On Tue, Aug 7, 2018 at 6:39 PM Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
> From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> > > > If there is a FTL physical influence, even if there is no information > transfer possible, it leads to big problems with any reality interpretation > of special relativity, notably well described by Maudlin. Maudlin agrees > that many-mind restore locality, and its “many-mind” theory is close to > what I think Everett had in mind, and is close to what I defended already > from the mechanist hypothesis. To be sure, Albert and Lower Many-Minds > assumes an infinity of mind for one body, where in mechanism we got an > infinity of relative body for one mind, but the key issue is that all > measurement outcomes belongs to some mind. The measurement splits locally > the observers, and propagate at subliminal speed. > > > I don't think that the many-minds interpretation is really what you would > want to support. In many-minds, the physical body is always in the > superposition of all possible results, but the 'mind' can never be in such > a superposition, so stochastically chooses to record only one definite > result from the mix. In the Wikipedia article on the many-minds > interpretation, the following comment might be relevant for you: > The mind is implemented by a classical computation (computed by the brain which is a classical computer). Brain states don't interfere because the brain is a macroscopic object. I think it is incorrect to say the mind choose to record one definite result, because there is an infinity of minds, and each possible result is recorded (by at least one of the infinity of minds). > > "Finally, [many-minds] supposes that there is some physical distinction > between a conscious observer and a non-conscious measuring device, > While there may be a distinction, I think its a mistake to call it is a physical distinction. Or at least, calling this a physical distinction can easily lead to confusion. I would say that the distinction is between non-physical entities (mind) and and physical (not mind) rather than between an observer and a measuring device, as both are physical objects. Mind (consciousness), however, is non-physical in that it is more accurately described as a computational/arithmetical/mathematical notion. It is the difference between a story and a book. A story is non physical, as it is abstract and informational, a book is however physical. A mind has no physical location, mass, energy, etc., a brain does. > so it seems to require eliminating the strong Church–Turing hypothesis > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church%E2%80%93Turing_thesis#Philosophical_implications> > or postulating a physical model for consciousness." > I don't see how this follows. Could you explain? > > If machines can do something that the mind cannot do (viz., be in a > superposition of all possible results, when the mind cannot participate in > any such superposition), the Church-Turing thesis goes out the window -- > and you might not want to say "Yes, Doctor". > Brains and bodies can be in superpositions, a conscious state, however cannot be. It is self-contained and accessible to only one point of view. This doesn't effect the Church-Turing thesis, as far as I can see. The Church-Turing thesis is about what a computer can compute, not what can perceive itself to be in a superposition. I would say if a measuring device could read itself, it too would never see itself to in a superposition. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
