> On 6 Aug 2018, at 22:47, [email protected] wrote: > > > > On Monday, August 6, 2018 at 6:22:45 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 6 Aug 2018, at 09:23, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sunday, August 5, 2018 at 5:50:56 PM UTC, [email protected] >> <http://gmail.com/> wrote: >> >> >> On Sunday, August 5, 2018 at 4:43:21 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 4 Aug 2018, at 23:32, [email protected] <> wrote: >>> >>> AFAIK, no one has ever observed a probability wave, from which I conclude >>> the wave function has only epistemic content. >> >> >> Then you need to explain how that epistemic content interfere in nature. >> Your idea might make sense, and indeed if we believe in a collapse (as you >> have to do if you believe in QM and that the superposition does not apply to >> us) the idea that consciousness collapse the wave is perhaps the less >> ridiculous idea. That idea has indeed be defended by von Neumann, Wigner, >> and some others. But has been shown to lead to many difficulties when taken >> seriously by Abner Shimony, as well guessed by Wigner itself. Obviously that >> idea would be inconsistent with Mechanism. >> >> Easy to show that consciousness doesn't collapse the wf. Just do repeated >> trials and don't look at the screen until the experiment is finished. I >> forget; what is mechanism? AG >> >> There is no probability waves. >> >> IIUC, the wf has the mathematical form of a wave, of which the amplitude is >> part of. AG > > The point is that it behave also like a wave. Even if I send only one > particle, the position of the screen is determine by a wave which take into > account all physical available path. > > You have proposed an instrumentalist interpretation, and that is OK if you > goal is to build microscopic transistor or atomic bombs. Here we try to make > sense of a theory. The choice is between a non-local guiding potential, the > relative states or a (magical) collapse, also non local. > > > >> >> There is only an amplitude of probability wave, and the weirdness is that we >> have strong indirect evidence that the amplitude of that wave is as >> physically real as the particles that we can observe, because the particle >> location is determined by that wave having interfered like wave usually do. >> In particular, even if send one by one, the particles will never been found >> where the wave interfere destructively, and the pattern on the screen will >> reflect the number of holes, and their disposition. >> >> The fact that the wf gives information about the constructive and >> destructive inference pattern on the screen, say, is within the meaning of >> having an epistemic property. > > Not at all. It is based on inter-observer sharable documentation. The whole > mystery is in the double slit, or all the many-slits elaboration, like the > “joke” of Feynman asking what if we put slit everywhere. >> If you want to claim it has ontic property, you need to define what that >> means. AG > > That it predicts result sharable by many people, who can then repeat the > experience, and see indeed that te arrival or non arrival of one election > depend on the sum of the amplitude of the happening events relative to > sharable device and device plan. > > Epistemic has this property.You haven't distinguished epistemic from ontic.
I did, but perhaps you have other definitions. You might give them for proceeding. > If you want to know what's "real", or ontic, compare an EM wave with a > probability wave. In the former case it can be detected when it passes, say > with an antenna, in the latter case not. The “probability wave” can de detected by the interference fringe. > No device exists that can detect a probability wave when it passes. AG Two slits or an interferometer do that all the time. That is why we postulate the wave to begin with. I really insist that you bought the little book by David Albert “Quantum Mechanics and Experience” (Harvard University Press, 1992). That would be a good base to progress in the discussion. Bruno > > If this contains epistemic (and it does with mechanism), that epistemic part > can share the fact that some happening, and perhaps all, is a sum on > infinitely many virtual path. With mechanism, there might still be too much > parts, but that is testable. > > Bruno > > > > >> >> It is OK to say that probability comes from ignorance, and that the wave >> describe that ignorance, the extraordinary thing is then that this >> ignorance interfere independently of you. >>> So I have embraced the "shut up and calculate" interpretation of the wave >>> function. >> That can be wise. Nobody can enforce the search of the truth. It is >> frustrating because we can’t be sure if we progress toward it or the >> contrary, and it is shocking because truth always beat fictions. >>> I also see a connection between the True Believers of the MWI, and Trump >>> sycophants; they seem immune to simple facts, such as the foolishness of >>> thinking copies of observers can occur, or be created, willy-nilly. AG >> That remark deserves your point and diminish your credibility. It also >> suggests that you are a “True Believer” in something. >> >> Assuming Mechanism in cognitive science, you don’t need quantum mechanics to >> understand that there are infinitely many relative computational states >> corresponding to you here and now emulated by infinitely many universal >> machines. Even without mechanism this is a theorem of arithmetic using only >> Church thesis. With mechanism, we have to derive the “guessable wave" from a >> statistics on those computations, and so we can test Mechanism if it leads >> to more, or less extravaganza than Nature. It fits up to now. So with >> Mechanism, we get the *appearance* of many interfering “worlds”, and this >> without any worlds, from just the natural numbers and the laws of addition >> and multiplication. I will show that with the combinators as it is much >> shorter (but still long) than showing this with the numbers. This is known >> by logicians since the 1930s (I mean that a universal Turing machine is an >> arithmetical object). Computationalism, or Indexical Digital Mechanism >> imposes a Many-Dreams internal interpretation of Arithmetic (or combinator >> theory, or game-of-life theory, … we have to assume only one universal >> machinery). >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] <>. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] <>. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >> <javascript:>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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