From: *Bruno Marchal* <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>


If there is a FTL physical influence, even if there is no information transfer possible, it leads to big problems with any reality interpretation of special relativity, notably well described by Maudlin. Maudlin agrees that many-mind restore locality, and its “many-mind” theory is close to what I think Everett had in mind, and is close to what I defended already from the mechanist hypothesis. To be sure, Albert and Lower Many-Minds assumes an infinity of mind for one body, where in mechanism we got an infinity of relative body for one mind, but the key issue is that all measurement outcomes belongs to some mind. The measurement splits locally the observers, and propagate at subliminal speed.

I don't think that the many-minds interpretation is really what you would want to support. In many-minds, the physical body is always in the superposition of all possible results, but the 'mind' can never be in such a superposition, so stochastically chooses to record only one definite result from the mix. In the Wikipedia article on the many-minds interpretation, the following comment might be relevant for you:

"Finally, [many-minds] supposes that there is some physical distinction between a conscious observer and a non-conscious measuring device, so it seems to require eliminating thestrong Church–Turing hypothesis <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church%E2%80%93Turing_thesis#Philosophical_implications>or postulating a physical model for consciousness."

If machines can do something that the mind cannot do (viz., be in a superposition of all possible results, when the mind cannot participate in any such superposition), the Church-Turing thesis goes out the window -- and you might not want to say "Yes, Doctor".

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