From: *Russell Standish* <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>
On Wed, Aug 08, 2018 at 09:39:06AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> From: Bruno Marchal <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>
>
>
> If there is a FTL physical influence, even if there is no
information
> transfer possible, it leads to big problems with any reality
interpretation
> of special relativity, notably well described by Maudlin.
Maudlin agrees
> that many-mind restore locality, and its “many-mind” theory is
close to
> what I think Everett had in mind, and is close to what I
defended already
> from the mechanist hypothesis. To be sure, Albert and Lower
Many-Minds
> assumes an infinity of mind for one body, where in mechanism we
got an
> infinity of relative body for one mind, but the key issue is
that all
> measurement outcomes belongs to some mind. The measurement
splits locally
> the observers, and propagate at subliminal speed.
>
>
> I don't think that the many-minds interpretation is really what you
would want
> to support. In many-minds, the physical body is always in the
superposition of
> all possible results, but the 'mind' can never be in such a
superposition, so
> stochastically chooses to record only one definite result from the
mix. In the
> Wikipedia article on the many-minds interpretation, the following
comment might
> be relevant for you:
>
> "Finally, [many-minds] supposes that there is some physical
distinction between
> a conscious observer and a non-conscious measuring device, so it
seems to
> require eliminating the strong Church–Turing hypothesis or postulating a
> physical model for consciousness."
It seems this final sentence contradicts earlier statements, such as
I think there is an implied bracketing of the last two points; i.e.,
eliminating BOTH the strong CT thesis AND a physical model for
consciousness.
"Nonetheless, it is not what we experience within physical reality.
Albert and Loewer argue that the mind must be intrinsically different
than the physical reality as described by quantum theory.[6] "
>
> If machines can do something that the mind cannot do (viz., be in a
> superposition of all possible results, when the mind cannot
participate in any
> such superposition), the Church-Turing thesis goes out the window --
and you
> might not want to say "Yes, Doctor".
"Yes, Doctor" appears to wrap up the idea that the computational mind
cannot be in superposition of mind states, supporting Albert and
Loewer's position over that of primitive physical supervenience.
Nevertheless, physical supervenience can be rescued in a weaker form
(as I argue it must) of mind supervenience on phenomenal physics
(experienced physics of the observer).
That seems a bit circular.
This goes to the heart of JC and BM's argument over UDA step 3.
Helsinki guy does not experience a superposition of Moscow and
Washington, but one or the other.
I do not follow the comment for why the strong CT thesis (aka
Deutsch's Turing tropic principle) needs to be abandoned, though.
Possibly the idea that a machine can calculate anything that a human can
with pencil and paper. If the physical is in superposition but the mind
is not, this seems to make no sense.
However, I think that the problems with the many-minds interpretation is
that it ignores decoherence and the FAPP orthogonality of the superposed
states. Most many-minds interpretations that make any sense are just
re-workings of the standard many-worlds approach. E.g., Lockwood in BJPS
(1996).
Bruce
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