On Wed, Aug 08, 2018 at 11:09:37AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > From: Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au> > > > On Wed, Aug 08, 2018 at 09:39:06AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> > > > > > > If there is a FTL physical influence, even if there is no > information > > transfer possible, it leads to big problems with any reality > interpretation > > of special relativity, notably well described by Maudlin. Maudlin > agrees > > that many-mind restore locality, and its “many-mind” theory is close > to > > what I think Everett had in mind, and is close to what I defended > already > > from the mechanist hypothesis. To be sure, Albert and Lower > Many-Minds > > assumes an infinity of mind for one body, where in mechanism we got > an > > infinity of relative body for one mind, but the key issue is that > all > > measurement outcomes belongs to some mind. The measurement splits > locally > > the observers, and propagate at subliminal speed. > > > > > > I don't think that the many-minds interpretation is really what you > would > want > > to support. In many-minds, the physical body is always in the > superposition of > > all possible results, but the 'mind' can never be in such a > superposition, so > > stochastically chooses to record only one definite result from the mix. > In the > > Wikipedia article on the many-minds interpretation, the following > comment > might > > be relevant for you: > > > > "Finally, [many-minds] supposes that there is some physical distinction > between > > a conscious observer and a non-conscious measuring device, so it seems > to > > require eliminating the strong Church–Turing hypothesis or postulating a > > physical model for consciousness." > > It seems this final sentence contradicts earlier statements, such as > > > I think there is an implied bracketing of the last two points; i.e., > eliminating BOTH the strong CT thesis AND a physical model for consciousness. >
Although the actual word used is or, rather than and. Perhaps one could keep one or other hypothesis. IIUC, the strong CT thesis referred to above is the thesis that the universe _is_ a computation, aka "digital physics". This thesis rules out the presence of random oracles (all seemingly random source (eg beta decay) will turn out to have an underlying computable algorithm). As Bruno points out, a corollory of the UDA is that random oracles must exist, therefore computationalism is incompatible with the strong CT thesis. The same considerations apply with many minds, or even various other many worlds interpretations AFAICS. "Physical model of consciousness" is a bit ambiguous - I can only interpret this as physical supervenience. ISTM phenomenal physical supervenience is a required feature of reality, but primitive physical supervenience may well be incompatible with computationalism (Bruno's argument), or possibly even just plain incoherent - a suspicion I think I share with Brent. > > > "Nonetheless, it is not what we experience within physical reality. Albert > and Loewer argue that the mind must be intrinsically different than the > physical reality as described by quantum theory.[6] " > > > > > > If machines can do something that the mind cannot do (viz., be in a > > superposition of all possible results, when the mind cannot participate > in any > > such superposition), the Church-Turing thesis goes out the window -- and > you > > might not want to say "Yes, Doctor". > > "Yes, Doctor" appears to wrap up the idea that the computational mind > cannot be in superposition of mind states, supporting Albert and Loewer's > position over that of primitive physical supervenience. Nevertheless, > physical supervenience can be rescued in a weaker form (as I argue it > must) > of mind supervenience on phenomenal physics (experienced physics of the > observer). > > > That seems a bit circular. > Why is it circular? > > > This goes to the heart of JC and BM's argument over UDA step 3. Helsinki > guy does not experience a superposition of Moscow and Washington, but one > or the other. > > I do not follow the comment for why the strong CT thesis (aka Deutsch's > Turing tropic principle) needs to be abandoned, though. > > > Possibly the idea that a machine can calculate anything that a human can with > pencil and paper. If the physical is in superposition but the mind is not, > this > seems to make no sense. > > However, I think that the problems with the many-minds interpretation is that > it ignores decoherence and the FAPP orthogonality of the superposed states. > Most many-minds interpretations that make any sense are just re-workings of > the > standard many-worlds approach. E.g., Lockwood in BJPS (1996). > Well it is more that it is an orthogonal issue. Decoherence provides a physical model for why the multiverse foliates into distinct worlds, FAPP. IMHO, this provides the physical mechanism underpinning what I call the "projection postulate", ie that the mind is not in superposition. It will support the phenomenal physical supervenience of the mind. But it won't be the end of the story with respect to what mind is, otherwise we will need to attribute personhood to geiger counters, voltmeters and so on. -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Dr Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellow hpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
