On Wed, Aug 08, 2018 at 09:39:06AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > From: Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> > > > If there is a FTL physical influence, even if there is no information > transfer possible, it leads to big problems with any reality > interpretation > of special relativity, notably well described by Maudlin. Maudlin agrees > that many-mind restore locality, and its “many-mind” theory is close to > what I think Everett had in mind, and is close to what I defended already > from the mechanist hypothesis. To be sure, Albert and Lower Many-Minds > assumes an infinity of mind for one body, where in mechanism we got an > infinity of relative body for one mind, but the key issue is that all > measurement outcomes belongs to some mind. The measurement splits locally > the observers, and propagate at subliminal speed. > > > I don't think that the many-minds interpretation is really what you would want > to support. In many-minds, the physical body is always in the superposition of > all possible results, but the 'mind' can never be in such a superposition, so > stochastically chooses to record only one definite result from the mix. In the > Wikipedia article on the many-minds interpretation, the following comment > might > be relevant for you: > > "Finally, [many-minds] supposes that there is some physical distinction > between > a conscious observer and a non-conscious measuring device, so it seems to > require eliminating the strong Church–Turing hypothesis or postulating a > physical model for consciousness."
It seems this final sentence contradicts earlier statements, such as " Nonetheless, it is not what we experience within physical reality. Albert and Loewer argue that the mind must be intrinsically different than the physical reality as described by quantum theory.[6] " > > If machines can do something that the mind cannot do (viz., be in a > superposition of all possible results, when the mind cannot participate in any > such superposition), the Church-Turing thesis goes out the window -- and you > might not want to say "Yes, Doctor". "Yes, Doctor" appears to wrap up the idea that the computational mind cannot be in superposition of mind states, supporting Albert and Loewer's position over that of primitive physical supervenience. Nevertheless, physical supervenience can be rescued in a weaker form (as I argue it must) of mind supervenience on phenomenal physics (experienced physics of the observer). This goes to the heart of JC and BM's argument over UDA step 3. Helsinki guy does not experience a superposition of Moscow and Washington, but one or the other. I do not follow the comment for why the strong CT thesis (aka Deutsch's Turing tropic principle) needs to be abandoned, though. The only additional feature of the phenomenal physics is the existence of random oracles, which does not enlarge the class of computable functions, as an old paper by Shannon showed. -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Dr Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellow [email protected] Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
