On Monday, August 6, 2018 at 6:22:45 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 6 Aug 2018, at 09:23, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: > > > > On Sunday, August 5, 2018 at 5:50:56 PM UTC, [email protected] wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sunday, August 5, 2018 at 4:43:21 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 4 Aug 2018, at 23:32, [email protected] wrote: >>> >>> AFAIK, no one has ever observed a probability wave, from which I >>> conclude the wave function has only epistemic content. >>> >>> >>> >>> Then you need to explain how that epistemic content interfere in nature. >>> Your idea might make sense, and indeed if we believe in a collapse (as you >>> have to do if you believe in QM and that the superposition does not apply >>> to us) the idea that consciousness collapse the wave is perhaps the less >>> ridiculous idea. That idea has indeed be defended by von Neumann, Wigner, >>> and some others. But has been shown to lead to many difficulties when taken >>> seriously by Abner Shimony, as well guessed by Wigner itself. Obviously >>> that idea would be inconsistent with Mechanism. >>> >> >> *Easy to show that consciousness doesn't collapse the wf. Just do >> repeated trials and don't look at the screen until the experiment is >> finished. I forget; what is mechanism? AG * >> >>> >>> There is no probability waves. >>> >> > > *IIUC, the wf has the mathematical form of a wave, of which the amplitude > is part of. AG* > > > The point is that it behave also like a wave. Even if I send only one > particle, the position of the screen is determine by a wave which take into > account all physical available path. > > You have proposed an instrumentalist interpretation, and that is OK if you > goal is to build microscopic transistor or atomic bombs. Here we try to > make sense of a theory. The choice is between a non-local guiding > potential, the relative states or a (magical) collapse, also non local. > > > > > > >> There is only an amplitude of probability wave, and the weirdness is that >>> we have strong indirect evidence that the amplitude of that wave is as >>> physically real as the particles that we can observe, because the particle >>> location is determined by that wave having interfered like wave usually do. >>> In particular, even if send one by one, the particles will never been found >>> where the wave interfere destructively, and the pattern on the screen will >>> reflect the number of holes, and their disposition. >>> >> > *The fact that the wf gives information about the constructive and > destructive inference pattern on the screen, say, is within the meaning of > having an epistemic property. * > > > Not at all. It is based on inter-observer sharable documentation. The > whole mystery is in the double slit, or all the many-slits elaboration, > like the “joke” of Feynman asking what if we put slit everywhere. > > *If you want to claim it has ontic property, you need to define what that > means. AG* > > > That it predicts result sharable by many people, who can then repeat the > experience, and see indeed that te arrival or non arrival of one election > depend on the sum of the amplitude of the happening events relative to > sharable device and device plan. >
*Epistemic has this property.You haven't distinguished epistemic from ontic. If you want to know what's "real", or ontic, compare an EM wave with a probability wave. In the former case it can be detected when it passes, say with an antenna, in the latter case not. No device exists that can detect a probability wave when it passes. AG* > > If this contains epistemic (and it does with mechanism), that epistemic > part can share the fact that some happening, and perhaps all, is a sum on > infinitely many virtual path. With mechanism, there might still be too much > parts, but that is testable. > > Bruno > > > > > >>> It is OK to say that probability comes from ignorance, and that the wave >>> describe that ignorance, the extraordinary thing is then that this >>> ignorance interfere independently of you. >>> >>> So I have embraced the "shut up and calculate" interpretation of the >>> wave function. >>> >>> That can be wise. Nobody can enforce the search of the truth. It is >>> frustrating because we can’t be sure if we progress toward it or the >>> contrary, and it is shocking because truth always beat fictions. >>> >>> I also see a connection between the True Believers of the MWI, and Trump >>> sycophants; they seem immune to simple facts, such as the foolishness of >>> thinking copies of observers can occur, or be created, willy-nilly. AG >>> >>> That remark deserves your point and diminish your credibility. It also >>> suggests that you are a “True Believer” in something. >>> >>> Assuming Mechanism in cognitive science, you don’t need quantum >>> mechanics to understand that there are infinitely many relative >>> computational states corresponding to you here and now emulated by >>> infinitely many universal machines. Even without mechanism this is a >>> theorem of arithmetic using only Church thesis. With mechanism, we have to >>> derive the “guessable wave" from a statistics on those computations, and so >>> we can test Mechanism if it leads to more, or less extravaganza than >>> Nature. It fits up to now. So with Mechanism, we get the *appearance* of >>> many interfering “worlds”, and this without any worlds, from just the >>> natural numbers and the laws of addition and multiplication. I will show >>> that with the combinators as it is much shorter (but still long) than >>> showing this with the numbers. This is known by logicians since the 1930s >>> (I mean that a universal Turing machine is an arithmetical object). >>> Computationalism, or Indexical Digital Mechanism imposes a Many-Dreams >>> internal interpretation of Arithmetic (or combinator theory, or >>> game-of-life theory, … we have to assume only one universal machinery). >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >>> >>> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <javascript:>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
