> On 28 Jun 2018, at 04:14, Russell Standish <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Wed, Jun 27, 2018 at 10:39:20AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> His retort was that >>> integers weren't stuff - but I think that is somewhat of a lost in >>> translation moment. The French word etouffe >> >> Etoffe. >> >> >> >>> basically means material, >>> and in English stuff used to mean the same, but in more recent times has >>> taken on a placeholder function, a generic collection of "things". >>> > > My point about the lost in translation moment still pertains. My > grandmother used to admonish me for saying things like "... and all > that stuff", because for her, stuff meant material. Language has > changed. Colloqially, we can refer to integers, sets and stuff, and > clearly mean something along the lines of the rest of mathematics with > stuff. It is a very colloquial word, best avoided for precision :).
Indeed. I am using stuff like if it was a generalisation of matter, but typically substantial. With mechanism, numbers are more like ideas (like in Plato’s world of ideas) than anything made of something. With mechanism, matter is more a bit of experience and mathematics. It is a mental construct related to deep or long mathematical complex histories, with a linear bottom justifying the measure (and thus the local persistence of the illusion). > >> >>> >>> One mystery does remain though - why don't we see things like Hilbert >>> hotel computers? It is a somewhat hidden assumption of >>> computationalism that such things don't exist. >> >> Only 0, s(0), s(s(0) … are existing. You need an axiom of infinity to have a >> Hilbert Hostel. >> >> My axioms are only classical logic + Kxy = x and Sxyz = xz(yz). >> > > Yes - but Deutsch's point would be: why just those axioms, and not say > some kind of infinity axiom that allows Hilbert hotels? Because this would lead to an inflation of white rabbits.Today, I begin to think that even PA is already delusive. Somehow Nelson is right, even the induction axioms are too much powerful. Infinity axioms need to be made by the machine/number to understand themselves, but they are part of the phenomenology. That is related to incompleteness, but also illustrated by analytical number theory. Infinity is important, but not in the ontology suitable for Mechanism, where it adds unnecessary difficulties. I think computationalism entails that the physical reality *is* infinite, though, but again, physics is part of the phenomenology. We need to assume only one universal machinery, and we cannot assume more in the ontology, as the phenomenology should justify the role of the infinities all by itself. Bruno > > > -- > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Dr Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > Principal, High Performance Coders > Visiting Senior Research Fellow [email protected] > Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
