> On 5 Aug 2018, at 19:50, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, August 5, 2018 at 4:43:21 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 4 Aug 2018, at 23:32, agrays...@gmail.com <javascript:> wrote:
>> 
>> AFAIK, no one has ever observed a probability wave, from which I conclude 
>> the wave function has only epistemic content.
> 
> 
> Then you need to explain how that epistemic content interfere in nature. Your 
> idea might make sense, and indeed if we believe in a collapse (as you have to 
> do if you believe in QM and that the superposition does not apply to us) the 
> idea that consciousness collapse the wave is perhaps the less ridiculous 
> idea. That idea has indeed be defended by von Neumann, Wigner, and some 
> others. But has been shown to lead to many difficulties when taken seriously 
> by Abner Shimony, as well guessed by Wigner itself. Obviously that idea would 
> be inconsistent with Mechanism.
> 
> Easy to show that consciousness doesn't collapse the wf. Just do repeated 
> trials and don't look at the screen until the experiment is finished.

The idea that consciousness collapses the wave is that the wave is described by 
a sum of two waves which are the one diffracted by the two slits. The *final* 
probability is the square of the amplitude on that screen, and the absence of 
particles ever on some part of the screen is due to the destructive 
interference of the wave. We have a superposition, and it works because I have 
not been conscious of which path the particle has chosen. It is the 
unconsciousness of which hole took the electron which interferes in this 
picture, and consciousness which select the eigenstate in its favourite base.

The idea is that if I look at u + d, QM describes that as O(u+d) = O u + O d. 
The collapse is the inference that [1/sqrt(2)Ou + 1/sqrt(2)Od] collapses into 
either Ou or Od with a probability (1/sqrt(2)^2. Everett is the theory that 
there is no collapse, and it explains why the observer O will still describes 
in its diary something like a collapse, using Mechanism (identifying a person 
with its personal memory sequences of experiences, like looking at a particle 
state)..

I think more and more that the appellation “Relativise state theory” is better 
that many-worlds, because the notion of worlds is more tricky to defined than 
the word “state”.

With mechanism we know at the start that the notion of world does not make 
sense, there are only relative sharable dreams.


> I forget; what is mechanism? AG 


It is the hypothesis/theory/assumption that it exists a level of description of 
your brain, or body (including any finite part of the environment if you 
insist), such that a digital emulation executed by some physical computer, at 
that level, would support your consciousness and subjective life and character, 
etc. To simplify the reasoning I use often the brain metabolical level, 
allowing you to survive with a digital brain. My contribution is that entails 
you do survive also in the arithmetical reality, and that we have to explain 
the origin of the wave trough a Pythagorean theology, and the work of Gödel, 
Löb and Solovay provides exactly that, and the tests (the comparison between 
the theological physics of the universal Turing machine with the observation 
fits. The wave itself is a phenomenological first person plural product on the 
sum of all universal machine computations/dreams.

Let me describe you the possible progress in the field, 

I. Copenhagen: the assumptions are

1) the sigma_1 true propositions (a little part of arithmetic)
2) The SWE
3) a dualist unintelligible theory of mind

II. Everett: the assumptions are

1) the sigma_1 true propositions
2) The SWE
3) Mechanism

III) … and you can see this as a problem to solve, but the propositional parts 
can be shown offered on a plate by the (Löbian) Universal Machine:

1) the sigma_1 true propositions
2) Mechanism

Both the wave and the collapse should be (and is already up to further 
verifications) explained the origin of the universal wave. Eventually it is all 
in the head of all universal machine/machinery.

Do you know a programming language? If yes, an example of a universal machinery 
is provided by the enumeration of all programs in that programming language. 
Another example: the enumeration of all Turing machines. Another example: the 
enumeration of all combinators K S KK KS SK SS KKK K(KK) …, or the numbers 0 S0 
SS0 SSS0 SSSS0 …(S = successor here, nothing to do with the Starling S, I mean 
the combinator S).

Bruno


> 
> There is no probability waves. There is only an amplitude of probability 
> wave, and the weirdness is that we have strong indirect evidence that the 
> amplitude of that wave is as physically real as the particles that we can 
> observe, because the particle location is determined by that wave having 
> interfered like wave usually do. In particular, even if send one by one, the 
> particles will never been found where the wave interfere destructively, and 
> the pattern on the screen will reflect the number of holes, and their 
> disposition. 
> 
> It is OK to say that probability comes from ignorance, and that the wave 
> describe that ignorance, the extraordinary thing is then that  this ignorance 
> interfere independently of you.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> So I have embraced the "shut up and calculate" interpretation of the wave 
>> function.
> 
> 
> That can be wise. Nobody can enforce the search of the truth. It is 
> frustrating because we can’t be sure if we progress toward it or the 
> contrary, and it is shocking because truth always beat fictions.
> 
> 
> 
>> I also see a connection between the True Believers of the MWI, and Trump 
>> sycophants; they seem immune to simple facts, such as the foolishness of 
>> thinking copies of observers can occur, or be created, willy-nilly. AG
> 
> That remark deserves your point and diminish your credibility. It also 
> suggests that you are a “True Believer” in something.
> 
> Assuming Mechanism in cognitive science, you don’t need quantum mechanics to 
> understand that there are infinitely many relative computational states 
> corresponding to you here and now emulated by infinitely many universal 
> machines. Even without mechanism this is a theorem of arithmetic using only 
> Church thesis. With mechanism, we have to derive the “guessable wave" from a 
> statistics on those computations, and so we can test Mechanism if it leads to 
> more, or less extravaganza than Nature. It fits up to now. So with Mechanism, 
> we get the *appearance* of many interfering “worlds”, and this without any 
> worlds, from just the natural numbers and the laws of addition and 
> multiplication. I will show that with the combinators as it is much shorter 
> (but still long) than showing this with the numbers. This is known by 
> logicians since the 1930s (I mean that a universal Turing machine is an 
> arithmetical object). Computationalism, or Indexical Digital Mechanism 
> imposes a Many-Dreams internal interpretation of Arithmetic (or combinator 
> theory, or game-of-life theory, … we have to assume only one universal 
> machinery).
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
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