them, we're going to need physical experiments to give us some >> hints and I just hope that doesn't require a particle accelerator the size >> of the galaxy. >> >> >>> >** >>> * It is physically impossible to arrange 7 stones into a rectangle* >>> >> >> If there were not 7 stones or 7 of anything in the entire physical >> universe the entire concept of "7" would be meaningless. >> >> >> >>> > >>> * It is physically impossible to move your pencil over a piece of paper >>> such that it writes a valid proof that 7 has more than 2 integer factors > >>> 0* >>> >> >> Yes, it is a physical law that the physical act described above would be >> physically impossible because there are at least 7 physical things in the >> physical universe so “7” means something. >> >> >>> >* * >>> *It is an impossible experience to see 7 stones arranged into a rectangle >>> (as defined above)* >>> >> >> I'm less sure about that, I've never taken it but with enough LSD I might >> be able to experience it. >> >> >> John K Clark >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > -- > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Dr Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > Principal, High Performance Coders > Visiting Senior Research Fellow [email protected] > Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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